Transhuman Traditionalism

The Historicism and Providence of Middle-Earth

2012-01-15T07:00:00.000-08:00

The Historicism and Providence of Middle-Earth, Third Draft

by Ryan Haecker

[This is the third draft of an essay on the historicism of Middle-Earth. It is 6,000 words and 15 pages in length. Please send any comments or criticisms you may have to rhryanhaecker@gmail.com. I will make final revisions and corrections before submitting the essay for publication.]

J.R.R. Tolkien's mythopoeia is a philosophical enterprise in-and-through the vehicle of myth. In the essay On Faerie Stories Tolkien acknowledges the essential limitation of propositions, or "a net of words" to describe "the nature of Faërie."[1] In response to the limitations of words and propositions, Tolkien like Plato employs the power myth to let fly the encumbered imagination:[2] "Creative fantasy, because it is mainly trying to do something else (make something new), may open your hoard and let all the locked things fly away like cage-birds."[3] Tolkien shares in Plato's purpose of humbling his reader to re-conceive of those things which they had presumed to know; not through a dialectical contradiction of ideas, but through fantastic myth-making which illustrates the mystery and majesty of being.[4] By entering the sub-created world of Middle-Earth, the readers' idea of being, which has hitherto been dominated by the understanding, is intruded upon by novelties of mystery and majesty: mystery interrupts the readers' explanatory ratiocinations and majesty summons forth their latent powers of imagination. The enchantment of imagination, rather than the speculative understanding of ideas, is the philosophic end of Tolkien's mythopoeia. This philosophic end of enchantment is to inspire readers with a sense of wonder and humility towards being.[5] This is achieved through the dramatic interplay of history and myth which become inseparably united for the reader's imagination in the sub-created world of Middle-Earth.

The mythopoeia of J.R.R. Tolkien describes the history of thesub-created cosmos of Eä. A sub-created world is an idea of a secondary world which has been imaginatively created through the intellective powers of creatures, or through the minds of created beings within the primary world. As the mythopoeia of Middle-Earth is said to transpire in the distant past and is yet disclosed to the present through the Red Book of Westmarch, we may understand that Tolkien intended to problematize the boundary between the primary and the secondary world - between history and myth.[6] Through the sub-created interplay of history and myth, the conceptual boundary between the primary and the secondary world becomes porous and permeable. As a consequence, the secondary world may through the activity of the reader's imagination exert some influence upon the reader's idea of history and reality, and thus inspire the reader with an enchanted appreciation of the primary world.

The theme of the history in Tolkien's mythopoeia rests beneath the panoply of sights and sounds, like a barely discernible baritone which blasts its horn in the recollections of stories and songs. Historical remembrances of antique things pierce through the panoply of the present, peek into the narrative, to enchant the imagination of the reader. As the Lord of the Rings develops from the initial intrigues of Hobbiton to a global strategic conflict for the future of Middle Earth, the reader finds the limited ordeals of the Fellowship to be merely a microcosm of the universal historical drama of Middle Earth. The overthrow of Sauron appears to bring a conclusive end to the cosmic theogany of Eä - a battle amongst the gods which began before the creation of Middle-Earth and the cosmos of Eä. The theogany of Eä, between the rebellious servants of Dark Lord and the faithful Children of Ilúvatar, had its conception amidst the angelic Ainur before the creation of the cosmos and had thereafter continued cyclically and intermittently throughout the whole history Middle-Earth. As the historical drama of the Third Age draws to its conclusion, its part within the symbolic concert rises to a crescendo, and the historicism of Middle-Earth is heard to contribute a central theme to the sub-created movement of mankind's providential restoration.

In the Third Age of Middle-Earth there appear many modern themes, such as industrialism, eugenics and scientific rationalism, which both allude to the distinctive characteristics of the modern world as well as its unique historical perspective. In the Third Age the characters of The Lord of the Ringsperceive the history of Middle-Earth from a similar late historical perspective as we children of modernity have upon our past. If the First Age recalls an antediluvian or Homeric era of springtime Elves and heroic first Men, and the Second Age bespeaks of a classical age of expansive empires, then the Third Age more resembles a dissolute age of pygmies rather than of heroes and of social decline rather than of imperial grandeur. In consideration of this late historical perspective,the Lord of the Rings can be read as a distinctly modern myth whose splendid achievement was to have replied to our contemporary intellectual burdens of rationalism, scientism and disenchantment with a majestic mythical history of Middle-Earth.

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Footnotes:
OFS = Tolkien's essay "On Fairy Stories"

[1] OFS: "The definition of a fairy-story—what it is, or what it should be—does not, then, depend on any definition or historical account of elf or fairy, but upon the nature of Faërie: the Perilous Realm itself, and the air that blows in that country. I will not attempt to define that, nor to describe it directly. It cannot be done. Faërie cannot be caught in a net of words; for it is one of its qualities to be indescribable, though not imperceptible."

[2] Seung, T.K. Methods of Philosophy: "Thus Plato’s philosophy has turned out to be a heavy mixture of dialectical science and poetry. The dialectical method performs only the negative (critical) function of his philosophy, but its positive function is left for the poetic method."

[3] OFS p.23: This is an allusion to Plato's dialogue the Theaetaetus in which Socrates describes ideas through the metaphor of birds in a cage.

[4] Nagy: “Saving the Myths: the Recreation of Mythology in Plato and Tolkien.” p. 82: "[Plato] used myth, not only by way of interpretation and reflection, but even by writing some myths himself, assigning to them an important part in his dialogs." "Like Tolkien, he gives thought to myth, transforming and reshaping it to suit his purposes. Both authors stand in a tradition of relating to myth, which they both knew they could not disregard... integrating myth into their own inventory of discourses."

[5] McPartland p.15: "The sense of wonder is openness to what is beyond the everyday, a marvel at things beyond... Aristotle, we might recall, identifies wonder as the source of all science, especially the highest science, namely wisdom, and can see ―the lover of myth as in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1.1, 980a, 1.2, 982b18)"

[6] OFS p.15: "Of course the borders between them are often fluctuating or confused; but that is not only true for children. We all know the differences in kind, but we are not always sure how to place anything that we hear."

An Idealist Interpretation of Revolutionary Girl Utena, 2nd Draft

2011-11-12T07:27:00.000-08:00

Introduction to the Setting of the Ohtori Academy

"Revolutionary Girl Utena" is a shōjo, or 'magical girl', animated series which presents the adventures of a tomboyish girl, Utena Tenjou and her ambition to become a prince. The series is set at the prestigious Ohtori Academy for teenage students. The Ohtori Academy is apparently ruled by a Student Council of tremendous authority and self-importance, whose five select members wear a rose-seal ring and are uniquely permitted to enter the forbidden forest dueling arena. The Student Council is directed by a succession of letters mailed from the mysterious "End of the World", whose millenarian instructions are said will soon bring about the about the "World Revolution". The Academy is richly decorated in French fantasy-gothic architecture, stained-glass windows, and accompanied by grandiose organ music. French ornament, letters and Empire-style costumes are continually employed throughout the series, lending the Academy a classical north-European motif (at one point in the series, a teacher mentions there is a sister-school in the Netherlands). The geographic dislocation of this foreign occidental design hints at the spacio-temporal dislocation of the setting. Through a baffling variety of surreal psychosexual imagery and supernatural occurrences "Revolutionary Girl Utena" continuously destabilizes a coherent or literal interpretation of the characters and themes. For this reason, "Revolutionary Girl Utena" has been described as an example of a post-modernist fairy-tale.

You are welcome to download full-length PDF through this weblink:
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Mike and the Rose Bride from Episode 5, "the Sunlit Garden"(4:45)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_n8HvsIadv0

Utena and Juri duel in Episode 7, "Unfulfilled Juri"(3:27)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbX59Xqmw6E

Indecision at the End of the World in Episode 37, "the One to Revolutionize the World"(2:25)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=02_HXCERB-0

Life and Desire in Self-Consciousness of the Phenomenology of Spirit

2011-11-12T07:18:00.001-08:00

by Ryan Haecker

The first three sections of G.W.F. Hegel’s the Phenomenology of Spirit fall under the heading A. Consciousness, while the fourth section begins with the heading B. Self-Consciousness. In the phenomenological dialectic of Consciousness, the protagonist of the narrative had sought to achieve certain knowledge of the object of consciousness. This protagonist had investigated an object of knowledge which was supposed to exist independently and be other than itself. In the section on Self-Consciousness, Hegel begins with the intention to transition from the narrative of Consciousness to a new stage in which the phenomenological protagonist can achieve his knowledge of the object of self-consciousness through embodied actions upon the cosmos. Hegel writes in the beginning of Self-Consciousness that the “notion” (a concept which is incompletely developed) has been shown to “vanish” in the phenomenological dialectic of Consciousness.

In the previous modes of certainty what is true for consciousness is something other than itself. But the notion of this truth vanishes in the experience of it. (*PoS par. 166) Hegel believes himself to have shown in the preceding chapters that those objects previously known to Consciousness had been merely “moments” of consciousness whose untruth has been revealed. In Self-Consciousness he continues to investigate the truth of self-consciousness in an embodied social realm.

Hegel can say, in proposing the topic he is to explain and justify, that the “being” of sense-certainty, the “universality” of perception, and the “empty inner being of the understanding” are now no longer “essences” but are to be understood as “moments of self-conciousness” (Pippin 1989 p. 145)

But now there has arisen what did not emerge in these previous relationships [ofConsciousness], viz a certainty which is identical with its truth; for the certainty is to itself its own object and consciousness is to itself the truth. (PoS par. 166)

Henceforth the protagonist of the phenomenological dialectic of Self-Consciousness will investigate both the subject and the object, or the notion and the object, as these are beheld by self-consciousness.

If we call Notion what the object is in itself, but call object what it is qua object or for an other, then it is clear that being-in-itself and being-for-an-other are one and the same. (PoS par. 166)

[Self-consciousness] is characterized by a reflection not on the structure of the things about which we are conscious, but on the structure of our conscious attending and takings themselves. (Pinkard 1994 p.146)

Consciousness has now become a reflective self-consciousness which knows that both the self and the other are simultaneously beheld for and within itself. Hegel claims that this model of self-consciousness has preserved all of those epistemological faculties which had characterized the preceding dialectical movements, and has thereby come to resemble the native powers of the human mind.

With self-consciousness, then, we have therefore entered the native realm of truth. If we consider this new shape of knowing, the knowing itself, in relation to that which preceded, viz. the knowing other, then we see that though this other has indeed vanished, its moments have at the same time no less been preserved, and the loss consists in this, that here they are present as they are in themselves. (PoS par. 167)

The truth which self-consciousness begins to investigate is not an independent object but an apprehension of the unity of itself, the self-conscious subject, with the object of its investigation. However apprehension of the object, and the truth for self-consciousness, has yet to be realized because the cosmos has not yet been investigated. Nor has the truth of this object, the cosmos, become known to the subject. This curiosity of the subject to know and act upon its object is described by Hegel as the Desire of self-consciousness.

The truth, viz. the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is Desire in general… In this sphere, self-consciousness exhibits itself as the movement in which this antithesis is removed and the identity of itself with itself becomes explicit for it. (PoS par. 167)

Self-consciousness now desires to overcome the epistemic division between the subject and the object of knowledge. Self-Consciousness aspires to unite its object within itself through knowledge and action. Although the subject acts upon the material within the field of perception, the unity of the subject with its object is intelligibly apprehended as an ideal relation of subject and object within self-consciousness.

Hegel is also engaged in an idealist reformulation of the notions of the practical, desire, life, and purposiveness and it is that transformation that, we shall see, helps explain the kind of dissatisfaction with the immediacy of desire that leads to the reintroduction of explicitly philosophical and theoretical considerations. (Pippin 1989 p.149)

As with the previous models of consciousness, self-consciousness applies a uniform epistemological method to its investigation of the object of the intelligible cosmos. The epistemological method in Self-Consciousness is a conceptual apprehension of the teleological relation of parts of the whole within a succession of living organisms.

Hegel seems initially here to be suggesting the beginning of his infamous spirit monism, the suppression of all apparent differences in a single organic, living whole. Hegel may be introducing here his own version of the romantic program we have discussed before, the Greek notion of a living, incarnated (but now self-conscious) Nature that he had so recently shared with Holderin and Schelling... As Poggeler succinctly puts it, at this point the Notion under consideration appears to be “everything that is basically is self-consciousness” [Poggeler 1973c, 248] (Pippin 1989 p.144)

The first object of self-consciousness investigation is nothing less than the entire cosmos as a living organism, or the essence of Life as a universal organism. To be "reflected into itself", or self-negating, is to distinguish parts are within the totality of the whole organism, or to organically live and grow.

…the object has become life. What self-consciousness distinguishes from itself as having being, also has in it, in so far as it is posited as being, not merely the character of sense-certainty and perception, but it is being that is reflected into itself, and the object of immediate desire is a living thing. (PoS par. 168)

In his characterization of Life Hegel adopts the Aristotelian notion of a teleological organism. He would later describe in the Encyclopedia Logic(¶ 204A) that Immanuel Kant had in the Critique of Teleological Judgement had effected a "resuscitation" of Aristotle's insights (Kreines, the Logic of Life 2008).

[Hegel is] trying to indicate by these notions a characterization of such a subjectivity borrowed loosely from Aristotle. A living being has its “principle of motion” within itself. Its purposiveness, its “leading” of its life, is not acquired but internal. (Pippin 1989 p.150)

Hegel defines the essence of Life as (i) a movement through which an organism differentiates parts from the whole within itself. This essential process of differentiation is the creation of organs as parts within the whole of the organism. Hegel describes this process as infinite because, rather than having been set in motion by the "external purposiveness" of an alien causal-agent, Life appears to be self-caused through the "inner purposiveness" of the organism itself (Kreines, the Logic of Life 2008). He believes Life to be uniquely the self-cause of its motions in time and self-organization of its parts in space.

Essence is infinity as the supersession of all distinctions, the pure movement of axial rotation, its self-repose being an absolutely restless infinity; independence itself, in which the differences of the movement are resolved, the simple essence of Time which, in this equality with itself, has the stable shape of Space. (PoS par. 169)

When Hegel wants to stress the empirical independence of such an autonomously self-determining categoriality, he invokes the notion of “infinity”, thought purely determining itself or even “revolving on its own axis.” (Pippin 1989 p.150)

A teleological organism contains within itself (ii) the essential power of Life’s “inner purposiveness” to grow, from germ to adult, towards the complete actualization of its mature and final end. Hegel describes growth in the same terms as (i) the self-differentiation of the parts of an organism because growth requires an organism to continually reproduce its parts within itself. Hegel describes growth as the infinite “dividedness’, “negation”, "supersession" or "sublation” of the organism in-itself.

It is this very flux as a self-identical independence which is itself an enduring existence, in which therefore, they are present as distinct members and parts existing on their own account. Being no longer has the significance of abstract being, nor has their pure essentiality the significance of abstract universality; on the contrary; their being is precisely that simple fluid substance of pure movement within itself… This substance, however, is infinite, and hence the shape in its very subsistence is a dividedness within itself, or the supersession of its being-for-itself. (PoS par. 169-170)

In a continuation of essential Life processes of (i) the self-differentiation of parts and (ii) growth, Hegel describes the emergence of independent organisms from the organic totality of the cosmos as the “separating-out” of an independent other from the “universal fluid medium”.

The independent members are for themselves… This independence of the shape appears as something determinate, for an other, for the shape is divided within itself; and the supersession of this dividedness accordingly takes place through an other... Life in the universal fluid medium, a passive separating-out of shapes becomes, just by so doing, a movement of those shapes or becomes Life as a process. The simple universal fluid medium is the in-itself, and the difference of the shapes is the other. (PoS par. 170-171)

[Footnote 13] The immediate sentiment of self thus introduced by life as a “shape of Spirit” allows Hegel to begin to discuss a number of elements crucial for his full theory of subjectivity. Life also involves a kind of “separation” of the subject from itself; it not only lives but must continue to pursue or lead its life; it is in a relation of independence and dependence with respect to its “other.” And it is not simply a living individual, but lives out the life of the species; its life reproduces in its general structure the life of the species, and even literally reproduces that “universal life.” (Pippin 1989 p.289)

To complete this speculative cosmogenesis of life Hegel describes an ontological inversion, similar to the inversion of perception and understanding described in Chapter 3, in which the greater complexity of the newly independent organisms allows them to devour, sublate and incorporate into themselves the passive medium of the organic cosmos from which they had emerged.

The simple universal fluid medium is the in-itself, and the difference of the shapes is the other. But this fluid medium itself becomes the other through this difference; for now it is for the difference which exists in and for itself, and consequently is the ceaseless movement by which this passive medium is consumed: Life as a living thing. (PoS par. 171)

The consumption of the passive medium of the cosmos by independent organisms is a practical satisfaction of Desire. Yet Hegel does not merely intend to refer to a Desire for material consumption. On the contrary, he intends Desire to be understood as (iii) a general relation of the subject towards its object in which the living subject seeks to possess, comprehend and assimilate the object into itself.

In Hegel’s language, such a subject, or living being, is simply and immediately “for itself” in its relation to objects. This means that it senses itself only in desiring, and that its other, objects of all kind, are object is simply to be negated, overcome, controlled, mastered. (Pippin 1989 p.150)

This relation of Desire, in which the subject masters and sublates its object, is the basis for the predation of Life in the natural world. The most superbly adapted organisms prey upon victims, which are then superseded and united within the more adapted organisms. Life is essentially characterized by (i) the potential for adaptive self-differentiation, (ii) an Aristotelian teleology of growth, and (iii) the predatory relation of the Desire of the subject towards its object. This adaptive, purposive organic process of continual sublation persists until the emergence of an organism with the power of continual sublation within itself- or a reflective self-consciousness which negates the object of its subjective consciousness.

On account of the independence of the object, therefore, it can achieve satisfaction only when the object itself effects the negation within itself; and it must carry out this negation of itself in itself, for it is in itself the negative, and must be for the other what it is. Since the object is in its own self negation, and it being so is at the same time independent, it is consciousness… this universal independent nature in which negation is present as absolute negation, is the genus as such, or the genus as self-consciousness. Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness. (PoS par. 175)

The self-conscious being which has emerged possesses both an organic body and a conscious mind. The nature of Self-consciousness is absolute negation because self-consciousness has as its essential power the potential for infinite self-negation, or the unceasing sublation of its object. Self-consciousness’s sublation of its object destroys the independence of this object as a thing-in-itself. In coming to know and control the thing-in-itself, the subject unites this object within itself so that the object no longer exists for itself, but only in and for self-consciousness. The Desire of self-consciousness is the aspiration for practical and intellectual mastery over its other through the sublation, apprehension, and domination of the entire organic cosmos within itself.

…self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness is Desire. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty, a certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner. (PoS par. 174)

We must understand the active pursuit of life, the overcoming of external objects as obstacles to life, or the use of them as means, and so their negation as independent. (Pippin 1989 p.151)

Yet when self-consciousness encounters another self-conscious being with comparable rational and practical autonomy, the particularity of its self-consciousness becomes known explicitly to the self-conscious subject through the apprehension of the property of self-consciousness in its object. The appearance of the doppelgänger self-consciousness makes the subject explicitly aware of its own existence as a particular self-consciousness in relation to the other self-conscious being.

A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only so is it in fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become explicit for it… the object of Desire, however, is only independent, for it is the universal indestructible substance, the fluid self-identical essence. A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much ‘I’ as ‘object’. With this, we already have before us the Notion of Spirit. (PoS par. 177)

The awareness of another self-consciousness is the beginning of the Notion of Spirit because through this awareness each self-consciousness becomes aware of the possibility of some knowledge for another self-consciousness which withheld from itself. The suspicion of some knowledge which is exclusively known to the other self-consciousness results in the subject’s Desire to sublate this exclusive knowledge through the sublation of the other self-consciousness. As each self-consciousness recognizes the other as the object of its Desire, each attempts to sublate the other within itself. This conflict precipitates the duel of self-consciousnesses in the famous Master-Slave dialectic ofLordship and Bondsman.

In the preceding chapters Hegel believed himself to have illustrated the impossibility of achieving direct knowledge of the world, or the truth of the object, through any possible epistemological method. In Self-Consciousness he will accordingly redirect the attention of the subject towards pragmatic action upon an object of knowledge within a social community of other self-conscious beings.

Hegel is [in the chapter on Self-Conciousness] carrying over the antirealist dimensions of the first three chapters into an explicit, full-blown anti-realism, pragmatism. Hegel appears to be saying that the problem of objectivity, of what we are willing to count as an objective claim in the first place, is the problem of the satisfaction of desire, that the “truth” is wholly relativized to pragmatic end. (Pippin 1989 p.148)

The duel of consciousnesses in Lordship and Bondage is the basic epistemological and practical relation of self-consciousness to another self-conscious being. What had inConsciousness been the private epistemological inquiry of its own object becomes in Self-Consciousness the organized social practice of a community to collectively inquire into their understanding of the cosmos.

[in self-consciousness] the pursuit of knowledge will, as a result of this chapter’s claims, be reconceived as participation in a social practice or institution, a rule governed, collective, teleological activity. (Pippin 1989 p.147)

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[This essay was written for Prof. Ian Proop's Seminar on G.W.F. Hegel's the Phenomenology of Spirit]

*PoS = the Phenomenology of Spirit

An Essay on the Theoretical Origin and Social Function of Modesty

2011-09-25T03:54:00.000-07:00

by Ryan Haecker

“How beautiful then is modesty and what a gem among virtues it is.” - St. Bernard of Clairvaux

A. The Concept of Modesty:

There are two connotations associated with the word modesty: the first (i) is that humility and undervaluation of oneself which pertains to ones abstract self-consciousness and the second (ii) is that restriction upon the exhibitions of natural features which pertains to the innate eroticism of the sexes. Julia Driver explains: "there is the sexual sense of modesty (ii), usually considered a womanly virtue, which primarily consists in a chaste and unassertive countenance. There is also the more usual sense (i) that is associated with self-deprecation, or an underestimation of one's self-worth."[1] These two connotations of 'modesty' are conceptually related, and must therefore be treated together: the second meaning (ii) which is actually manifested within social relations will be shown to be derived from the first meaning (i) which pertains to the abstract self-consciousness. The first meaning of 'modest' is the virtue of practical wisdom which Aristotle implicitly describes in the Nicomachean Ethics as the habit of choosing the mean between excessive and deficient public expression of one's self-worth. This 'modesty' of honoring oneself according to ones worth may be understood as the virtue of accurately appraising and expressing the worth of ones abstract self-consciousness. Aristotle writes:

"The man who judges himself worthy of great honors and is in fact unworthy is conceited... On the other hand, the man who thinks he deserves lesser honors than he deserves - whether the honors be great, ordinary, or little - is pusillanimous. This will be especially evident in one capable of splendid achievements... However, the magnanimous man holds an extreme in extension but a mean in appropriateness, for he thinks himself deserving in accord with his worth. Others exceed or fall short of this mean."[2]

Thus, according to Aristotle, a man practices the mean of modesty when he neither judges himself too highly (conceited) nor too meekly (pusillanimous), but moderates his practices between between excess and deficiency, always appraising himself according to what he truly deserves. The private judgment of a man whether he be conceited or pusillanimous may be visibly manifested whenever a man acts upon the world under the determination of this judgment: as the intellect is constituted by prior judgments, and actions are determined by the intellect, so the actions which manifest these judgments of our self-worth must be determined by the private judgments of the value of oneself. Thus this self-evaluation of the honors one deserves is expressed in a social setting, and is there elevated from the subjective appraisal of abstract self-consciousness to the public acclamation of ones value within an inter-subjective community. While this public acclamation of ones self-worth may be expressed through an inestimable variety of mediums, from propertied possessions to political positions, it ascends to a hazardous extremity in the exhibition of those natural features of the body which elicit the innate eroticism of the sexes.

The hazardousness of exhibiting these erotic natural features of our bodies is associated with the second sense (ii) of 'modesty' which is the moderation upon excessive public self-displays. This second sense (ii) manifests (i) the private valuation of abstract self-consciousness within an actual, public and social setting. This manifestation is likewise the actualization of the former abstract concept (i) in (ii) the social realm of inter-subjective experience (i => ii). Following the form of syllogistic deduction, (ii) the social manifestation of 'modesty' may be understood to be conceptually deduced from (i) the private evaluation of abstract self-consciousness, just as particular terms are deduced from universal terms.[3] For the syllogism, the concept of (i) abstract modesty is the universal term which is instantiated in the particular term, which is (ii) the actual realm of our social experience. Following this description, (ii) ‘modesty’ within a social setting is inexplicable outside of its deductive relation to (i) the abstract concept of modesty for self-consciousness. Due to the inexplicability of outside of its deductive relation to (i), ‘modesty’ will here refer to both senses of the word, (i) and (ii), as they are understood within the syllogism of related concepts.

B. Response to Conundrums with the Virtue of Modesty:

Modesty is generally conceived of as a particularly womanly virtue. Under this conception, women are held to be, far more than men, imminently and ubiquitously concerned with the flamboyant exhibition of their bodies for others. Yet this syllogism, from (i) the universal concept of self-evaluation to (ii) the social expression of this evaluation, pertains not merely to women but to all reflective self-consciousness beings, i.e. for all mankind. Thus regardless of the distinctive social exhibitionism of the sexes, modesty must be acknowledged to be a universal concern of applied ethics; which Aristotle terms practical wisdom. Aristotle defines a virtue as the habit of action according to right reason. But the concept of modesty presents three prominent rational conundrums (a,b, & c), and these conundrums threaten to eject modesty from the canon of virtues.

(a) First, modesty is socially exhibited with signs and markers which may be comprehensible to observers familiar with these variegated customs, yet customs can in no way be deduced a priori. There can be no a priori deduction of these because what is a priori must be known prior to experience, yet both customs and signs are apprehensible only through experience, or a posteriori: customs are the result of practical action and signs which are received through our senses. And as the mean of modesty cannot be formally deduced or strictly determined, it may perhaps be alleged that modesty is no genuine virtue but merely a shadowy phantasm of naïve moralizers.

This criticism supposes that virtues must be established by pure reason, which is that reason which is both purely formal and a priori. The belief that virtues and prescriptions must be so established is termed ethical formalism, and for which Kant gave brief expression to in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. As Kant later realized,[4] because ethical formalism constructs a priori concepts which our beyond all possible experience, such constructions can provide no sound basis for ethical prescriptions a posteriori, or within the world of our sensory experience. Thus if ethical inquiry be fruitful, it must inquir into prescriptions for action within the world, for which many practices are found to be generally beneficent and ennobling without allowing for the possibility either a formal deduction or a strict determination. Now custom is the result of strong habits and practices within a society. The strength of these habits and practices cannot be deduced but must be observed and judged. Observation and judgment of these habits and practices requires a patient and dedicated observer within this society: hence he who wishes to ascertain these practices and the mean of modesty most become intimately familiar with the society in which modesty is expressed. Thus modesty is neither, as with truthfulness, a virtue which can be understood according to the subjects’ intentions, nor is it, as with reciprocity, a virtue which may obtain merely among individuals. Rather, modesty is a virtue, the meaning of whose signs and markers, are apprehensible only within a social context and for a dedicated observer of society.

(b) Secondly, it will be denied that the virtue modesty will fall within Aristotle’s definition of virtue as an action according to right reason as modesty requires, not merely that one’s self-expression be accurate to one’s relative social-worth, but a self-conscious undervaluing of one’s self-worth. Modesty does not require an evaluation of oneself which is equivalent to one’s true worth relative to others, but a self-conscious undervaluing of this worth as it is expressed in society. For Aristotle, this would require modesty to be a virtue which aims below and not equal to the mean of self- depreciation and self-aggrandizement. If virtue is acting according to the mean of right reason, then it would seem that because modesty aims below the mean it cannot be a virtue.

For modesty to be retained in the canon of virtues it must find some additional reason, apart from the Aristotelian mean, to motivate a self-conscious under-evaluation. Julia Driver attempts to give such a reason in her essay Modesty and Ignorance:[5] “I have argued that the best account of modesty is anunderestimation account. On this view, modesty involves—or at least can involve—an agent underestimating self-worth in some respect, to some limited degree. The degree of underestimation must be limited in order to differentiate modesty from a vice such as self-deprecation.” Thus modesty is not a mean between self-aggrandizement and self- depreciation, but a further mean between this first mean and self-depreciation. The additional reason why the self-depreciation of modesty is valued is not disclosed through considerations of subjective intentionality, such as with lying, or through interpersonal relationships, such as with reciprocity. Modesty is rather a higher-order virtue which only becomes meaningful within and in reference to the general customs of society. Because modesty is a mean within and in reference to the customs of a society it cannot be independently derived but must be judged in accordance with the customs of a society.

(c) Thirdly, the cultivation of modesty may be said to itself become an expression of immodesty, in which case modesty may be made to be the vehicle of exhibitionism. Because immodesty has been described as an excess of public self-acclamation, and this acclamation may be expressed through many mediums and exhibit any good attribute, even the virtue or modesty which is ostensibly opposed to immodesty may become the medium through which immodesty is expressed. To phrase this another way; because modesty is considered a virtue, virtues are actions directed by practical reason towards that which is good, and immodesty is the exhibition of what is good pertaining to self-consciousness, the good of modesty may presumably be exhibited in an immodest manner.

However this criticism fails to notice that when the virtue of modesty is exhibited immodestly, it has at that same moment become immodesty. This criticism presumes that the expression of modesty may both become immodesty and continue to be modesty; or, that it may both be and not be that which it is. To say that a thing both possesses a property and does not possess a property in the same manner and in the same way is the description which Aristotle gives of a substantial contradiction. Because a substantial contradiction can neither be nor be conceived, it is both impossible and inconceivable.

C. The Public expression of Modesty and Immodesty:

Though it may first ascend to prominence in the soundless depths of (i) self-consciousness, self-evaluation is afterwards visibly manifested in (ii) public self-expressions. The manifestation of the value of the self, from ideal self-consciousness to real externality, follows the form of a syllogistic deduction from (S) universal, to (M) mediation, to (P) particular: the ideal self-consciousness is the (S) universal term of self-evaluation, the practical expressions through speech, movement and bodily adornment are altogether the (M) mediating term, and the real externality is the (P) particular term (S-M-P; Some S is M, All M is P, .: Some S is P). This is the syllogism of self-expression whereby private evaluations for the self are externalized for others and become apprehensible to and efficacious upon public spectators. The evaluative concepts, which had hitherto been closeted within the bastion of self-consciousness, are then wildly jettisoned from these ramparts as projectiles upon other minds. The darts and arrows of self-consciousness differ in violence and volatility: among the most hazardous is undoubtedly the exhibition of the body for others through speech, dress and manners.

Two social phenomena commonly result from the hazardous exhibition of the body: (m) the competitiveness of public displays, and (n) the innate eroticism of the sexes. The first (m) arises from the perennial contest for dominance within the inter-subjective public domain of social self-consciousness. G.W.F. Hegel describes the origin of this contest in his celebrated parable of Lordship and Bondsman: “Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has come outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other. It must cancel this, its other.”[6] Hegel illustrates how the contest for dominance in public settings arises from the desire among many self-conscious beings to mutually cancel the free externalization of concepts by their neighbors. In public exhibitions of the body, this contest for the dominance is transfigured into an unspoken contest for the public exhibition of the body for the adoration of public spectators.

The innate eroticism of the sexes (n) is a consequence of the primordial division of the sexes, and the consequent innate striving towards their subsequent conjugation and sexual reproduction. While asexual reproduction is the function of a single organism, sexual reproduction requires the conjugation of the opposed male and female sexes, or two organisms; a requirement which allows for selectivity among many mating partners. Male and female organisms to seek that mate whose traits are most advantageous because the selection of sexual mates determines the hereditary traits of their progeny. Seeking the most advantageous mate requires an assessment of the mates fitness for reproduction; a fitness which is physiologically express through features of sexual dimorphism, or the innate sexed differentiation of organisms. Sexual dimorphism takes different forms in different animal species. While all animals have sexed reproductive organs, or primary sexual features, some animal species possess more or less prominent secondary features of sexual dimorphism. Human males are principally dimorphized by their broad shoulders, greater muscle to body fat ratio, oily skin, height, sharp features, androgen hair and beards. Human females are principally dimorphized by their broad pelvis, protruding breasts, curvilinear features and predominance of vellus hair (which his most salient in beardlessness). The prominence of these traits in the physiological composition of an organism can, apart from the reproductive organs, present a reliable picture of that organism’s relative sexual dimorphism, and hence also of their relative fitness for sexual reproduction. The dimorphized features of the sexes (n), which display an organism's fitness for reproduction, may be modestly or immodesty exhibited within a public social setting of competitive displays (ii). This exhibition follows the general syllogism of modesty (S-M-P) in which an (i) evaluation for self-consciousness is (ii) externalized in a real social setting.

D. The Social Virtue of Modesty:

The evaluation of oneself, which finds its nascent beginning under the cloak of self-consciousness, is afterwards revealed, in the manner of a syllogism, through the medium of artifice and action in the world. Neither artifice nor action are the fruits of nature. Rather, these are freely manifested from the intrinsic and ineliminable power of self-conscious reason, or the power of the human spirit. This is why St. Thomas writes in the Summa Theologiae: “Although outward attire does not come from nature, it belongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are naturally inclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates outward raiment.” Although modesty may be manifested through an uncounted variety of mediums, in clothing it finds the most enduring and visible expression. The selection and adoption of clothing is the work of man’s reason and artifice through which he gives to himself a second form to envelop and re-represent his natural form.

As clothing re-represents the body to the spectator, it is formally composed as a second-skin to mimic and highlights the sexual dimorphism of male and female bodies. As the most express and enduring visual indicator of the self, clothing is the principle artificial means through which men and women modestly indicate and excessively highlight their respective sexual features. Clothing may indicate and highlight sexual features through clothing which (p) overlaps and mimics the form of sexual features, or (q) selectively reveal sexual features which are customarily covered. For example, ties and dresses (p) mimic the sexual features of men and women, while (q) exposed arms and bosoms may selectively reveal these features. Some clothing, such as tight-fitting corsets for women, may both (p) mimic and (q) selectively reveal sexual features. Because sight is the most immediate means by which the fitness of a potential mate may be assessed, the exhibition of sexual features through the medium of clothing (p & q) is among the most express means of inducing the concupiscent desire of the opposite sex.

Clothing is a form manifested man’s self-conscious reason upon the world; thus this determination proceeds from the very same locus of self-consciousness. Sharing the same origin in self-consciousness, the particular expression of clothing may be conceived as subsumed under the more general syllogism of modesty (S-M-P). An outward determination of clothing ought to be selected according to the mean between under-evaluation and over-evaluation, or modesty and immodesty. Modest exhibitions may be said to be those which result from (b) an under-evaluation of self-worth and may indicate features of sexual dimorphism without excessively highlighting them. Immodest exhibitions arise from an excessive evaluation of self-worth which may be expressed through the highlighting features of sexual dimorphism.

For self-consciousness the virtue of modesty may merely be the virtue of moderation between the extremes self-debasement and self-aggrandizement, yet within a social setting this virtue serves the further and more prominent end of pacifying the endemic contest of wills amongst self-conscious beings in their immediate apprehension of one another. This contest of wills, which Hegel has illustrated in the parable of Lordship and Bondage, finds its most express and salient vehicle in the plums, cuts and billows of fashionability. And this competitiveness of public exhibition is moreover intensified as a consequence of the innate eroticism of the sexes, through which the visual exhibition of the body assumes a psychic intensity and moral gravity altogether disproportionate to their cause. Clothing may indicated, emphasize, and highlight those features of sexual dimorphism which induce the sexes towards their conjugal union. Thus does the immodest exhibition and re-representation of the body through clothing invite the extremest hazards which follow upon the intercourse of the sexes; such as coquetry, bastardry and adultery. Thus Augustine writes: "Whoever uses outward things in such a way as to exceed the bounds observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either signifies something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he uses these things for sensual pleasure or ostentation." (St. Augustine, De Doctre. Christ. Iii,12)

[1] The Virtue of Ignorance, Julia Driver

[2] Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1123b8-15, 739-741

[3] A syllogism is an Aristotelian deductive formula which contains a major premise and a minor premise, the deduction of which, results in a concluding premise

[4] Kant abandoned the method of ethical formalism in his later ethical works, the Critique of Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals.

[5] Julia Driver, Modesty and Ignorance

[6] Hegel, G.W.F. the Phenomenology of Spirit, Miller translation par.178

History and Historicism of Middle-Earth, Second Draft

2011-08-31T20:53:00.000-07:00

This is the second and much abridged draft of the work-in-progress essay on the History and Historicism of Middle-Earth. Please review it at your leisure and e-mail me with any suggestions at rhryanhaecker@gmail.com:

Literature may be considered epic when it enchants, not merely its own, but every generation with allusions to universal themes which surpass the finitude of its setting. Though the Bronze Age is long since passed, the poems of Homer continue to enchant readers with scenes of harrowing carnage upon the Scamander plain before the walls of Troy. And unlike the strict didacticism of Aristotle, Plato’s myths aim not merely to instruct but to inspire the reader so that their imagination might freely take flight. Tolkien’s mythopoeia shares in this Platonic purpose to be both fiction and philosophy: through fictive and fantastic stories it aims to impart to the reader’s imagination a recollection of immortal wisdom.[1] As the Lord of the Rings develops from the initial intrigues of Hobbiton to a global strategic conflict for the future of Middle Earth, the reader finds the limited ordeals of the Fellowship to be merely a microcosm of the grander and universal historical drama of Middle Earth. The theme of history - like a deep and barely discernible baritone - is often hinted at through oblique recollections in stories and songs. Yet as the drama draws to its conclusion its part within the symbolic concert rises to a mighty crescendo: the theme of the history and historicism constitutes the scenery within which the macro-historical drama of cultural restoration of mankind is achieved. The historicization of Middle Earth is thus found to be central literary device through which Tolkien establishes both the gravity of the setting and the universality of the themes of his Mythopoeia.

With his presentation of the labyrinthine history of Middle-Earth, J.R.R. Tolkien illustrates an immanent and historical theodicy. Theodicy is a theological and philosophical enterprise in which an author attempts to demonstrate God’s justice for mankind.[2] A theodicy describes (a) the origin and nature of evil, (b) the means by which evil is overcome, and (c) the compatibility of evil with God’s goodness and providence. Tolkien describes (a) the origin and nature of evil in the Ainulindalë, which is the creation story of the Silmarillion. Thereafter the whole history of Middle-Earth until the beginning of the Fourth Age constitutes an expansive historical drama which presents (b) the means by which evil is overcome and (c) the compatibility between evil and God’s providence. The historical drama of Middle-Earth accomplishes its climax and resolution in the Third Age, through which Tolkien intends by his mythopoeia to present a fictional theodicy to demonstrate the wisdom and justice of God for mankind. The overthrow of Sauron then appears to bring to a conclusive end the cosmic and macro-historical theogany - a battle amongst the gods which began before the creation of Middle-Earth and the world of Arda. The theogany of Arda, between the rebellious servants of Dark Lord and the faithful Children of Ilúvatar, had its conception amidst the angelic Ainur before the universe’s creation and had hitherto continued cyclically and intermittently throughout the whole history of Arda. The conclusion of this theogany appears therefore to constitute, from the perspective of the reader of a historical drama, the conclusion of the history of Middle-Earth and Tolkien’s speculative theogony. The aimlessness of the Fourth Age is a consequence and testimony to the conclusiveness of these cosmic conflicts in the Third Age.

The continued interest and abiding enthusiasm which we children of modernity share for Middle-Earth is not merely the result of the heroic characters, majestic cultures, and thrilling battles. Rather Tolkien’s fictional history has thrilled and enchanted us with its distinctly modern principal themes of historicism, historical nostalgia, responsibility and regret. In the Third and climactic age of Tolkien’s fictional history there appear, for the first time, many modern themes; such as industrialism, urbanism, eugenics and scientific rationalism; which both allude to the distinctive characteristics of the modern world as well as its late historical perspective. The Lord of the Rings is situated in the Third Age and has its characters represent the unique historical perspective of modern man upon his past. Although the history of Middle-Earth is plainly not co-temporal with the history of Western Civilization, it nonetheless bears sufficient structural and thematic similarities to be considered a critical modernist allegory of Western history. If the First Age recalls an antediluvian or Homeric era of springtime Elves and heroic first Men, and the Second Age bespeaks of a classical age of expansive empires, then the Third Age more resembles a dissolute age of pygmies rather than of heroes and of social decline rather than of imperial grandeur. Yet in spite of this mediocrity, relics and recollections of a more impressive antique world continually intrude into the story as the Quest of the Ring nears its resolution. These intrusions of the past symbolically tie the present experience of the reader with the memory of its expansive historical narrative, through which the reader comes to appreciate the significance and conclusiveness of the history and historicism of Middle-Earth. Through this literary device Tolkien’s readers find the significance of the War of the Ring to be the ultimate resolution of the entire preceding historical narrative; a narrative which is at the same time the conclusion of Tolkien’s immanent historical theodicy of Middle-Earth. And with the finality of its resolution, the History of Middle-Earth in the Third Age recalls the apparent finality of history in our own time, which is the time modern scientific and industrial civilization. In consideration of this late historical perspective of the characters, the Lord of the Rings can be read as a distinctly modernist fantasy-epic whose splendid achievement was to have replied to our contemporary anxieties of social fragmentation, anonymity and disenchantment with a sublime vision of an alternative history and counter-modernity.

[1] Nagy, Gergely. “Saving the Myths: the Recreation of Mythology in Plato and Tolkien.” In J.R.R. Tolkien and the Invention of Myth: A Reader, edited by Jane Chance, 81-100

[2] Maritain, Jacques “An Introduction to Philosophy” p.195: "Leibniz in his Theodicy(1710) undertook to defend Divine Providence against the attacks of the skeptics (particularly Bayle). The term theodicy (etymologically: justification of God) has been used since that time to denote the branch of philosophy whose object is God."

Lord of the Rings essay: the History and Historicism of Middle Earth

2010-10-16T08:27:00.000-07:00

Dear friends,

Prof. Robert Koons

After auditing the class offered by Prof. Koons last Spring on Fantasy Literature, I have completed a long-essay(70 pages) on the history and historicism of Middle-Earth. Prof. Koons has graciously accepted to read and comment on the essay. Linked below is a read-only digital copy of the essay for everyone who may find it of interest. If you have the opportunity, please read and write comments(under the review tab of MsWord) as freely as you like. I would like you to principally comment upon the style, structure, and the argument which is developed throughout the essay. The essay may be too long in its present form, so please suggest any sections which ought to be removed. There are eight chapters which may be selected(control+click) from the Table of Contents, as well as many subheadings. Please e-mail me the commented document when you are finished, so that I may take your comments into consideration when I work to revise the essay for submission to one of the many Tolkien and literary journals. I have included below the introduction to the essay. Thank you all for your assistance and patience.

Sincerely,

Ryan Haecker

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Email to: rhryanhaecker@gmail.com

----------------------------

Abstract: The History of Middle-Earth is the central literary device in J.r.r. Tolkien's mythopoeia. The History of Middle Earth is presented as a repeated historicist cycle of decline and restoration. The historicism of Middle-Earth is determined by the elaborate cosmology and mythical theodicy of the cosmos of Eä. The History of Middle-Earth is an allegory of Western History. The decline of Men in Middle-Earth is principally caused by the same forces of industry and science which have effected Western Civilization. The historicism of Middle-Earth presents a modernist allegory of history which is intended to illustrate the perils and potentials of Western Civilization in our time.

1. Introduction

Literature may be considered epic when it enchants not merely its own but every generation with allusions to universal themes which surpass the particularity of its setting. Though the Bronze Age is long since passed, the poems of Homer continue to enchant readers both with scenes of harrowing carnage upon the Scamander plain before the walls of Troy, and with excited expectation upon Odysseus’s long-expected homecoming to rocky Ithaca. Unlike the strict didacticism of Aristotle, Plato’s myths aim not merely to instruct but to inspire the reader's imagination to take flight. Tolkien’s mythopoeia shares in this Platonic purpose, and presents itself as both fiction and philosophy. As “the Lord of the Rings” develops from the initial intrigues of Hobbiton to a global strategic conflict for the future of Middle Earth, the reader finds the limited ordeals of the Fellowship to be merely a microcosm of the grander historical drama of Middle Earth. The obliquely referenced historicization of the setting incomprehensibly elevates the dramatic tension by situating the limited story of “the Lord of the Rings” within an infinitely broader historical narrative. Although the drama of the Fellowship is limited in time and space, Tolkien’s continual allusions to the immense history of Middle Earth leads the reader to likewise reflect upon the sublimity of Middle-Earth’s incomprehensibly extensive past. Tolkien’s use of myth recalls C.s. Lewis description of faerie stories as “lies breathed through silver”. And as with Plato’s “Republic”, Tolkien’s mythopoeia possesses the cathartic potential to initiate the reader into an esoteric awareness of the Good.

The historical context of Middle Earth is the central literary device which establishes the setting and the thematic importance of the Fellowship within it. Although the historicization of a mythical cosmos, or mythopoesis, has since become a commonplace characteristic of the fantasy genre, the great subtlety and erudition with which Tolkien created his literary history and cosmology distinguishes Middle earth from his often less coherent imitators. In contrast to vulgar fantasy, which often presents a familiar retinue of magic and creatures, J.r.r. Tolkien’s “the Lord of the Rings” presents readers with a setting which, while retaining many staples of the fantasy genre (elves, dwarves, trolls, wizards etc.), nonetheless wholly re-conceptualizes their qualities and relations so as to integrate them within the broader fictional history and cosmology of Middle-Earth. Consequently Tolkien’s history is inseparable from the essential themes of his myth-making, or mythopoeia. The theme of history, like a deep baritone, is often disguised by oblique recollections in songs and references in languages, places, and character names. Yet through this historicization the otherwise disjointed locations, characters and cultures are integrated into the broader historical-drama of Middle Earth.

The historical drama of Middle-Earth is, in the Third Age, the apparent final resolution of a cosmic battle among the gods - a theogany which began before the creation of Middle-Earth and the world of Arda. This cosmic contest between the rebellious servants of Dark Lord and the faithful Children of Ilúvatar continues intermittently and repeats itself cyclically throughout the history of Middle Earth. As new disorders are introduced the faithful Elves and Men continue to work to perpetuate the divine harmony of Arda which had once existed, yet has since been corrupted. The historical perspective of “the Lord of the Rings” in the Third Age of Middle-Earth situates the Fellowship and the reader in a late historical era with an expansive prior history of literature, songs, and myths. The conflicts which occur in the Third Age of Middle-Earth parallel many previous world-historical conflicts, such as the Last Alliance of the Second Age (which is introduced in the second chapter of "the Fellowship of the Ring"). The late historical perspective of Middle-Earth in the Third Age invites the reader to reflect upon the repeated yet ever-diminishing scale of Middle Earth’s prior historical conflicts, as well as the apparent conclusiveness of the War of the Ring. For the first time in the Third Age, there noticeably appear many distinctly modern themes of industrialism, urbanism, eugenics and scientific rationalism, which allude to the distinctive characteristics of the modern world and our own unique historical perspective. These allusions to a late historical perspective within the limited drama of the novel prompts the reader to similarly reflect upon the magnitude of own history, as a parallel inter-generational contest to preserve justice, harmony, and a memory of the past.

Beginning with the writings of Herder, Blake, Goethe, Wordsworth and Novalis, Romanticism has been characterized as a literary and philosophic response to the reductionist pretentions of scientific rationalism. Inspired by romanticism, C.s. Lewis argued that a fictional setting must be morally meaningful and conceptually coherent to suitably interest an audience in the plight of the characters. For Lewis, this required fantasy literature to be intellectually and spiritually compelling. The Thomistic theologian Jacques Maritain described inspired creativity with a similar emphasis upon introspective spiritualism:

"Reason does not only consist of its logical tools and manifestations, nor does the will consist only of its deliberate conscious determinations. Far beneath the sunlit surface thronged with explicit concepts and judgments, words and expressed resolutions or movements of the will, are the sources of knowledge and creativity, of love and suprasensuous desires, hidden in the primordial translucid night of the intimate vitality of the soul." (Maritain, La Philosophie Bergsonienne 1914/48, p.103)

Tolkien’s fantasy exhibits an intimate romantic consideration for the importance of fantasy, which reflects the concerns of these Christian writers. The coherency and complexity of Tolkien’s mythopoeia illustrates his methodological view that believable and compelling fantasy requires an internally consistent and historical setting. In contrast to the mediocrity of vulgar fantasy, Tolkien aspired to create a believable and immersive mythology whose sublimity might re-enchant the present with a richer awareness of integral and humane living.

If the First Age recalls an antediluvian or Homeric era of springtime Elves and heroic first Men, and the Second Age bespeaks of a classical age of expansive empires, then the Third Age more resembles one of pygmies than heroes and social decline rather than imperial grandeur. Yet in spite of the mediocrity of the Third Age, relics and recollections of a more impressive antique world continually intrude into the story as the Quest of the Ring nears its resolution. The completion of the Quest of the Ring, the defeat of Sauron, and the Return of the King too nearly resemble the global victory of the Anglo-American alliance in the modern era and the resulting hegemony of capitalism and liberal-democracy. With the finality of its resolution, the History of Middle-Earth in the Third Age recalls the apparent finality of human history in our own time. In consideration of this historical perspective, “the Lord of the Rings” can be read as a distinctly modern fantasy-epic, whose splendid achievement was to have replied to the mundane modern anxieties of social fragmentation, anonymity and disenchantment with a sublime vision of an alternative modernity.

"Tolkien, it is true, did not embrace the twentieth century. But neither did he run from it. Rather, he forced his readers to confront their world from a different perspective, a perspective informed by the power of myth, symbol, and examples of true heroism. The modern and industrialized world seem to have little use, he knew, for the older way of seeing and knowing represented by his mythology. Nor did it have much use for the decentralized mode of social and political organization in which he believed. Rather, tyranny characterized Tolkien's century, and Tolkien passionately hated tyranny, whether it came from Left or Right of the political spectrum. And as to the "escapist" charge? As Tolkien once told C.S. Lewis, 'those who most hate escapism are the jailers.'" (Sanctifying Myth, p.109-110)

Link to the Download of the Read-Only Word Document:

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Email to: rhryanhaecker@gmail.com

Contra Lockean Toleration

2010-10-10T16:25:00.000-07:00

Lockean Argument:

p1: There is no way for a man to know the truth of the doctrines of religion.
p2: There exist among men competing claims to know the truth of the doctrines of religion.
p3: If (p1) & (p2) are true, then these doctrines of religion cannot be universally and completely true but must be merely particularly and partially true to those men who believe in them.
p4: If (p1) & (p3) are true, then there is likewise no way for the State to know the truth of a particular and partial religious doctrine.
p5: The imposition of a religion is justified if and only if a religion is universally and completely true.p6: If (p3) & (p5) are true, then the imposition of a particular religion cannot be justified.
p7: The State may only act in a manner which is justified.
p8: If (p6) and (p7) are true, then the state may not impose religion.

Therefore: The State may not impose any religion and must remain impartial to them.

Counter-Argument:

c1: God is All-knowing and completely knows what is right and true.
c2: If (c1) is true, then God would only reveal that religion which is universally and completely true.

c3: Men may know the truth or falsity of the doctrines of religion through reason and revelation.c4: If (c3) is true, then (p1) is false

[The conflict between the propositions (c3) and (p1) is whether reason may discern the truth or falsity of religious doctrines. Locke’s adherence to (p1) is a consequence of his empiricist epistemology, or his belief that all knowledge is gained through sensory perception. As the doctrines of religion (such as the incarnation of Christ and the Trinity) are not beheld through sensory perception, Locke would dismiss them as unknowable.]

c5: If (c1) & (c3) are true and men believe in God and his revealed religion, then these men believe in the universal and complete truth of this revealed religion.
c6: if (c5) is true, then (p3) is false
c7: if (p1) & (p3) are false, then (p6), (p7), and (p8) are false

Therefore: Men do not believe in religion because it is partially and particularly true, but because revealed religion is universally and completely true. To judge a religion to be particularly and partially true is to deny the completeness and universality of its truth. To deny the completeness and universality of the truth of a revealed religion is therefore to deny that a religion is the true religion, as revealed by God.

Explanation:
Locke argues the inability to know the true and correct doctrine from among competing religions means that we cannot choose a particular religion which should then be imposed upon everyone. This conclusion is founded upon two premises: (p1) that the mind is incapable of judging the correctness and truth of religious doctrines, and (p3) that judgments of the correct and true doctrinal content of religion are partial, particular and incompletely true. (p1) is the result of Locke's reductionist empiricist epistemology. (p3) is based on Locke's failure to distinguish the social demography of religion, or the relative share of adherents of a religion, from the propositional content of religion, or what the religion itself claims. In Locke's time, there was in England a plurality of particular religions confessing a variety of Christian doctrines. However, these doctrines all claimed to be confessing universally and completely true doctrines rather than particularly and partially true doctrines. Locke mistakenly interpreted the appearance of religious pluralism to mean that the propositional content of religion was only particularly and partially true. Yet for a religion to be particularly and partially true would contradict the completeness and universality which religion claims to be the inspired result of God's knowledge and revelation: (c1) & (c2). A believer in God's revealed religion believes that the religion of God is universally and completely true for everyone. If a religion is universally and completely true for everyone, and it is best to know what is true and reject what is false, then everyone ought to accept and believe in the true religion of God. It would be a contradiction for a Christian to maintain that God’s revealed religion is both completely and partially true or that two religions are both completely true if their doctrines contradict. Therefore a Christian must affirm the universal and complete truth of God’s revealed religion.

Furthermore Locke is not exempted from these qualities of belief. If Locke believes that Christianity is only particularly and partially true, then he cannot also believe that Christianity is universally and completely true. Neither might Locke assert that he holds a belief which is only partially and particularly true, which must be held to be is true for everyone. No one can both believe that something, whether christology, physics, soteriology or mathematics, is true for particular people and yet might be universally worthy of belief for everyone. Locke may escape this conundrum only by sneakily introducing a novel religious belief which resembles Christianity, and which is implied to be universally and not particularly true: this novel religious confession is Locke’s advocacy of public toleration and secularism. Locke believes that public secularism is universally right, good and true, while enjoying the advantage of remaining impartial in its judgment of particular religious doctrines. Unbeknownst to Locke’s reader, his novel confession of public secularism is, in fact, merely another particular religious doctrine which claims to be universally true. Locke believes that public secularism is not a religion, yet contains within its doctrines every doctrine which is essential to public Christianity, while subtracting those accidental, superfluous and extraneous doctrines of Christianity which are so violently disputed in Locke's England. Locke believes that the circumscription of Christianity to a private practice and the elevation of public secularism to the policy of the state will preserve the essential doctrines and morals of Christianity while allowing individuals to freely devote themselves to the various accidental, superfluous, and unnecessary doctrines of older forms of Christianity. Because Locke believes that public secularism is universally rather than particularly true, he believes that he can escape from his own conundrum of imposing a particular religion upon a people who believe in a variety of religious doctrines.

However, Locke's concept of public secularism is just as partial and particular as he believes Christianity to be. Locke did not know this because his naïve and mistaken empiricist epistemology led him to believe there could be a simpler Christianity, without the traditional supernatural and supersensory beliefs. An attempt to simplify Christianity to its essential doctrines has been an ongoing project of Protestant theology since Martin Luther. This view supposes that the so-called accidental doctrines of Christianity have been corrupted through an incorrect organic development in history, while reason can rediscover the now-submerged essential and core components of Christianity. Locke’s secularism is therefore a particular form of empiricist Protestant Christianity. If Locke's secularism is particular and not universal then he indicts himself for the very same religious partisanship, intolerance and bigotry which he criticizes the variety of Christian sects of England in his time. Moreover, the falseness of Locke's epistemology means that he is exposed as an unwitting and contradictory hypocrite. In fairness to John Locke, it was not by any lack of imagination, ambition, or good will that he further distorted public and political Christianity. Rather it was by a naïve enthusiasm for empiricism and a regrettable lack of foresight that he promulgated so many injurious political doctrines.

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"Locke's contemporary, Jonas Proast, responded by saying that Locke's three arguments really amount to just two, that true faith cannot be forced and that we have no more reason to think that we are right than anyone else has. Proast argued that force can be helpful in bringing people to the truth “indirectly, and at a distance.” His idea was that although force cannot directly bring about a change of mind or heart, it can cause people to consider arguments that they would otherwise ignore or prevent them from hearing or reading things that would lead them astray. If force is indirectly useful in bringing people to the true faith, then Locke has not provided a persuasive argument. As for Locke's argument about the harm of a magistrate whose religion is false using force to promote it, Proast claimed that this was irrelevant since there is a morally relevant difference between affirming that the magistrate may promote the religion he thinks true and affirming that he may promote the religion that actually is true. Proast thought that unless one was a complete skeptic, one must believe that the reasons for one's own position are objectively better than those for other positions.

Jeremy Waldron (1993), in an influential article, restated the substance of Proast's objection for a contemporary audience. He argued that, leaving aside Locke's Christian arguments, his main position was that it was instrumentally irrational, from the perspective of the persecutor, to use force in matters of religion because force acts only on the will and belief is not something that we change at will. Waldron pointed out that this argument blocks only one particular reason for persecution, not all reasons. Thus it would not stop someone who used religious persecution for some end other than religious conversion, such as preserving the peace. Even in cases where persecution does have a religious goal, Waldron agrees with Proast that force may be indirectly effective in changing people's beliefs."

Judith Butler Summary and Commentary

2010-10-10T16:10:00.000-07:00

Due to the apparent confusion at this Friday’s UPA meeting on the subject of Judith Butler’s “Gender Trouble”, I have taken the liberty to write a summary of Judith Butler’s claims and my own briefly described counter-arguments. Judith Butler has two central claims: one is epistemological, and pertains to knowledge(A), and the other is ethical, and pertains to morals(B). The former(A) is described in academic literature as the Particularity Argument, and the latter(B) is described as the Normative Argument.

A. Particularity Argument

Judith Butler rightly recalls that late 20^th-Century feminists(notably Gale Rubin) concocted the “gender-sex” division as a means of differentiating the specific cultural expression of gender from the biological fact of sex, to combat the supposed biological determinism of Science. Gender was described as culturally variable and socially constructed while sex was described as immutable and biologically innate. The “gender-sex” division is important to the feminist project because (i) it founds the identity of women in the concrete physicality of biological sex, and (ii) presents an avenue for social transformation in and through the social-construction of gender. Judith Butler criticizes this theoretical division because it presents feminists with a theoretical paradox of invoking (i) the universal subject of “woman”, while attempting (ii) to radically transform the social expression of woman-hood. Butler correctly notes that this(i) appeals to the Platonic universal of “woman” as the subject of feminist identity politics, while (ii)attempting to change the relative instantiations of this universal in society. Judith Butler criticizes the “unitary” idea of a gendered “woman”, which she claims fails to account for either differences among women or the “multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections”. Following Elizabeth Spelman(“Inessential Woman”, 1988) Judith Butler argues as follows:

1. There are no Essences of Gender and Sex

2. If (A1) then there are no distinctions between Genders and Sexes

Judith Butler describes the popular view of Gender Essentialism as “an intelligible gender” which is merely a “socially coherent expression of gender performances”(Butler, 1990 p.23). Butler explains her view that all expressions of gender are not metaphysical Essences but merely “a stylized repetition of habitual acts”(Butler, 1990 p.179) which create the “compelling illusion” of gender as a “strong pragmatic construction”(Butler, 1990 p.271). Butler claims that the “compelling illusion” of gender is merely a result of the contingent power-structures of our “heterosexist” society which create the “heterosexual matrix” in which we categorize sex and gender. In less arcane and verbose prose, Judith Butler means to say that there is no real Essence of sex or gender, but only the names, categories, and words with which we describe them. This is the ontological claim of “gender anti-realism” or “gender-nominalism”. It is distinguished from the Aristotelian concept of Sexual Essentialism, or “gender-realism”, which claims that there is a metaphysical Essence of sex which is relatively instantiated in particular sexed persons.

B. Normative Argument

Judith Butler believes that the Platonic universal of “woman” which prior feminists had referenced as the subject of the feminist political project had carried undisclosed normative, or ethical, connotations. Butler believes that all feminist discourse which describes the universal of “woman” as a subject of oppression and emancipation then surreptitiously valorizes a unitary, exclusionary, and hegemonic Platonic idea of “woman” at the expense and marginalization of alternative gendered expressions. Butler believes that these hegemonic ideas are inherently exclusionary, marginalizing, conformist and oppressive. She believes that these concepts prescribe a socially recognized coherent form of gender expression, while proscribing incoherent gendered expressions(such as homosexuality). Butler describes all essentialist concepts of sex and gender collectively as forms “heterosexist oppression”. Furthermore, Judith Butler claims that feminist appeals to sex and gender essentialism is inherently self-defeating to the very project of feminist emancipation. This creates an irresolvable problem for feminists, regarding the subject of their political project. If there is no universal commonality among women which can be referenced, as "woman", then all claims regarding the oppression and emancipation of "woman" are totally vacuous. If there is no woman, then no one is oppressed and no one can be emancipated. It may be objected that people can simply self-identify as women, but this would be a too expansive definition for feminists, as it would allow anyone(including myself) to claim to be an oppressed woman. This more expansive definition of "woman", which may potentially include all humans and some animals, necessarily dilutes the possibility of acting to emancipate this larger set(as all women plus others) from the oppression which, under the former definition, applied to a smaller set(as all women without others).

Butler proposes, as an alternative, that feminists encourage different gendered expressions, which aim to undermine the socially coherent cultural constructions of sex and gender. Judith Butler’s political ambition is the encourage a continual expression of incoherent gendered expressions. She hopes these expressions will radically subvert all socially constructed concepts of sex and gender, and eventually make these concepts unintelligible and inexpressible. This political ambition explains Judith Butler’s support of "homosexual marriage”, with which she intends to radically subvert the social “legitimating practices of sex and gender”, or the legal recognition of Holy Matrimony.

Counter-Arguments

Judith Butler’s (A) particularity argument is the very basis and justification of her (B)normativity argument (or B iff A). If (A) the particularity argument is false then (B) the normativity argument would intend to subvert the real essences of sex and gender, as they are expressed, utilized, and socially legitimated. Judith Butler would then not be an emancipatory theorist but a terrible villain who wickedly conspires to radically distort, confuse, and pervert the social expression of human’s essential nature.

Judith Butler’s (A) particularity argument suffers from two critical explanatory deficiencies: (C) Firstly, (A) fails to explain the intended purpose of and mechanisms through which the “heterosexist world order” functions. (D) Secondly, (A) fails to explain the historicicity, or historical continuity, of the “heterosexism”. The (D)historicicity of “heterosexism” is contingent upon (C) the mechanisms and purposes of the social functioning of “heterosexism”(or D iff C). On Friday I mentioned (D) the Historicicity problem in relation to Revolutionary France and Tsarist Russian which both maintained so-called "heterosexism" despite have polar-opposite government types. Here I will limit myself to discussing (C) the functionalist criticism of Judith Butler's particularity argument. Because Judith Butler is a poor philosopher and likely cannot explain (C), I proposed a model to explain the functioning of the “heterosexist world order”:

Judith Butler surreptitiously uses a Marxist model of the State’s political economy when she describes the “juridical production of gender”. In the Marxist model of the State’s political economy, the ruling capitalist oligarchs control social and political power within the state because they own the means of production, in which the people work, and collect the majority of surplus capital from the profits of the sale of commodities(grey). To this model Judith Butler applies Michel Foucault’s theory of linguistic power, or the power of creating and proliferating words, as conceptual categories, to nominally define reality. Judith Butler synthesizes these two models of socio-political power to create a model of “heterosexist political-linguistic economy”. Judith Butler applies the Marxist and Foucaultian criticism of science, in which scientific discourse(green) and results favor the interests of the ruling oligarchs, to the popular concept of Sexual Essentialism, or gender-realism. Butler intends to dismiss the sexed paradigm of the physical and social sciences(blue) as false, because within her model of political-linguistic economy they are complicit in the legitimation of the “heterosexist world order”.

C. Functionalist Criticism of Butler’s Political-Linguistic Model

Judith Butler appeals to Foucault’s theory of linguistic power, but cannot explain why and how the State applies gendered categories to the People. Judith Butler’s (A)Particularity argument claims that there are no real Sexual Essences, and only the words for them. Sex and Gender have no reality, but only a nominal expression. The State juridically constructs these words, categories, and juridical categories providing the “compelling illusion” of their reality. To my knowledge, Judith Butler provides no satisfying answer to how and why the State would consistently work to deceptively construct gendered categories. Because her particularity argument is contingent upon her theory of Political-Linguistic power, the absence of an explanation of this model’s functioning radically undermines her particularity argument. If (A) the particularity argument is unjustified then (B) the normative argument is unjustified as well. For these reasons Judith Butler must be a terrible villain of philosophy and humanity.

Apart from poor judgment, there are some reasons why Judith Butler cannot feasibly offer an explanation of her Political-Linguistic model. Because people moralize about Sexual Essences, the functioning of her Political-Linguistic model is intrinsically associated with the morals of man and woman. It cannot be explained without an account of these morals. If Judith Butler were to explain the functioning of this model, then she would unwittingly offer a moral justification for it as well. If Butler offered a moral justification for her model then she would contradict the conclusions of her normative argument by presenting two alternative and contrary normative prescriptions. Although Butler’s appeals to Foucaultian and Marxist theories may superficially appear intriguing, under closer scrutiny it is found that her verbosity merely conceals her shallow theories and morally subversive political agenda.

**If you would like to learn about Sex and Gender, please don't read Judith Butler's books. On the contrary, you must watch the "magical-girl" anime "Revolutionary Girl Utena":

http://transhumantraditionalism.blogspot.com/2010/07/platonic-interpretation-of.html

Ode to Immanuel Kant

2010-07-11T21:24:00.001-07:00

Ode to Immanuel Kant

composed and presented aloud on the 286th anniversary of Kant's birth

Along foggy Baltic shores, in centuries gone was found,
amongst pear-plumed steeples and knotted girdles,
Resolute Kant, made humble by late notice,
in sleepy Tuetonic town of Königsberg

Lengthily he speculated into nebulas above- searching, formulating,
and deducing by Leibniz logical laws
Yet lately were his thoughts troubled more by contrast
of philosophie and Newton's universal laws

Upon oft-expected morning sojourns,
which both maintained routine and Kant's virginitee
His careful inquiries would soon chance to find
by trials and turns to considerrings of too reasonable impiety.

Soon his copious deliberations were coarsely intruded
by the fattened skepticism of David Hume
Stunned was he to find yet overlooked that causality protruded
from the cosmos which Leibniz had presumed.

Those cloistered thoughts, long constructed, were swiftly tumbled,
the orderly heavens were loosened and unfixed
Sun and Moon ceased assisting, a new star stirred and rumbled,
the Copernican Revolution began and mixed.

Hibernating went Kant so swiftly,
Ten restless years he descended into critical slumber
Dancing and wrestling. Dialectics and antinomies.
Kant mined cognition for a glittering intuition and a pure number.

Unceasing phenomena, unknowable noumena,
Kant marooned, a perceiver adrift in Space and Time.
Thence was conceived of- Luminous Ego!
The transcendental self , the source of good will mine.

Three Critiques thereafter followed: Pure, Practical, and Judgmental,
to worldwide bafflement and unexpected fame.
Immanuel now exalted, his memory now hallowed,
of comprehension, a poet laureate he is acclaimed.

All concepts' hidden passageways, the self's innermost chambers,
once guarded wisdom now made known.
A self-conscious synthesis of man's intuitions; both space extensive and time eternal,
all within the mind as Kant has shown.

Napoleon's ambition spirited away, Holy Roman Empire surrendered; astounding!
Ideas of Reason disperse through all lands.
Philosophic youths gaily awaken, set now firmly on sure grounding,
an unforeseen synthesis now in hands.

Forevermore Hume's skepticism has retreated,
amoralism and solipsism conclusively expire in very fitting and loathsome ignominy.
Kant has buttressed starry vaults with new permanence,
demonstrated reason's prowess and transparency,
Gloria Immanuel!
His triumph is the minds evermore undimmed sublimity.

a Short Defense of Monarchism

2010-07-11T21:21:00.000-07:00

This is a short defense of Monarchy in theory and history written in response to the criticisms of Justin. Please enjoy.

Justin:

Ugh Ryan. I wasn't going to respond to these strange monarchist outbursts of yours. But come on. I'm all for healthy intellectual dissent, but i highly doubt you're genuine to the core--you delight in too many freedoms that otherwise you would not be deemed entitled to you in a tyrannical regime. I’ve seen your rather Nietzschean arguments that somehow suppose aristocratic excellence (which somehow is more desirable, or more ‘excellent-ish’ than other types of imaginable excellences/[virtues?]) is A.) only achievable in a non-egalitarian social framework (in your case it seems only monarchism could achieve this) and B.) somehow innately desirable. [which of course is ludicrous]

You know that monarchy is not somehow a more natural form of governance, and you *know* that Obama-idolatry or celebrity idolatry isn’t evidence of a society’s natural inclination toward monarchy. There’s no indefeasible warrant connecting the two—at all, just sophistic contrivance. Now, if you wanted to advance some argument that there’s some perpetual, ever-present social forces pushing toward plutocratic oligarchy, then fine, I might even be inclined to agree with you—but that doesn’t get a singular sovereign into the picture…at all.

Furthermore, a monarchy is almost always theoretically predicated upon a social fiction—some supposed ‘divine right’ or what have you. And these fictions are demonstrably (just that)….fictions. There is no social warrant, no bite to an absolute, hereditary monarchy.

In any monarchical system there are extra-monarchical magnates and extra-monarchical feudal or feudal-like structures. IN THIS FACT ALONE we can see the beginnings of the theoretical necessity for popular sovereignty, from that, the seeds of liberalism. Magnates must be pleased in order to maintain power, and their potential (and actual) “usurpation” of power is not only a salient feature of monarchical regimes—but historically a part of every monarchical system this planet has ever seen. Because it is, in fact, a NECESSARY feature of every monarchy—we see that there is NO ORGANIC RIGHT/ENTITLEMENT to absolute sovereignty. There is only practical, this-worldly forces that the person who claims the sovereignty can manage to wield to maintain power—all completely contingent upon his abilities and any other random, relevant state of affairs. **there might be some very tiny nations, or tribes out there where this might not apply, but consider them irrelevant—I refer only to nation states of any sufficient size.

Theoretically, the only way there might be some organic entitlement is to derive some Hobbesian normative claim—which is all predicated upon arcane state of nature arguments—and which still rely on theories of social contract—and, as I won’t go into depth here, I think as soon as we wrestle w/ social contract, popular sovereignty and the seeds of liberalism begin to sprout [I’ll just take that as granted…I’m sure you’re smart enough to fill in the in between steps].

Where else might we find an organic entitlement? Perhaps…God? Ryan, as a good catholic you should be well aware of various encyclical literature praising things like democracy and egalitarianism. This should be enough for you to drop your monarchist claims…or at least any claim that monarchy is somehow innately good…or at VERY least, that monarchy is some how natural or necessary.

Finally, the contemporary monarchy [that is actual] is DE FACTO a fascist and/or otherwise extreme totalitarian regime. I shouldn’t need to go into this too much. Maybe you don’t think that’s too bad—but tell me, examine yourself and ask whether you would really like to live in such a state. The sovereign is always in a harrying fight to maintain his power—which leads to oppressions and violence of every kind—the modes of productions are taken over (this includes far-right regimes…it’s just done through the military industrial complex)—otherwise threatening magnates will arise AKA potential usurpers. There just has been no contemporary monarchy that has been idyllic or pleasant—it has just produced violence and war, oppression and misery…and what may for you be even worse…the antithesis of excellence and virtue.

I hope I haven’t created too many straw men here, I only briefly read a lot of your recent comments floating around Facebook. Regardless, I think these considerations are enough to defeat any monarchist claims. I’m calling you on your bull.

Ryan:

I am pleased that you have expressed such diligent interest in the viability and coherency of Monarchy. I have excerpted what I considered to be the nine principle arguments(in quotes) from the previous reprinting of your criticism.

1. "you delight in too many freedoms that otherwise you would not be deemed entitled to you in a tyrannical regime."

Classical political philosophy, from Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, to Porphyry, Iamblichus and Augustine, employed the conceptual distinction between monarchy and tyranny. Tyranny, in contradistinction to monarchy, was considered to be an illegitimate usurpation of the State; generally by a personal turn to wickedness, the force of partisan loyalists, or the cajolery of populist demagoguery, for the aim of private interest and aggrandizement unrestrained by moderation, law or governmental bodies. By contrast, Monarchy was considered as a healthy and virtuous form of government, in equal proportion to the viciousness and pathology of Tyranny. Where the former was thought to be a harmonious and integral social body, ordered by the unreflective expression of prudence, wisdom, civility and compassion, the latter was required, in the absence of these virtues, to employ the legal and administrative powers of the State to forcibly coerce and compel compliance with the self-indulgent whims of the Sovereign. In short, Monarchy was envisioned as an idyllic community in which virtue was natural and spontaneous, rather than mere hypocrisy or affectation, and obedience resulted, not from legal or social compulsion, but rather from a fraternal cooperation and a genuine admiration and fidelity to the excellence and superiority of the rulers.

However both Plato and Aristotle recognized the fragility of the ideal Monarchy due to the weakness of social immoderation and human caprice, and for this reason forewarned that a monarchist regime was all too prone to descend into Tyranny if the sovereign were not of exceeding superiority of character and the severest self-restraint. For this reason both classical philosophers, while recognizing the lofty aspiration of Monarchy, advised a variety of remedies(a topic of investigation for political theorizing, yet the concern of philosopher-poets of old!) with which to restrain the sovereign, so that his expected incontinence and inadequacies might be prevented from thereby imperiling the State. In reference to the classical tradition of political philosophy, it should be apparent that the integral fraternity and humane felicity of Monarchy need not imply an unfavorable diminution of freedom, but instead rather serves to enable a more immediate freedom of personal actualization and princely decisiveness; both of which remain unrestrained by either constitutional proceduralism or legalism, and yet simultaneously adhere without reflection to the requirements of the universal Moral Law! Furthermore, this sublime vision of government is intended, not merely for the private avarice of the Sovereign, but for the vigor and spiritedness of broader society; who are through this means united in action and intention by a continually renewed bond of fraternity and courtesy, extending from the humblest servant to the most resplendent and magnanimous prince.

2. "I’ve seen your rather Nietzschean arguments that somehow suppose aristocratic excellence (which somehow is more desirable, or more ‘excellent-ish’ than other types of imaginable excellences/virtues?) is a.) only achievable in a non-egalitarian social framework (in your case it seems only monarchism could achieve this) and b.) somehow innately desirable. [which of course is ludicrous]"

The second contention which you raise(2.b) concerns whether virtue and excellence are innately desirable by all men, or merely the parochial aspiration of Aristotelians or Nietzscheans. While it appears that you seem find this proposition to be prima facie "ludicrous", instead I contend that the desirability of these qualities is both apodeictically and categorically true- or truly the case everywhere and always for all persons! We should ask how could virtue could be unwelcome when broadly conceived as the pragmatic capacity to act freely, a potentiality and will to power, as well as the moral conscience and discipline to resolutely adhere in thought and action to what reason informs us to be practically required and theoretically true. When virtue is thusly conceived, it is viewed not as an arbitrary social circumscription or an unfavorable restrictedness, but as the very means and measure of will and action with which to actualize the intrinsic potential of our selves in accordance with the pragmatic and theoretical necessities of the world! As no alternative to this moral and pragmatic freedom can possibly be conceived without also imagining a diminution of the angelic freedom which virtue implies, this effectatious unity of movement and comprehension cannot be simply disregarded or denied without also involving oneself in a theoretical contradiction.

The first contention which you raised(2.a), concerning whether an inegalitarian society is more conducive to the furtherance of excellence and virtue, or whether these traits might be equally evident in a more egalitarian society, is a central theoretical concern for monarchists and one of the principal reasons for any advocacy of a more explicitly inegalitarian society and constitution. Like the dialogue of Socrates in which in which personal virtue is related to political virtue in "the Republic", I find that this concern can be best understood in relation to the previous question(2.b) of the intrinsic value of virtue and the conditions which inspire human excellence. If the former description of the practical necessity and highest good of virtue is categorically true, then it follows that we should analogously judge that constitution and social arrangement which is most conducive and effective in inspiring the development of virtue among the people to likewise be the highest social or political good.

From this judgment, it needn't follow that socio-political inequality is more advantageous than equality, nor does this recommend a specific arrangement of the constitution, the laws, or of broader society. The necessity of unequal relations (such as the five Confucian relations of ruler and minister, parent and child, older and younger neighbors, husband and wife, and older and younger sibling) follows instead from another three convictions: 1) that among the varying multitude of mankind there is to be found an unequal allotment of talent, form, and ability which corresponds to their intrinsic potentiality and relative actualization of human virtue, 2) that human society and politics achieves the aforementioned aims most efficiently when organized so as to maximize the beneficial effects of (1), and 3) that (2) is best achieved when society and politics are organized into a visible and understood hierarchy from the most temperamental infant to the most serene and magnificent exemplar of mankind. The result of accepting the soundness and truth of these three propositions, which I see no need to herein argue for, is the inferential conclusion that Monarchy is the most just, able and noble form of government.

3. "if you wanted to advance some argument that there’s some perpetual, ever-present social forces pushing toward plutocratic oligarchy, then fine, I might even be inclined to agree with you—but that doesn’t get a singular sovereign into the picture…at all."

I do not argue that a description of social or economic forces which lead incrementally from one government form to another (such as the anacyclosis described by Polybius, the corruption of a regime described by Aristotle, or the development of productive and political monopolies under capitalism as described by Marx ) is a compelling argument for the benefits of Monarchy. Indeed such a description does not suffice to advise us of the benefits of any particular regime, and serves merely to describe the dangers of inherent in the development of polities in history. Additionally, you correctly mention that these unintended historical processes are very likely to tend towards unfavorable governments such as Tyranny, Oligarchy, or Ochlocracy(or the rule of the mob), and offer very little reassurance of a benign result.

4. "Furthermore, a monarchy is almost always theoretically predicated upon a social fiction—some supposed ‘divine right’ or what have you. And these fictions are demonstrably (just that)….fictions."

Has there been, or could there ever foreseeably be, a form of government which does not make use of social fictions, myths, and rhetorical sophistry to offer a legitimization of their laws, policies and institutions? Even the city-states of classical Greece found it expedient to deify their founders, to trace their ruling lineages to the heroes of Homer and Hesiod, and to attribute their laws and constitutions to sage-kings such as Solon of Athens or Lycurgus of Sparta. The fictions which our present polity entertains- of inspired founding fathers, hallowed documents, and unexamined egalitarian convictions-seem equally fantastic, yet for this we are faulted with the greater hypocrisy due both to our stated disbelief in the sacredness of the State as well as our cynicism concerning the fallibility of men and their writings. The reason for the necessity of these social fictions should be quite clear; for why would any man consent to be governed and punished by a State which is not of his choosing, if it and its laws were acknowledged to be the whimsical invention of fallible men of his own wretched condition? Why should he prize the constitution and the products of his legislature so highly, when he might equally scribble his own thoughts for the regulation of his neighbors? These inquiries swiftly reveal that the State is at present, and has been for all time, the result of a systematic exercise of force, violence, and cruelty without comparison in any other human institution.

Our present adulation of the State, inspired with the same benign intention as Virgil's mythic retelling of the founding of imperial Rome, aims in part to persuade us against considering these unsettling conclusions - yet is a sophistry which I find to be indispensable in governing the sentiments and restraining the ambition of nations. This observation of the continuing necessity of social fictions should not be misconstrued as simply a injunction to maliciously deceive the people. Rather it is an pragmatic assessment, in the tradition of blessed Plato's "noble lie", of the invaluable yet strategic function which the myths and public cult of the State serve.

5. " In any monarchical system there are extra-monarchical magnates and extra-monarchical feudal or feudal-like structures. (a)In this fact alone we can see the beginnings of the theoretical necessity for popular sovereignty, from that, the seeds of liberalism. (b)Magnates must be pleased in order to maintain power, and (i)their potential (and actual) “usurpation” of power is not only a salient feature of monarchical regimes—but historically (ii)a part of every monarchical system this planet has ever seen."

In the excerpted quote(5.a) you describe the necessary plurality of social and political power (whether it be invested in ministers, proconsuls, governors, dukes, or viceroys etc.) which you infer to create the "theoretical necessity [of] popular sovereignty". First, it will help to clarify that "popular sovereignty" is a modern theory of statal legitimacy rather than a description of either the arrangement or the functioning of political power. It is fairly incoherent to infer the theory of popular sovereignty(which it should be noted is a conceptual contradiction, for how can the people be both sovereign and subject) from the existence of political plurality. Additionally the existence of political plurality has not historically resulted in a theory of "popular sovereignty" until the writings of European liberals in the early modern period(Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu). When Pontius Pilate touted his power to crucify Jesus Christ, the Prince of Peace replied "Thou shouldst not have any power over me, unless it were given to thee from above."(John 19:11), yet no theory of popular sovereignty followed from this exchange.

Second, although it might be imagined that the necessary existence of political plurality (this is a necessity as humans live in communities which require cooperation and interdependence) leads historically to liberal democracy, this assertion of a grand historical narrative merely tautologically presumes the conclusion(in this case liberal democracy) of a historical socio-political teleology, and thereafter claims that the present political arrangement is a conclusive validation of the "end of history" presumption! Although this assertion is logically invalid, the thought remains compelling- or at least as compelling as the historical inevitability of the Kaiser's German Empire or the Soviet Union must have seemed to partisan contemporaries. However without any further arguments in support of this historical teleology, this assertion will only seem as presumptuousness as those of our ancestors; ancestors whose tendency towards cultural chauvinism has yet to be exorcised by the inspiration of modern rationalism.

The second criticism which you offer(5.b) is twofold: (i)you briefly argue that the means by which the recipients of political power in a monarchy are compensated and recognized inclines them to usurp power from the sovereign. Apart from this observation being horribly anachronistic(for instance the last civil-war among the nobility of England was the War of the Roses(1455-85), the Wars of Religion(1562-98) in France, and the uprising of Zhu Di(1398-1402) in Ming China!), the argument fails to offer either an explanation of why this phenomenon might be more pronounced in Monarchy, or why we should not expect to find similar events in liberal democracy (as in the innumerable instances of military coup d'états in recent memory). An argument in your favor might be presented as follows:

(p1) Feudal lords are granted absolute power over their subjects and soldiers.

(p2) Fuedal lords are afforded compensation and recognition in proportion to the extent of land and the number of subject which they have dominion over.

(p3) if (p1) and (p2) are true, then we should expect fuedal lords to attempt to forcibly increase the extent of their land and the number of their subjects by (i) usurping power from the sovereign, (ii) and accumulating absolute socio-political power to themselves.

(p4) if (p3) is true and political plurality is necessary for any monarchy, then we should expect this violent cycle of hegemonic domination and usurpation described in (p3) to repeat itself without end.

TF: if (p4) is true, then Monarchy is inherently violent and politically unstable.

However this argument is specious because, although Monarchy might comically be conceived as a violent monopoly of marauding Franks, Huns, and Vandals, history and political theory displays much more administrative and social sophistication in actual monarchies; a fact which demonstrates (p1) and (p2) to be mere storybook simplicities. Additionally it is not clear that, if these premises were sound then this argument would not also apply to contemporary military officers; who are similarly invested with inestimable armed force, and are recognized in accordance with their political power and compensated, not with land(as in physiocratic agrarian states), but with money. Yet the application of this argument to present government of either a country like Communist China or the United States is viewed as prima facie absurd precisely because we know of the social and political mechanisms with which military officers are restrained from overthrowing the state- mechanisms such as legal institutions, social reprobation, and the fiction of sacredness(quote 4) which the State promotes and for which officers swear to defend (a custom similar to an oath of fealty still practiced widely in the world's militaries).

After asserting the truth of (5.b.i) you inductively conclude(5.b.ii) that because usurpation is evident in all historical monarchies, Monarchy is therefore intrinsically prone to feudal strife and instability. If the falsehood of (5.b.i) and thereby this inference is not apparent, then we might instead equally investigate the sordid history of political instability among Republics; beginning with the Athenian Democracy, the Roman Republic, the five French Republics, and so many other instances of civil strife and political instability in recent history. From this it may be understood that evidence alone is insufficient to establish to preponderance of political instability in Monarchy in comparison to liberal democracy. Finally, it should be considered that the political instability of a government, while certainly the cause of great harms and historical grievances, cannot and should not be universally prepared against, as it may in some instances be the requisite means by which a despotic form of government is overthrown.

6. Because it is, in fact, a necessary feature of every monarchy—we see that there is no organic right/entitlement to absolute sovereignty. There is only practical, this-worldly forces that the person who claims the sovereignty can manage to wield to maintain power—all completely contingent upon his abilities and any other random, relevant state of affairs."

For the reasons elaborated in (5.a), the criticisms expressed in quote (6) are meaningless. Neither the existence of political hegemony nor the necessity of political plurality suffices to warrant either the theory of monarchical "absolutism" or the theory of "popular sovereignty". This is so because a description of affairs does not necessarily entail a normative theory of how affairs ought to be, without reference to additional theoretical resources which are not contained within the description.

7. "Theoretically, the only way there might be some organic entitlement is to derive some Hobbesian normative claim—which is all predicated upon arcane state of nature arguments—and which still rely on theories of social contract... Where else might we find an organic entitlement? Perhaps…God?... that monarchy is somehow natural or necessary."

The three convictions which were listed in response to quote (2) provide a limited theoretical justification for the legitimacy of monarchy, without appealing to either Hobbesian political hegemony or the "divine right" of kings. However, this inferential judgment doesn't show that Monarchy is "natural or necessary", only that it is preferable to other forms of government which fail to satisfy the second requirement.

8. "Finally, the contemporary monarchy [that is actual] is de facto a fascist and/or otherwise extreme totalitarian regime... There just has been no contemporary monarchy that has been idyllic or pleasant—it has just produced violence and war, oppression and misery…and what may for you be even worse…the antithesis of excellence and virtue. "

The presentation of the argument (5.b), which is implied in this quote (8), adequately demonstrates that Monarchy needn't invariably lead to either Tyranny or Fascism. The confusion between Monarchy and Tyranny was addressed in response to quote (1). Additionally, there is some dispute among scholars concerning the historical causes and intellectual ancestry of Fascism, yet Monarchy is not generally considered among the factors involved (for a scholarly summary of this dispute, you might read pages 141-72 of Roger Griffin's anthology "Fascism" for which I wrote this Wikipedia article http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fascism_(book)). While Italian fascism developed within the government of the Italian monarchy(the Monarchy also was among the principle agents in deposing the Fascist government of Benito Mussolini), this has not been universally the case with fascist states as Adolf Hitler's National Socialists famously emerged from the republican government of Weimar Germany. Furthermore, many historians consider modernity(Talcott Parsons), capitalism(Harold Laski), and liberalism(Ernst Nolte) to be among the principle factors in the historical development and continued appeal of Fascism; while the historical influence of traditionalism is a subject of dispute(Stephen Holmes), but is not an argument which I find especially convincing.

9. "Ryan. I wasn't going to respond to these strange monarchist outbursts of yours. But come on. I'm all for healthy intellectual dissent, but I highly doubt you're genuine to the core.[...]I think these considerations are enough to defeat any monarchist claims. I’m calling you on your bull."

I am indeed genuine in my advocacy of Monarchy, which I find to be both a viable and healthy alternative to the contemporary morass of democratic liberalism. These considerations of yours are unfortunately insufficient to "defeat any monarchist claims". I encourage you to re-examine your democratic beliefs in reference to this alternative as well as the potential of Monarchy to offer America and the world a more advantageous socio-political arrangement to that which we currently enjoy. I thank you for your contributions, and encourage you to inquire into any further concerns which you have with the idea of Monarchy.

Discussion of Homosexual Marriage in Political Liberalism

2010-07-11T21:19:00.000-07:00

Jen

"Ryan, what arguments do you present to defend your opposition to same-sex marriage?"

Ryan

I was afraid that people who believe in political liberalism would find this link objectionable, and express some outrage at my voicing opposition to this most recent homosexual activism, but I didn't find these sentiments to be an especially compelling reason to abstain from posting this. Now, the belief in the universalizability of the principles of political liberalism (namely equality, individualism, and liberty) and the impossibility of holding a coherent political position which does not derive there from or in some way contradicts these supposedly universal principles political liberalism, very often leads liberals to summarily dismiss and hyperbolically vilify those people who criticize or politically oppose the extension of these principles (see some of the previous comments for examples of this). The chain of reasoning generally follows a predictable pattern:

1.) all persons should be afforded equal recognition and privilege according to the law

[assumed] (1) is apodictic(self-evident) and therefore unquestionably true

2.) If some person(s) is afforded recognition or privilege which is not extended to all persons, then (1) is contradicted.

If (1) is true and (2) is true then practice does not conform to theory, and an injustice occurs.

This would generally be the conclusion, if the truth of (1) determines how justice is understood in practice. However, it is the true apodicticity of (1), not inference of (2), which is disputed by opponents of homosexual "marriage". If (2) were contested and (1) were accepted than the swift practical entailment would likely follow, yet in challenging the practical application and truth of (1) opponents thereby circumvent the presumed entailment for which supporters boast of such self-assurances.

I expect that it will be admitted by supporters of homosexual marriage that (1) is not, without some great difficulty, logically deducible, and rests principally upon egalitarian sentiments, rather than upon such vacuous phrases like the "advances of modern science" or "the universal principles of liberty". Now, Kant believed that his theory of the state's justified political authority offered a reason for the state treating people equally without consideration of particular qualities which were not common to all rational beings. [read this:http://drop.io/avm5xgt/asset/kantpolitics-pdf] Yet this fails in this circumstance for two reasons: 1) Kant's proscription against government paternalism is not (and cannot be feasibly) adhered to (for example our government has affirmative action, graduated income tax, selective service etc.) 2.) Kant's epistemology, from which his political philosophy is derived, is subject to further contention and enjoys no universal acceptance.

This raises the question of which party holds the burden of demonstrating their position. In this particular court case, supporters of homosexual "marriage" have raised the case and will presumably argue that the US constitution affirms (1) and (2) should thereafter follow from (1). A separate question, related to the truth of (1), is here raised; whether the legal "equality" of (1) extends to subsume sexual orientation. If (1) does, then it would be no valid criteria for discriminating against homosexuals. However, (1) need not and has not generally in US common law been extended to subsume sexual orientation. The first objection to Kant's political theory is here important, because it was mentioned that government legal paternalism and discrimination is often used to serve the "greater good". Given that (1) is selectively, rather consistently applied, and the US government does discriminate on many basis, the case must be made by advocates of homosexual "marriage" why the quality of homosexuality should not be considered a justifiable quality for descrimination. Presumably both supporters and opponents will present their justification in terms of the "public good", yet neither party enjoys an A priori claim to deductive certainty without question begging.

Jeremy

"That certainly is a long-winded way of admitting that you're a bigot, Ryan.

You've given zero reason to think homosexual marriage is objectionable. Of course we all *know* why you think that - your religious beliefs - but you'll be hard-pressed to get those of us who don't share them to agree with you. Perhaps you recognize that, which is why you spent your time (badly) anticipating and analyzing anti-Prop 8 positions rather than answering Jen's question.

As for (1), I've played this game with you for too long to even bother trying to argue. :)
Sorry, there really is no need for name-calling. I just find your views abominable (and you know this, and we're still friends). :)"

Ryan

"Yes of course. I find that I'm most bigoted towards licentiousness, popular culture, anti-intellectualism, social atomism, nominalism, and moral skepticism."

Jen

Ryan, I have several points of response, so I'll break it into a few comments for easier reading. I'll address the main concern first, then take issue with your characterization of political liberalism (my current area of study in pursuit of a PhD), then offer a final comment.
Let’s get to the issue at hand as you’ve posed it: why the quality of homosexuality should NOT be considered a justifiable quality for discrimination. I have several thoughts about this.

For one, the sexual activity performed among homosexuals itself may be abhorrent to some, but is ultimately private, in that it is prohibited from being performed in open spaces and brings no quantifiable harm to the participants, nor to people who merely think about others doing it. Most governmental statutes are based upon quantifiable harm. If there is no quantifiable harm associated with an activity, one would be hard-pressed to pass a law preventing it. If there IS harm associated with homosexuality, let us consider what that harm might be. You’re not required to be homosexual, nor are you required to view related sexual activity of those who are homosexual. The church wouldn’t be required to perform same-sex marriages, anymore than they’re required to marry people who’ve been divorced. I have encountered no credible accounts of quantifiable harm posed by homosexuality itself, unless you count the unhappiness and violence that comes with societal responses; in which case, I might say that Christians experience some of this bigotry and unhappiness, themselves. Well, then, is there some kind of qualitative harm? That can be publicly demonstrated?

An opponent of same-sex marriage should be asked to explain why it is that some people, who think homosexuality is abhorrent, are deemed “right” simply because there are more of them. Face it: in 20 years, there will be more people who are in support of same-sex marriage than not. Will that make them any more right than you think you are? Of course not. So it’s a matter of time, and it still doesn’t settle who’s RIGHT, does it? To be sure, your religious convictions are that it’s wrong. Religious conviction is not a reason that is publicly available. Why should I believe that YOU have privileged access to truth? You wouldn’t believe me if I presented a similarly earnest, considered, Scripture-based, consistent argument from the point of view of my own religion. Nor should you, I think, or I’d lose respect for you as a thinking person. So, this is an intractable dilemma. How should the government decide in cases like this? Well, we know from experience that going with the majority is not always the right thing to do, and the minority has no greater claim. It seems we should probably make a decision that would allow everyone, as far as possible, to retain his or her own strongly held beliefs without penalty and without constraint to participate in others’ beliefs. Otherwise, you may as well admit that what you’re looking for is a theocracy, or some other rule based around a single set of moral standards. If that’s true, we’re done talking.

If you’re not looking for a theocracy, the next question should probably be this: to what extent does secular marriage impede the belief on the part of Christians that marriage is a sacrament? Would secular marriages between people of the same sex violate this belief ANY MORE than marriages between people of opposite sexes who are Islamic? Or atheists? If so, how would you then demonstrate that you’re NOT calling for a theocracy? If you say tradition, I ask: why the tradition of heterosexual marriage and not the tradition of polygamous marriage? Whose tradition, when, and why? And why would your choice of tradition be privileged over mine? Sentimentality? Paternalism?

Shall we go about outlawing ALL marriages that do not take place within the context of a particular sort of church? If so, then we’re back to theocracy, or we have to stretch the definition of “church” to include so very many different kinds of worldviews that we water the notion down so far it might as well be secular.

Shall we say that what the church believes is what it believes and no one should make them do something that goes against their beliefs? YES! Emphatically! But, what does marriage that takes place outside of the church have to do with the church? No one would require churches to perform same-sex marriages, just as no one requires the church to hire homosexuals in pastoral roles.

What morally compelling reason could you possibly have that supports discrimination in this area? Because it would result in discrimination against the beliefs of Christians and other like-minded people, who: a) don’t have to support homosexuality in any way, b) don’t have to perform same-sex marriages, and c) never have to participate in a same-sex marriage? This would be a case of personal moral offense, at worst, in which no one would be compelled to participate. For an analogous example, please see laws under which conscientious objectors are not compelled to fight if drafted, but must still pay taxes and serve a government involved in a personally morally offensive war.

You don’t have the right not to be offended, and you lose NO consideration under the law if same-sex marriage is instituted. On the other hand, an entire sector of the population is denied similar consideration under (at last count) over 1000 laws and statutes that REQUIRE one to be heterosexual.

This isn’t “for the public good.” It’s a request for logical consistency in the application of the law, and the insistence of the church itself on non-governmental status. Either marriage is religious, or it’s secular. To attempt a hybrid is to produce logical inconsistency on one side or the other. If you want two different statuses, fine: let people get “married” in the church and then go get their secular governmental legal unions down at the courthouse. If they don’t want to get “married,” great! Let them go get their secular governmental legal unions down at the courthouse so they get the consistent application of those 1000+ laws… laws which are about rendering unto Caesar, aren’t addressed in Scripture, and are of no concern to those who render unto God what is God’s.

On political liberalism (this is shorter, I promise): I believe your characterization of political liberalism (PL) to be grossly misrepresentative. In regard to (1), that “all persons should be afforded equal recognition and privilege according to the law,” I would do a spit-take if asked to agree to this, as, I believe, would most proponents of PL. One might immediately ask, “at what times and in what spheres should which people be afforded what privileges and what sort of recognition?” For instance, one would most certainly want to deny some privileges to convicted felons or to children (time factor). Further, one would most certainly want to say that there are spheres in which not all people should have an equal voice or receive equal privilege. For instance, because I am not a member of the Catholic Church, the Church should have no obligation to recognize my voice as one that is equal to another parishioner, or to an archbishop; and the Church should by no means be obligated to consider hiring me to run a Bible study (even if I have the requisite knowledge). So, no, your characterization of PL is not one most proponents of PL would even remotely support.

So, you ask, what would be a better characterization of PL? Well, if we’re talking about formal conditions for creating an acceptable theory of justice, I’m partial to John Rawls, myself. But, we’re not talking about that. We’re talking about the material conditions under which actual people actually have to live. In these cases, I think Michael Walzer captures the essence of PL best when he says that success in one political/social sphere should not translate into success in another sphere. If you are successful in the economic sphere, that shouldn’t mean you get more influence in the sphere of religion, and vice versa (c.f.: indulgences). If you’re a famous actor, that shouldn’t get you a university degree. Let each sphere function as separately as possible in order to avoid ambiguity about which social rules apply to whom; people should know what rules apply when and where. Government, under PL thus described, might then be a neutral meeting-ground and arbiter wherein no particular sphere has any more power than any other. This doesn’t rely on sentimentality or paternalism. Rather, it deeply acknowledges the depth and breadth of our intractably different worldviews and convictions, our conflicting comprehensive doctrines. It offers ideas about how to arbitrate differences among people without taking a side as to who is right.

Finally, I will add not what is on my mind, but what is on my heart. Love is the wellspring of truth. Love overcomes much and suffers much. If what you say comes from legalism, from adherence to the requirements of man’s reason, and not from simple love for another human being, you’ve lost your way. What you say has no heart in it. I’m disappointed, if only because those with the brains to be guardians so rarely have the love to be shepherds.

Ryan

Jen, I am very pleased that you have written this thoughtful, courteous, and well-reasoned response to my initial argument which (as Jeremy and you surely pointed out) criticized only the vulgar means by which the moral rightness of extending marital benefits to homosexual partners is commonly inferred. Your detailed response, which admirably anticipates possible counter-arguments, hints at the branching complexity of this issue and examines aspects of it which I had heretofore taken little notice of. In consideration of these complexities, I admit that my initial consideration of the subject was far too succinct. Rather than preoccupy yourself with the tangential logical and epistemological questions which I swiftly proposed and thereafter dismissed with, you correctly focused on the subject of preeminent importance which I had hastily mentioned without further examination. I attempted to write a succinct response which adequately engaged with your general(if not specific) criticisms. I admittedly didn't discuss the specifics within the chain of reasoning which you previously presented, but aimed rather address the argumentative difficulties of this position.

You wrote: "What morally compelling reason could you possibly have that supports discrimination in this area?" I will not here address the moral criticisms of homosexuality, not because there are none but rather because they are not the sort which an irreligious audience would find especially compelling. If you require that pious opponents of homosexuality should produce an ethical criticism of homosexuality which relies on communicable and universally accepted reason alone, then you as well as I surely know that no such rational critique can be made absent of an appeal to theology, intuition, or teleology. Yet the requirement that we derive our ethical and political conclusions from the present political system is also without warrant. The present secular polity under whose sovereignty we now live is not necessary, but rather the contingent result of the time and place of our birth. You wrote: "This isn’t 'for the public good.' It’s a request for logical consistency in the application of the law, and the insistence of the church itself on non-governmental status." To claim that critiques of homosexuality must be derived from the present constitution of our secular republic is to presume an ideologically advantageous claim to the valid and invalid moral judgments of the human mind. Neither is it necessary to support secular policies within a secular republic, which I aim to demonstrate would be a practical contradiction. This is the trap which liberals so often aim to secretly lay for their moralizing opposition. It is reflective, not of the pious opponent of homosexuality, but rather of the limiting nature of the political discourse which informs political liberalism. Although political liberalism makes pretentions to universality, the self-referentiality and self-interestedness of its exclusive discourse reveals the partiality of its political promise. Rather than displaying universal magnanimity, liberalism is revealed to be merely one among many political ideologies, which boisterously announce themselves as universal, yet are shown upon further examination to service the particular interests of its supporters.

I would like offer a justification for my advocacy of what may appear as a partial moral judgment which will make problematic any practical application of John Rawls's theory. John Rawls's theory of the Original Position advocates that groups of people who hold beliefs in partial moral judgments which are not universally held, or are otherwise founded upon reasons which are not publically available and universally comprehensible(such as esoteric insight or divine revelation) should limit their support to those laws and public policies whose rational basis is publically available and universally comprehensible. John Rawls's original position, which you appear to invoke when you wrote "An opponent of same-sex marriage should be asked to explain why it is that some people, who think homosexuality is abhorrent, are deemed “right” simply because there are more of them." and "Religious conviction is not a reason that is publicly available. Why should I believe that YOU have privileged access to truth?", requires that people who believe in moral judgments which are not universally shared should simultaneously continue to maintain these beliefs while limiting their support of legislation to those moral judgments which enjoy universally shared.

The problem arises here because it seems to be a practical contradiction for a person to simultaneously believe in the universal efficacy of a moral judgment while also limiting one's support to those moral judgments which enjoy more popular approval. This is not simply a question of whether a person should limit their support to these laws, but rather how is it possibly consistent believe in a moral judgment while not supporting its universal application? We might answer that we are in fact referring to two types of moral judgments; some of which are merely whimsical preferences- like pistachio and vanilla ice cream- for which we might like people to adopt but are unconcerned if they should so long as my preferences are not infringed upon, while others are foundational values which we would wish to be universally adopted. The latter foundational value judgments are moral creeds which claim universality like Zoroastrianism or Political Liberalism, for which the term "moral judgment" more properly applies. Yet to cease to support of these moral judgments is thereby to deny their universal applicability. This could be done if we were to adopt the judgment that the liberal principle of toleration for moral diversity is of greater moral worth than a universal moral creed of Zoroastrianism. Yet a Zoroastrian could not elevate the principle of toleration to a position of a status of superior moral worth to his own moral doctrines without denying the universality of these doctrine, and thereby devaluing them as merely helpful for or the preference of a Zoroastrian. A universal creed like Zoroastrianism offers no reason to do so and any advocacy of this idea will surely fall into the practical contradiction of enjoining people to believe in a universal moral judgment while prohibiting themselves from advocating its political support.

Although you did not mention it, the topic of discrimination is relevant to the present contention insofar as it references which party is responsible for actively making these distinctions which result in some inequity. I will argue that the development of novel sexual categories has been appropriated in the rhetoric of homosexual activists to misrepresent the issue for the partial benefit of homosexuals. Homosexual activists generally presume (or at least use rhetoric which appears to indicate) that "homosexual" and "heterosexual" persons constitute two distinct, mutually exclusive and innate groupings of the human population for which no valid value judgment can be assigned. These activists will be argue that the overwhelming preponderance of heterosexuals has historically led to laws, ideologies, and artistic representations which valorize and falsely ascribe normativity to heterosexuals whilst unfairly denigrating homosexuals. With this in mind it will be claimed that laws and social arrangements which require a person to be heterosexual thereby exclude, and unfairly discriminate against homosexuals.

This conceptual apparatus, in which a dominate majority grants itself privileges while denying these to a minority, invites parallels to previous movements to eliminate historical forms of discrimination such as Dr. King's admirable leadership in protesting the Jim Crow laws. The analogy to the Civil Rights movement to end discrimination against African Americans is important to homosexual activists because this widely applauded and historically successful political campaign for the government recognition and protection from discrimination, offers supporters of the homosexual identity an ideological reference, a sympathetic comparison, and the hopeful assurance of an eventual legislative victory. With this in mind, advocates of the homosexual identity have misleadingly equated the cultural and racial distinctiveness of African Americans with the psycho-sexual features of homosexuals. While the question of homosexuality invokes questions of sexual normativity which are absent from most of the discussion concerning racial minorities. Nonetheless, there are interesting parallels between the identity conflicts of the post-war era and the nationalistic conflicts which preceded it; all of whom organized politically, produced chauvinistic ideologies, contrived a heretofore unknown mythos of cultural homogeneity, the belief in providential justice, and aggrandizement through historical struggle.

Advocates of homosexuals present(at least rhetorically if not also ideologically) the "discrimination of homosexuals" as a scenario in which "homosexuals" and "heterosexuals" are two morally equivocal, coherent, and distinct domains of all persons in which the preponderant majority of "heterosexuals" grants themselves exclusive social and legal privileges which are similarly denied to the minority of "homosexuals". Yet this presentation does not meet the standard of moral skepticism and neutrality invoked as the method of determining legislation with Political Liberalism. The presumptions of coherency and moral neutrality are necessary to maintain this conceptual framework, in whose absence the conceptual apparatus would swiftly collapse. Yet there seems little reason, apart from the rhetoric of homosexual activists to presume that either should be adopted without invoking methods which political liberalism would deny.First, there is a question for which no answer seems plausible; why should conservative opponents of the homosexual identity accept the moral neutrality of homosexuality, which moral skepticism doesn't appear to establish. Second, how is it that we should categorize the behavior of homosexuality, and also those persons who display this behavior? In the absence of an empirical explanation of the origins and causes of this behavior(which may be beyond the possibilities of empirical science), a categorization of homosexuality which doesn't invoke theology or teleology will be terribly problematic.

An Aristotelian teleological conception of nature, adopted in Natural Law ethics, has the philosophical resources to present homosexuality within a broader natural taxonomy. Yet this is not a conceptual schema which homosexual activists would readily adopt, as Aristotelian teleology presents homosexuality as the inverse of normative reproduction-oriented sexuality. With this Natural Law presumption (with which I will refer to this conceptualization), the socially normative heterosexuality has greater psychological and biological coherency- and thereby also moral worth. The equal and impartial comparison of heterosexual persons and homosexual persons would consequently become untenable. Instead, we would conceive of the comparison as one in which heterosexuality was both healthy and morally correct, while homosexuality would be conceived of as a psycho-sexual pathology (curiously it was only as late as 1973 that the American Psychological Association declassified homosexuality as a mental disorder). To some extent (I'm admittedly unfamiliar with the specifics of sexual psychology), this teleological conception of nature remains apart of psychiatric nosology; in recognition of which Gadpille(1972) has described homosexuality as an "abiological maladaptation".

This alternative presumption, in which heterosexuality is normative and healthy while homosexuality is deviant and pathological, is admittedly founded upon a purposive and teleological conception of nature and morality which is in some sense religious( insofar as it requires the acceptance of the judgment of teleology in nature which cannot be confirmed or denied by science). If this alternative Natural Law conceptualization is presumed, then the moral equivocability of "heterosexuals" and "homosexuals" vanishes; to be replaced by a conception of a majority population which is psychologically healthy (and normative) with a small minority population which is pathological. Because people with pathological conditions are considered a subset of the general population with additional physiological or psychological health complications, persons who identify as homosexuals would similarly be conceptually subsumed within the general population, rather than being afforded the privileged conceptual status of an identity equivocal (or nearly equivocal) with the identities of sex and gender. Homosexuals would henceforth be considered male and female persons agitating for privileged legal arrangements which serve their particular sub-culture's(by which I mean those who adopt the ideology of homosexual identity and liberation) interest. In the absence of a conceptually coherent and morally equivocal identity, no exclusionary discrimination of persons identifying themselves as homosexuals would be apparent. Those persons who would seek to advance the particular interest of homosexuals would rather be guilty of artificial distinctions; which had been concocted for their particular socio-political advancement, aggrandizement, and legal privileges.

The aforementioned conceptual scheme is relevant for the reasons previously mentioned; namely, if a religion invokes a teleological conception of nature and a person genuinely(rather than whimsically) believes in this religion, then it would be a practical inconsistency to both believe in the moral claims which are derived from this teleological conception of nature and to cease to support their universal application through the auspices of the nation-state. This teleological conceptual schema is not widely accepted among the political left, yet the juxtaposition of this conceptual arrangement and historical narrative displays the partiality(rather than universality) of the identarian narrative constructed by homosexual activists. While these moral judgments are presented as neutral and objective, they are in fact the historical result of novel moral judgments and conceptual categories which ignore inherited religious taxonomies and moral reprimands; favoring instead a conceptualization that serves the interests of secularists, social libertarians, and homosexual activists.

You wrote: "You don’t have the right not to be offended, and you lose NO consideration under the law if same-sex marriage is instituted. On the other hand, an entire sector of the population is denied similar consideration under (at last count) over 1000 laws and statutes that REQUIRE one to be heterosexual." The socio-political and legal advantages which homosexual activists attempt to procure should not be misconstrued as without relevance to the remainder of society. I would be willing to consider, as a compromise for the present demands, an allowance for homosexuals to be granted "civil unions" with the same legal and tax exemptions which heterosexual couples enjoy, yet this differential treatment of homosexual couples would likely be unacceptable to homosexual activists. This is because the implicit aim of homosexual activists is to enact a broad reconceptualization of gender and sexuality; which homosexual activists and their accomplices intend to be socially conceived of as morally unquestionable and elective, rather than customary and innate. This is the reason for the especial emphasis which homosexual activists place on validation of their idenity through the legal sanctioning of homosexual "marriage" by the state. The popular rhetoric of "discrimination" with which advocates of the homosexual identity so freely disparage their critics, is meant to silence religious and moral opposition as "hateful", "bigoted", illiberal prudery. This rhetoric is not simply restricted to issues of marriage in California, but rather aims to be widely adopted and subsequently utilized by the general public; with the further aim of socially denigrating and maligning well intentioned moral opposition to the broad acceptance of this ideology of homosexual identity. The narrative and rhetoric of homosexual liberation may also serve the purposes of cynical liberals who would otherwise have little to agitate against. For these supporters of the homosexual identity, the cause of homosexual liberation serves as an emotional catharsis, with which to militate against unfulfilled liberal utopianism and as a means of politically confronting social conservatives.

Immanuel Kant's theory of the transcendental Freedom of the Will

2010-07-11T21:17:00.000-07:00

Interview with Pablo on Immanuel Kant's theory of the transcendental Freedom of the Will

Prussian Philosopher Immanuel Kant

The problem of whether man's free will is compatible with the apparently deterministic laws of natural science was especially troubling to thoughtful men of the 18th century, due principally to the newfound popularity of Newtonian physics and its corresponding "universal laws of motion". Philosophers were greatly distraught by the apparent determinism which these universal natural laws of motion implied, and whether this new science meant that all notions of Man's free will would now be obsolete. The Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume responded to this problem by criticizing the possibility of gaining definitive knowledge of the truth of those causal connections which we perceived as cause and effect. However, this skepticism concerning universal causation merely served to bring the new science of Newtonian physics into doubt, and did not also demonstrate the possibility of free will of agent-determining moral action. The Prussian(German) philosopher Immanuel Kant(1724-1804) was deeply troubled by this apparently irresolvable skepticism of causal determinism, which raised fundamental doubts about the possibility of natural science and human freedom. At the age of 46, Kant began his "silent period" of uninterrupted isolation and dedicated contemplation of this very problem which would last eleven years. When Kant finally emerged, he was ready to publish the Critique of Pure Reason(1781), which would be followed within the decade by the Critique of Practical Reason(1788) and the Critique of Judgment(1790). These three great critiques explored, through the faculties of reason, the very potential and limitations of reason, judgment, and human understanding. Kant believed that he had discovered the solution to the problem which David Hume had raised concerning the incompatibility of universal causal determinism and human freedom(which philosophers call 'incompatibilism'). The following is a recorded discussion(edited for clarity) in which I discussed with Pablo the solution which Kant offers to this apparent problem.

Definition of Terms:

Causal Connectivity: This is the connection which is inferred to exist between the cause and effect of
any perception.

Determinism: This is the consistent universal relation of all perceived events in an inalterable chain of cause and effect.

Free Will: This is the freedom of a person to act apart from the causal influence of those causes which precede and determine effects in a sequence of cause and effect.

Causa Sui: This is the possibility of a self-caused effect, which has no preceding and determining cause for which it exists. Agent-Directed causa sui is thought to be necessary for the possibility of Free Will.

A Priori knowledge: That knowledge which is known independently of, and prior to, experience of the world.

A Posteriori Knowledge: That knowledge which is known of, and proven through experience of the world.

Postulate or Axiom: This is a premise in a logical argument whose truth is supposed, yet remains inconclusive as to whether it is either true or false.

Deduction:: This the logical and mathematical appraisal of whether the premises of an argument necessarily entail(or may be inferred as) the conclusion of the argument.

Induction: This is the sensory perception of phenomena and claims which may be made on the basis based on these experiences of phenomena.

Kant's theory of Free Will Interview with Pablo Vasquez.

[Tuesday December 1st 2009, 6:04-7:22pm]

[18:04] Ryan: I would like to tell you how it is possible to resolve the apparent conflict between Free Will and Determinism. I have determined how the difficulty might be successfully overcome.

[18:06] Pablo: I have a full hour, if you'd like to start.

[18:07] Ryan: alright. First, are you familiar with David Hume's criticism of commonly held view of causal connectivity?

[18:07] Pablo: Somewhat. Please overview it for me.

[18:09] Ryan: Alright. It is commonly held that just as "if A then B" entails "B" if "A" is true, then so too does "object A colliding with object B" compel "B" to move in equal and opposite reaction to object "A", as per Newton's 3rd law of motion.

[David Hume described the problem in "An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding". Here "reason" refers the deductive reasoning of mathematical logic and "induction" refers to what is perceived by the senses. First, Hume ponders the discovery of causal relations, which form the basis for what he refers to as "matters of fact." He argues that causal relations are known not by reason, but by induction. This is because for any cause, multiple effects are conceivable, and the actual effect cannot be determined by reasoning about the cause; instead, one must observe occurrences of the causal relation to discover that it holds. For example, when one thinks of "a billiard ball moving in a straight line toward another," one can conceive that the first ball bounces back with the second ball remaining at rest, the first ball stops and the second ball moves, or the first ball jumps over the second, etc. There is no reason to conclude any of these possibilities over the others. Only through previous observation can it be predicted, inductively, what will actually happen with the balls. In general, it is not necessary that causal relation in the future resemble causal relations in the past, as it is always conceivable otherwise. (More information:http://www.iep.utm.edu/humeepis/)]

[18:09] Pablo: Indeed.

[18:09] Ryan: David Hume criticized this view in "an Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding". Here he successfully showed that we can only know the effects of causal connectivity(that A compels B ) through experience, which provides no universally valid, or a priori logical laws of causation.

[18:11] Pablo: Indeed

[18:13] Ryan: However, if causal connectivity were merely perceived rather than actual in the universe, then both the laws of natural science would be inoperative, and human action would be impotent (because our willful actions couldn't be expected to produce predictable results). This is the problem which Kant set out to solve in the three critiques. [The Critique of Pure Reason(1781), The Critique of Practical Reason(1788),The Critique of Judgment(1790)]

[18:13] Ryan: Do you follow?

[18:14] Pablo: Yes, indeed. Do continue.

[18:15] Ryan: Alright. Kant concedes, as per Hume's critique, that it is true that we only continuously perceive, rather than know a priori that causal connectivity is operable in the natural world. Further, Kant argues that we can only, and must necessarily postulate some form of determinism as a precondition for the functioning of both natural science and human action. Now, a postulate is a logical axiom which is adopted, not necessarily because it is true(as its truth cannot be validated without a supporting argument), but rather merely on account of its utility in allowing for the present argument to function.

[18:17] Ryan: Do you follow this?

[18:17] Pablo: Yes, do continue.

[18:20] Ryan: Alright. Now Kant also says that we must necessarily also postulate the truth of free will for moral action to be possible. This is the case because without the freedom of the will, we cannot be held morally responsible for our actions. This position, in which determinism(or not free will) is incompatible with moral responsibility, is called "incompatibilism".[more information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incompatibilism]

[18:21] Ryan: So, because we want to act morally (or even effectively), we must necessarily postulate free will and moral responsibility as a precondition for human (and moral) action.

[18:22] Pablo: I see, yes, excellent point.

[18:24] Ryan: Alright, now a paradox arises here because if determinism is true, then free will is necessarily false. So if we postulate determinism (which is necessary for science and prediction) then we must deny the truth of free will. Further, if we postulate free will(which is necessary for moral action) then we cannot simultaneously hold determinism to be true. Hence there arises a logical paradox in which a proposition(either determinism or free will) is held to be true and false simultaneously, in violation of the laws of logic! [ ¬(P ∨ ¬P), for more information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_non-contradiction]

[18:25] Pablo: Quite so.

[18:26] Ryan: And now we come to where "ever-victorious" Immanual Kant, to whom immortal praise glorie and honor are forever due, triumphs over David Hume's skepticism.

[18:27] Ryan: Kant first distinguishes two abstract domains of human thought: pure theoretical reason and pure practical reason.

[18:28] Ryan: As an abbreviation of these terms, I will hereafter use "Pr" and "pr" to describe "pure reason"(Pr) and "practical reason"(pr) respectively.

[18:28] Pablo: Of course.

I made this picture to illustrate Kant's theory of cognition.

[18:30] Ryan: The former (Pr) is employed to cognize relations of a priori deductions; those of logic, mathematics, spacio-temporal arrangements, as well as the categories of understanding (unity, plurality, extension) etc. The latter (pr) is used to understand the relation to empirical phenomena and a posteriori things of experience, such as tying shoe laces, navigating while walking, chewing etc. In the first "Critique of Pure Reason", Kant grants to (Pr) the powers of theory and imagination, and to (pr) the power of understanding and judgment.

[18:32] Ryan: Now, one might question how the interaction between the faculties of pure reason(Pr) and practical reason(pr) can occur. For example, one would need to know spacial relations and deduction to know how to navigate while walking. Kant agrees that this is a difficult problem, and in the first and third Critiques he argues* that we use our faculty of "determinate judgment", with which to apply the theoretical ideas of (Pr) to the practical circumstances and experiences of (pr).

[*The comprehensibility of the most frustrating section of the first Critique, the "Transcendental Deduction of Categories", has been a consistently disputed topic among Kantians and later Idealists such as Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer and Hegel. Kant attempted to offer a more compelling account of this in the third "Critique of Judgement", and it remains a central question in Kantian scholarship and German Idealism as to how this 'Pure Reason-Practical Reason problem'(which mirrors the 'Mind-Body problem') might be resolved.]

[18:33] Ryan: For instance. If I see a ball, I can make the determinate judgment that it is a sphere by applying the idea of a sphere from pure reason(Pr) to the empirical phenomena of the sight of the ball.

[18:34] Ryan: Judgments of this sort are done reflexively and fairly instantaneously as you might imagine.

[18:34] Pablo: I see, yes.

[18:37] Ryan: Alright, here is where this question becomes a bit more complicated. As I mentioned before, both determinism and free will are postulates which are necessarily made for the functioning of practical reasoning(pr), and not those of theoretical reasoning(Pr).

[18:38] Ryan: Further, Kant states(and we will return to this later) that neither the truth of determinism nor that of the freedom of the will can be theoretically(Pr) demonstrated to be either true or false. That determinism cannot be shown to be theoretically true follows from the conclusiveness of David Hume's aforementioned critique of causal connectivity.

[This is David Hume's conclusion, which Kant and I accept as valid, that the truth of causal connectivity cannot be demonstrated either deductively or a priori, and must generally be assumed due to our continual perception of apparent causal connections.]

[18:39] Ryan: Now, Free Will cannot be shown to be true because of the requirement that for the Will to be free would mean to have the quality of "causa sui", or self-causation, and so also to be without an antecedent and determining cause.

["Causa sui" is a technical term of medieval scholasticism meaning "the cause of itself". The 17th-century physics of Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibnitz contained as self-evident axioms within them, the idea of universal causal laws of motion and the principle of sufficient reason. The acceptance of these two principles led inevitably to a conception of the universe in which all effects must necessarily be preceded by a sufficient cause. As A causes B, and B causes C, and on and on ad infinitum, we arrive at a conception of universal causation which requires a previous antecedent cause for every subsequent effect. As a the circumstances of a person's birth and life are preceded by and thought to be caused by effects which precede their birth, so too would everything about them, as well as all those decisions which they might make in life, be thereby causally determined by events prior to their conception. The term "causa sui" refers to those acausal instances in which an effect has no previous cause, and is thereby simultaneously both the effect and its own cause. Prior to Newtonian mechanics, God, the will of human beings, and miracles where all thought to occur in this way. (More information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_sufficient_reason, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causa_sui)]

[18:40] Ryan: Kant acknowledges that the "causa sui" quality of the will, cannot be theoretically demonstrated, and doesn't generally conform to our experiences of the natural world, where we perceive causal connectivity to be the norm.

[The impossibility of demonstrating "causa sui" or the self-causation of the will also follows from David Hume's criticism of the indemonstrability of causal connectivity.]

[18:41] Pablo: Indeed.

[18:51] Ryan: Now recall that Kant argued that the practical belief, or postulate, in and for the truth of causal connectivity is a necessary "practical postulate", or hypothesis of human action. Yet, we know from David Hume's criticism that the mere postulate of causal connectivity is not sufficient to theoretically demonstrate determinism, however necessary it may be for the practical belief in deterministic causal laws.

[18:55] Ryan: Here, Kant and I argue that the practical(pr) postulate of a deterministic universe is of no relevance to our ability to otherwise postulate, in our daily actions, the existence of the causa sui quality of and freedom of the Will. This follows because we have already accepted (due to David Hume) that determinism cannot be theoretically(Pr) demonstrated as an a priori law of reason, but must instead be merely presumed as a necessary postulate with which to speculate about the universal laws of natural science(for example Newton's Three Laws of Motion).

[18:58] Ryan: To clarify, we can willfully alternatively adopt the hypothetical postulate of free will and causa sui in our practical moral decisions, so long as there is no a priori and theoretical (Pr) argument which opposes and invalidates these postulates. It is admitted that we cannot practically(pr) postulate a theoretically(Pr) impossible axiom because, we cannot genuinely(with contrite judgment) adopt a practical(pr) postulate which contradicts what we know theoretically(Pr). If we attempted to do so, we would be deceiving ourselves and by acting contrary to our theoretical beliefs without a defensible theoretical justification.

[19:01] Ryan: Now, the English philosopher Galen Strawson argues that there is an a priori reason for not holding the postulate of Free Will to be true. He argues that 1.) causa sui (and Free Will as well) is impossible under deterministic natural causal laws, and 2.) that even if causa sui (and Free Will) were possible postulates of practical reason, then regardless there would be no means of judging according to a "causa sui" free choice, rather than our previously inherited circumstances(mental states, dispositions, biases etc.).

[19:02] Pablo: I see.

[19:01] Ryan: Now there is one further counter-argument which I would like to address. The English philosopher Galen Strawson(the son of the celebrated philosopher P.F. Strawson) argues that there is an a priori reason for not holding the postulate of Free Will to be true. He argues that 1.) causa sui (and Free Will as well) is impossible under deterministic natural causal laws, and 2.) that even if causa sui (and Free Will) were possible postulates of practical reason, then regardless there would be no means of judging according to a "causa sui" free choice, rather than our previously inherited circumstances(mental states, dispositions, biases etc.).

[19:02] Pablo: I see.

[19:03] Ryan: His first argument (1) is shown to be false because he unjustifiably supposes that causa sui is impossible. For causa sui to be impossible, and Strawson's presupposition to be true, determinism would have to be conclusively true and thereby universally binding. However, we have already accepted that it is impossible to demonstrate the truth of determinism. Therefore, neither determinism, nor argument (1) can be justifiably be accepted as true.

[19:04] Ryan: Now, if we postulate determinism as a precondition for natural causal laws, then causa sui and free will cannot be possible. However this postulate is only made necessary as a precondition for the study and understanding of the laws and mechanisms of natural science, and need not be consistently adopted for judgments of practical reason(pr), or moral actions in general. Indeed, it cannot be adopted as a postulate of practical reason(pr) and moral actions, without raising the practical contradiction of believing in determinism while simultaneously acting, as though one were free, to effect some future and conceivably indeterminate cause.

[19:06] Ryan: the second argument (2) is more difficult to refute as it appears to require a conceptual account of cognition which allows for causa sui as well as freely-willed judgments, independent of those previous involuntary facts of inherited biases, dispositions, and mental states. This is the case, because although we might practically(pr) postulate the freedom of the Will, if the freedom of the Will is nonetheless logically and theoretically(Pr) impossible, then we might assuredly come to know theoretically(Pr) that we are merely postulating falsehoods rather than the actual qualities of the cosmos. Further, regardless of our knowledge of our determinism, if the existence of causa sui and the freedom of Will is logically impossible, then no amount of willful protest can overcome our previously inherited determination.

[In the first Critique, Kant offers a helpful distinction between 'transcendental freedom' and 'practical freedom'. Transcendental freedom is that quality of the universe and our minds in which universal causal determinism is false, and human agents are wholly free from the determinism of antecedent causes(what philosophers call 'libertarianism'). Practical freedom is rather the moral freedom to act without a determinate influence from involuntary inclinations(such as concupiscence, lethargy, hunger, or wrathfulness). Kant believes that, whether we could come to or not know of universal determinism and the truth of 'transcendental freedom', is a question of pure theoretical reason(Pr), while acting with moral and 'practical freedom' in our daily affairs is a concern for practical reason(pr).]

[19:10] Ryan: Now, for this argument, in which causa sui and the freedom of the will are impossible, to be universally binding it would be necessary to conclusively show that causa sui is not only impossible in this universe(which was attempted with argument 1 and yet has been shown to be inconclusive), but also that the freedom of the will is metaphysically impossible; or impossible in any possible universe regardless of that particular universes physical laws due to the metaphysically binding laws of logic! [More information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_possibility]

[19:10] Pablo: Haha, indeed.

[19:11] Ryan: This raises two questions; 1.) what is the criteria for metaphysical impossibility, and 2.) does the postulate of the causa sui freedom of the will violate these criteria. I should stop to notify you here, that these criteria of metaphysical impossibility are enormously difficult to satisfy because they must be valid and irrefutable a priori - or merely on account of the very laws of logic.

[19:13] Ryan: The most commonly mentioned criteria of metaphysical impossibility is inconceivability. Because we can only conceive of logically possible things, it is generally held that a logical or metaphysically possible thing must similarly be conceivable. If a thing is inconceivable then it is generally thought to violates the laws of logic, and thereby also to be metaphysically possible.

[19:13] Ryan: Now, is causa sui and the freedom of the will conceivable? The answer is Yes! As no antecedent and deterministic cause to our wills can be conceived, human minds must always and everywhere phenomenologically perceive ourselves as willing our actions causa sui. This mere fact alone satisfies the criteria of conceivability for the able functioning of our practical reason(pr).

[This is Kant's, as well as my own, belief which I find to correspond with my inner sensation(or phenomenological perception) of my volition. This is an apodictic or self-evident assertion for which no argument(to my knowledge) can be given. Rather it must be perceived immediately and always by ourselves. It can easily be perceived by envisioning some prior cause which thereby determines your actions. Kant and I believe that this would be impossible to imagine because 1.) no preceding mental event can be perceived as the determining cause of our will to act, and 2.) because even if (1) were true, this would merely be a mental perception of causal connectivity which cannot be held to be true a priori (due to David Hume's critique).]

[19:15] Ryan: Here Galen Strawson aims to raise one final objection; that even if causa sui is phenomenalogically conceivable and functional for practical reason(pr), then it still does not follow that a conceivable account of causa sui, and transcendental freedom, can be given and conceived of theoretically(Pr). Strawson believes that it is necessary to offer a positive theoretical explanation of the transcendental freedom of the Will, for the practical freedom of the Will to be conceivable. If this were true and no positive account could be offered, then it would follow that the practical freedom of the Will is merely illusory and factually unreal. Furthermore, we have already established that neither universal determinism nor the transcendental freedom of the Will can be theoretically demonstrated. However, the indemonstrability of the transcendental freedom of the Will or of universal determinism, is not logically sufficient to conclusively discredit the metaphysical possibility of transcendental freedom or of universal determinism. Instead, we are left, as Socrates so often found himself, in a state of aporia, or a logical and conceptual impasse from which no conclusions can be forthcoming. The indemonstrability of either of these theoretical postulates(Pr) does not invalidate, but instead allows for the free postulation of either hypothesis(determinism or free will) by practical reasoning(pr). It is inconclusive whether Kant believed he had shown that the transcendental freedom of the will was true*, yet and later German idealists believed that he had conclusively saved the practical freedom of the will from the specter of determinism!

[*Although it is apparent from the Critique of Practical Reason that Kant believed he had overcome the problem of free will and determinism, there remains some contention among Kantian scholars, concerning whether Kant believed in the transcendental freedom of the will, or only the practical freedom of the will. Henry Allison in "Kant's Theory of Freedom"(1990), and Derek Pereboom's paper "Kant on Transcendental Freedom" in the journal "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research" argue in favor of Kant's theoretical account of the transcendental freedom of the Will. However, Allen Wood presents Kant as arguing merely for the practical freedom of the Will in "Kant's Compatibilism"(1994). http://www.arts.cornell.edu/phil/homepages/pereboom/KTFprfin2.pdf]

[19:19] Ryan: Because our daily actions of practical reasoning (pr) are informed by and generally correspond to the dictates of pure reason(Pr), our practical actions must generally, if not universally, obey the theoretical determinations of pure reason(Pr). To postulate that we have the freedom of the will, is not mere wishful thinking. Rather, the inherent unknowability of the truth or falsity of either determinism or causa sui, requires that we make this practical postulate. Further, we need only to postulate this as an axiom of practical reason(pr), to act with the belief in free will and moral responsibility in our daily affairs.

[Kant will argue further that, although we might theoretically believe in determinism, we nonetheless cannot act with practical consistency while holding this practical understanding. To do so would result in a practical(pr) (rather than logical or theoretical(Pr)) contradiction in which we should simultaneously act with the understanding that we were both free and not free.]

[19:21] Ryan: To conclude, if it is conceivable, and thereby possible, to postulate without a logical fallacy the causa sui freedom of the will, and for this reason it may thereby be freely postulated without practical(pr) or theoretical contradiction(Pr).

[19:22] Ryan: With this line of argument, the apparent conflict between determinism and free will is resolved.

[19:23] Pablo Vasquez: Absolutely fascinating.

[With this argument concluded, I implore all you who read this to daily act with the genuine confidence in your transcendental freedom to dutifully obey your very own self-legislating moral duties. Proclaim far and wide the philosophic gospel of Immanuel Kant.]

Dedication to Immanuel Kant:
Kant described overwhelming and terrifying aesthetic delight as a feeling of the sublime. If an undiluted insight into the very nature of cognition and reality can ring with the same finality as a new and harmonious melody, then I should loudly proclaim that the three great critiques of Immanuel Kant are surely the most sublime work of recorded human ingenuity. Now I feel assured that the mind actively synthesizes the perceptions of space and time into a coherent apperceptive unity. I have theoretically confirmed what I had heretofore known only in practice; that I am, at every moment, bound by the apodictic rational duty to my own self-legislating moral law, yet simultaneously practically free from the determination of outside causal forces.

I still find it astonishing to have had the philosophic dilemmas of my youth dismantled and thereafter reconstituted so as to grant my mind a brilliant new awareness of space, time, cognition, freedom, beauty, and the moral law. Johann Gottlieb Fichte confided a similar feeling to his friend in 1790 upon reading the three critiques: "I have been living in a new world ever since reading the Critique of Practical Reason... Propositions which I thought could never be overturned have been overturned for me. Things have been proven to me which I thought could not be proven - concepts of absolute freedom, and the concept of duty. I feel all the happier for it." The arrival of this insight was entirely unmerited, as it might have heretofore been imagined that our discursive and unruly intellects should have struggled unendingly with these intransigent paradoxes. That their answer should have been so fittingly and perspicaciously revealed gives me a renewed and ever-greater hope for our future, as well as a far deeper respect for the inestimable potential of Man's angelic reason.

All glorie and honor we give to thee o' Kant whose miraculous theophanie hast sav'd Mankind from the devastating skepticism of David Hume. Praise Kant! Zuruck zu Kant! Praise Kant! Hallow'd is his name forever and ever.

Paul Harvey's "Immanuel Kant with Flowers and Painting"
Acrylic on canvas, 92 x 71cm
http://www.paulharveypaintings.com/

A Short Refutation of the Principle of Hereditary Succession

2010-07-11T21:16:00.000-07:00

A Short Refutation of the Principle of Hereditary Succession

the Union of Lublin(1569) replaced the personal union of the Kingdom of Poland and the Kingdom of Lithuania with an elected King, a common Senate and Parliament. This painting is by Jan Matejko.

Due to the extended history of male primogeniture among world monarchies, it may at first seem meaningless to question whether it is just for a monarchy to choose its subsequent sovereign upon the principles of hereditary succession. With the political and military triumph of American Liberalism after the end of the Second World War, the purpose of existing monarchies has come under dispute and their future remains uncertain. It is my hope that a thoughtful examination of this question will provide some stimulus for a re-evaluation of the function and purpose of monarchies in the 21st century. Although the principle of hereditary succession could foreseeably be critiqued for both its socio-political and economic inefficiencies, in this essay I will focus on its most decisive failing; that of justice. Using the political philosophy of the recently deceased political liberal John Rawls(1921-2002), I will attempt to demonstrate the following:

1.) If a government does not adhere to the principles of justice, then this government does not have justified political authority(JPA)

2.) A government which chooses its subsequent sovereign through the method of hereditary succession does not satisfiably adhere to the principles justice.

3.) A government which is bereft of JPA ought be reformed or replaced in such a manner that the government will then have JPA.

TF: If premise 1,2,& 3 are true, then governments which choose their subsequent sovereign according to the principles of hereditary succession* ought to be reformed or replaced.

* “hereditary monarchies”, as mentioned here, refers only to hypothetical monarchies in which the sovereign, chosen according to the principles of hereditary succession, has political power. This argument may not be applicable to many contemporary constitutional monarchies in which the monarch lacks substantial political power.

Justified Political Authority

Justified Political Authority(JPA) is that authority of the state for which we have a normative obligation to dutifully obey quite apart from the potential of the state to forcibly coerce us. It is important here to distinguish between the de facto political authority and de jure political authority or JPA. De facto political authority is that non-normative, or not morally required, authority which is derived from the maintenance of public order, security, and tranquility(Hart 1961). De facto political authority is the “state's or any agent's ability to get others to act in ways that they desire even when the subject does not want to do what the agent wants him to do”(SEP Christiano 2004). While it is generally recognized that de facto political authority is pre-requisite for de jure political authority, JPA is distinguished by the additional normative moral obligations in which the state's subjects are obliged to obey it apart from the threat of coercion. Although this distinction is generally accepted, Thomas Hobbes(1668) notably argued that all JPA was derived from de facto political authority. Nonetheless, the general philosophical consensus has historically held that there is a clear distinction between the descriptive and non-normative circumstance of de facto authority and the prescriptive and normative circumstance of de jure political authority.

In the history of philosophy, this distinction between de facto and de jure political authority has been elucidated independently by numerous thinkers. During the Warring States period, the Confucian political philosopher Mencius distinguished between a government which was humane(ren), which its subjects had an obligation to obey, and a government which was tyrannical(li), under which conditions its subjects had a right to revolution(4A:2). In the Indian political text the Artashastras, the distinction is made between a King who obeys rajadharma(or “king law”) and one who does not, under which conditions Brahmans are obliged to leave the kingdom. In the Politics, Aristotle distinguishes between monarchy and tyranny(Bk. II ch. 7-14), and in the Republic Plato distinguishes between the rule of the just and the rule of force(see Justice of Thrasymachus Bk. I 343c-344c).

There are a variety of contemporary theories of JPA which I will briefly summarize:

1.) Instrumentalist view of JPA: A subject will be better off if he should follow the laws of the state (Raz 1986).

2.) Consent theory of JPA: the sovereignty of the government is legitimate only if it has the consent of the subjects it commands (Locke 1690) .

3.) Reasonable Concensus view of JPA: The coercive institutions of society should be structured to adhere with the reasonable views of the majority of the subjects (Rawls 1996).

It is important to recognize that all three of these theories of JPA require the notion of justice in jurisdiction, legislation, and (most importantly) regarding the elevation of persons to political power. For example, in the instrumentalist view justice is required insofar as the person following the laws of the state must benefit from following those laws. The instrumentalist view that the government provides justice to its subjects because it is in a person's benefit to live in a just society. This argument is similarly applicable to the consent theory as a person will presumably only consent to be governed by that government which ensures justice. Finally, the reasonable consent theory, which is said to be a “mean between the extreme individualism of consent theory and the lack of respect for people's opinions of the instrumentalist views”, similarly requires that justice benefit the people in such a way that the majority will assent to be governed. Therefore, although there are a variety of theories regarding the establishment of JPA, all of them require the establishment of sufficient standards of Justice. As such, we will now turn to the question of justice itself.

Theory of Justice

American political philosopher John Rawls(1921-2002)

While the de facto political authority, in which security is preserved through armed force against foreign and domestic enemies, is certainly a prerequisite for de jure political authority(JPA), this attribute alone is not sufficient to satisfiably meet to the requirements of justice. We may divide the attributes of justice as follows:

Political Authority:

I de Facto
II de Jure
A. Justice in Crime and Punishment
B. Justice in Opportunity
1. Economic Justice
2. Social Justice
3. Political Justice
a. Representation
b. Separation of Powers
c. Selection of Government Leaders

Although the principle of hereditary succession may fail to satisfiably adhere to the principles of justice in many of these categories, I will focus on the issue which appears to be the most central and decisive: the selection of government leaders(II.B.3.c). As the sovereign stands at the apex of the socio-political hierarchy, commanding the obedience of his people and the immense resources of the state, justice similarly requires that there should exist a means of selecting the sovereign which is similarly fair in respect to the enormity of this task. In John Rawls's 1971 book, “A Theory of Justice”, Rawls introduces a number of arguments for a theory of justice which should be relevant and universally agreeable in the context of our contemporary pluralistic society. For the purposes of this essay I will focus on his argument for the Original Position(OP).

In the presentation of his theory of the Original Position(OP), John Rawls continues a long tradition in Western Political Philosophy, beginning with Plato's Republic, of utilizing hypothetical thought experiments to establish the a priori principles of justice. “The strategy of OP is to construct a method of reasoning that models abstract ideas about justice so as to focus their power together onto the choice of principles.”(SEP, Wenar 2008)

Central to the conception of OP is the idea of a “veil of ignorance”, which inhibits the arbitrary facts of our current lives(social status, race, sex, class etc.) from influencing our decisions of how our ideal political community ought to function. This concept inhibits us from unabashedly biasing our idealization of justice in such a way that we might accrue the most socio-political gain from it. For example, in the absence of the veil of ignorance, it may be plausible for a tall man to will we should adhere to that conception of justice which disenfranchises only very short people.

However, if a person can imagine these principles without consideration of their socio-economic position, they would be compelled to wish that there should exist a society which distributes the maximum benefit to all, rather than the partial benefit of a select group. “No party can press for agreement on principles that will arbitrarily favor the particular citizen they represent, because no party knows the specific attributes of the citizen they represent. The situation of the parties thus embodies reasonable conditions, within which the parties can make a rational agreement. Each party tries to agree to principles that will be best for the citizen they represent (i.e., that will maximize that citizen's share of primary goods). Since the parties are fairly situated, the agreement they reach will be fair to all actual citizens.”(SEP, Wenar 2008)

Rawls clarifies what can be considered under his hypothetical veil of ignorance:
Parties do not know:
• The race, ethnicity, sex, age, income, wealth, natural endowments, comprehensive doctrine, etc. of any of the citizens in society, or to which generation in the history of the society these citizens belong.
• The political system of the society, its class structure, economic system, or level of economic development.

Parties do know:
• That citizens in the society have different comprehensive doctrines and plans of life; that all citizens have interests in more primary goods.
• That the society is under conditions of moderate scarcity: there is enough to go around, but not enough for everyone to get what they want;
• General facts about human social life; facts of common sense; general conclusions of science (including economics and psychology) that are uncontroversial.

With these conditions in mind, Rawls believes that any reasonable person will then conclude that there should exist a community in which primary goods will be distributed such that they will maximize their benefit to all persons, regardless of their respective social circumstances.

As the position of a sovereign confers upon its holder extraordinary social and political benefits, if we adopt the veil of ignorance we would foreseeably conclude that there should be an appropriately equitable method of assigning this office. In consideration of the veil of ignorance, it is required that political offices should be distributed so as to afford all persons, regardless of birth, the opportunity to receive the benefits which these offices confer. Now the necessity of command and control as well as the limitation on the number of offices available means that it will be necessary to select a small number of office-holders from among the general population. Because the veil of ignorance allows for an understanding of virtue and psychology, the OP does not require that the mentally ill or otherwise unfit persons should receive these offices. As the office of sovereign is at the apex of the socio-political hierarchy and government authority, its assignment carries unequalled importance. With all of these considerations in mind, the OP merely requires that those persons who are most able to benefit society through the distribution of primary goods, should receive this singularly important office.

Legitimist objections to John Rawls's OP:

I will herein outline the expected objections of legitimists(those persons who favor hereditary succession) to John Rawls's OP, and thereafter offer a refutation:

Objection 1: All talk of de Jure or justified political authority is mistakenly conceived. It was previously conceded that the "legitimacy" or "illegitimacy" of government X can only be evaluated after government X has achieved a monopoly on the use of force. Moral responsibility with regard to government X is misconceived because government X uses coercive force to secure and maintain power. Therefore force is the single requirement for JPA.

Objection 2: There can be no reasonable consensus on the standards of justice or the distribution of goods, because people invariably disagree about the standards of justice and the distribution of goods. Only the majority can decide how to distribute resources and conceive the principles of justice. How the majority decides to distribute resources and allocate goods is the functioning of government.

Objection 3: The original position(OP) and the veil of ignorance is mistaken because (i) it assumes that rational adults should be treated as equals and (ii) it presumes the possibility of excluding considerations of (a) religion and (b) individual partial interest. (i) It is merely presumed that all rational adults should be treated as equals, without offering an argument for this presumption. (ii.a) To include considerations of psychology and yet exclude considerations of religion is to violate the principles of justice. (ii.b) It is impossible for rational persons to wholly exclude their partial interests of class, sex, and ethnicity.

I answer that: (1) & (2) would disassociate the moral evaluation of JPA and moral responsibility from the distribution of goods and offices. If these objections were conceded, we might then allow for the existence of any regime, regardless of tyranny or injustice, without the possibility of a justifiable reproach. Although it is true that any consideration of whether government X has JPA requires that government X has a monopoly on the use of force, this is an essential and unavoidable characteristic of all sovereign governments. Yet because, a sovereign government might act to secure only the private interest of a few and thereby harm the majority of their subjects, and this requires reproach (1) must be rejected. The decisions of the majority can easily become its very own tyranny at the expense of a disenfranchised minority. disagreement generally arises from logical invalidity rather than mutually conflicting yet valid claims to justice. For these reasons (2) must be rejected.

(3.i) correctly states that the equality of all rational adults is presumed. Because this is a customary and widely held belief it has been presumed, yet the universality of this belief invariably places the social burden of proof lies upon the doubter. (3.ii.a) is mistaken because although religiously beliefs vary widely and are inherently indemonstrable, psychological theories and practice have retained a relative uniformity as well as offering methods of validation. So although psychological theories may not be deductible through pure reason alone, it remains prudent to utilize these theories, rather than religion, in our practical affairs. (3.ii.b) requires a strong argument for the epistemological determinism of interests arising from class, sex, and ethnicity. In the absence this argument, we cannot hold this objection to be decisive. For all of these reasons (3) must be rejected.

Legitimist Arguments for the Utility of Hereditary Succession:

I will herein offer the expected Legitimist arguments for the utility of selecting the subsequent sovereign according to the principles of hereditary succession. After which I will promptly answer them:

Argument 1: Hereditary succession is appealing because it uniquely allows the monarch to (i) hold magnificent ceremonies, (ii) the practice is sacred, (iii) it has origins in antiquity.

Argument 2: Hereditary succession is useful because it will allow for (i) the superior breeding of a future sovereign, (ii) a higher quality of education for the future sovereign, and (iii) serves as a unifying national figure and symbol.

Argument 3: Hereditary succession will make the future sovereign known to all, and thereby depoliticize the office of the sovereign. To depoliticize the office of the sovereign will be of greater benefit to the state, than the possibility of individually selecting the subsequent sovereign.

I answer that: (1.i) is an insufficient objection because the hereditary succession of the sovereign is not a necessary condition for magnificent pageantry and ceremonies, which might be displayed by any government whether monarchy or not. (1.ii) is correct to point to the appearance of the belief in the sacrality of the hereditary succession of the sovereign in some cultures (the Merovingians of France, the Japanese Emperor). Yet although this belief has been held in some few cultures, it is far from universal. We should note that many historic monarchies (the Carolingians, the Holy Roman Emperor, the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth) have rather had elective monarchies without thereby professing disbelief in the sacrality of the monarchy. The truth or falsity of the claim to the sacrality of hereditary succession cannot be readily ascertained, and the peculiarity of this belief lends evidence in favor of the view of it as artificial rather than genuine. (1.iii) is mistaken to assert that hereditary succession had its origins in antiquity. Many forms of government are known to have existed before recorded history, not all of whom are monarchies in which the subsequent sovereign is chosen according to the principal of hereditary succession.

Nonetheless, (1) must be rejected because aesthetic appeal alone cannot serve as the basis for the selection of a form of government. Although aesthetic judgment is surely an important consideration, allowing this consideration to hold priority over concerns of justice and utility leads to the absurd possibility of adopting an unjust and inefficacious government merely for its artistic merit. As the purpose of government is to lead its subjects to the highest goods of virtue, mutual protection and prosperity, aesthetic judgment alone cannot be the means by which we select the best form of government.

(2.i) is correct to note that the institution of hereditary succession will allow for the vast resources of the state to be employed in the selection of partners with which to breed the future heir. Nonetheless their will assuredly arise a myriad of problems which are inherent in the practice of breeding due to its unpredictability and the determinism of male primogeniture. Undesirable hereditary traits might appear prominently in the offspring which had heretofore remained dormant or unnoticed. The multitude of variables involved in breeding a single individual should warrant a large selection pool of candidates, yet the determinism of hereditary succession, which invariably selects the first-born male heir, precludes this possibility. Hence, (2.i) is as problematic as it is efficacious and cannot be a reliable response on the grounds of utility.

(2.ii) is correct to note that the institution of hereditary succession will allow for the vast resources of the state to be employed in educating the future heir. Additionally, the notoriety of the promise of succession to the throne might induce the future sovereign to study more diligently. Nonetheless problems similar to (2.i) arise here as well. If the intelligence, temperament, and studiousness of the sovereign is influenced by hereditary traits, then the variability of hereditary traits noted in (2.i) should warrant a very large selection pool. Yet again, the determinism of hereditary succession precludes this possibility. Because we should expect a diminishing return upon resources exhausted in educating the future sovereign, the benefits of a large selection pool of candidates who are all excellently provided for, would be presumably be of greater benefit than one single candidate possessing variable inherited traits who is super-abundantly provided for.

(2.iii) is correct to note that hereditary succession allows a single family and a single ruler to be the personified focus of national adoration. Although an elected lifetime monarch or a temporary president might also serve this function, the hereditary monarchy appears to do so more viscerally than the previous options. Although this objection is conceded, the benefit thereby accrued appears to be miniscule in comparison to a popular president or elected sovereign who might also, to an admittedly lesser degree, be the object of national adulation.

(3) is correct to note that hereditary succession depoliticizes the selection of the future sovereign. Although this point is conceded, we must see what benefit is thereby accrued. The benefit might be very great if the nation is fraught by internecine warfare. In this instance the succession might not thereby be politicized by the civil strife. However, the opposite might hold if monarchy is the source of civil resentment and antagonism, in which case the hereditary succession of the heir of the previous sovereign, rather than the prospect of electing an neutral candidate, might further inflame these tensions. While (3) may be of some benefit, it might also become a fatal liability.

While the arguments of legitimists are admittedly compelling, they cannot satisfy the requirements of justice. All of these arguments (1,2,&3) mistakenly presume that arguments from either the utility or the aesthetic value of an unjust government can validly object to the inefficacy of a just government. Although it is admitted that the efficacy of a government is a necessary condition for justice (see above Political Authority II.B.1&2), it cannot be a sufficient condition in the absence of the other criteria of justified political authority(JPA), especially political justice. If a regime is beneficent yet unjust, no amount of beneficence can make it so. All three abovementioned arguments might be conceded, and yet the injustice of hereditary succession would remain. Additionally, what useful and aesthetic ends which they achieve might be similarly wrought by other, less problematic, means. It may be beneficial to reflect upon the prosperity of 19th century monarchies which enriched their subjects and yet were the object of scorn and derision for precisely this reason.

Conclusion:

This short refutation is aimed principally at the legitimist argument for the necessity of hereditary succession. It does not exclude the possibility of a monarchy, but merely contests the necessary correspondence of the legitimist principle of hereditary succession. Future monarchs might be chosen from among one or many noble dynasties, so long as no single heir is determined exclusively on account of being the hereditary heir of the previous sovereign. Further, this argument nowhere entails either democracy or the political primacy of a parliament. An elected monarch might foreseeably distribute goods to the nation with greater beneficence than a parliament. Monarchy is not invalidated by this line of argument. Only the principle of exclusive hereditary succession has been cast into disrepute. I encourage all monarchists to reflect upon these issues, and consider the wonderful possibility of an elective monarchy.

The coronation of Tsar Nicholas II and Tsarina Alexandra Feodorovna. This painting is by Laurits Tuxen.

The Influence of Neo-Platonic Conceptions of God in Early Christian Theology

2010-07-11T21:14:00.000-07:00

Frederick Copleston described Neo-Platonism as “the intellectualist reply to the ... yearning for personal salvation”. Produced during the Crisis of the Third Century (235-284AD), this late mystical and soteriological development within the tradition of Platonic philosophy reflects upon both a shifting intellectual milieu as well as the swiftly transforming Mediterranean world system of the Late Roman Empire. With the assassination of Alexander Severus (208-235AD), the formerly pacific Roman Empire was catapulted into fifty years of political instability, famine, rebellion, and invasion in which the Empire was briefly divided in three parts and more than twenty pretenders would aspire to the title of Caesar. At the close of the third century, the herculean efforts of the Emperor Diocletian (244-311AD) would once again restore political order.
Emperor Constantine I
The conversion of Constantine (b.272 r.306-337AD) would afterwards imbue the Empire with a vibrant new Christian character. A variety of social, economic, and political trends would emerge during this century which would later come to characterize the ‘Middle Ages’ . Yet despite these changes, there nevertheless remained broad continuities of intellectual thought. Prominent among these was the philosophical tradition of Platonism which began with the founding of the Academy of Athens (387BC) shortly after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War (431-404BC). After six centuries of development, Late Platonism or Neo-Platonism was produced with the posthumous compilation and publication of Plotinus’s (204-270AD) six Enneads by his disciple Porphyry (234-305AD). In their lengthy metaphysical writings, Plotinus and his successors made explicit the metaphysical system which they believed to be implicit within the Platonic philosophical corpus. Although Plotinus was heavily indebted to previous Middle Platonists and Neo-Pythagoreans, the Neo-Platonic system which he and his successors created is nonetheless principally distinguished by its conception of the One - the ineffable first principle transcending being from which all reality is emanated and continuously sustained. The Neo-Platonic conception of the One is widely believed to have had a formative influence on the development of Christian conceptions of God during Late Antiquity- an influence which would continue throughout the theological tradition of Christianity.
The new Academy of Athens

Although Plotinus is generally credited with defining the concept of the Platonic One, the idea had many precedents within the history of Greek philosophy. In both the Republic and the Parmenides , Plato (428/7-348/7BC) had hinted at the possibility of a creative and sustaining power beyond the experiential grasp of the human discursive intellect. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle (384-322BC) also speculated about the possibility of a first cause (πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον or primus motor) - an unmoved mover which was, by its very nature, a self-existent cause unto itself. During the period of Middle Platonism , numerous attempts had been made to synthesize the metaphysics of Platonic philosophy with the mystical Gnostic and the monotheistic Jewish traditions. Additionally the Neo-Pythagoreans, like the Platonists, speculated about the existence of a unitary and self-existent Monad (μονάς) from which there originated all plurality and diversity within the perceptible cosmos. It is known from Porphyry’s biography of Plotinus that he would have been well informed of these prior religious and metaphysical developments within Platonism and Greek philosophy.
Plotinus

“Plotinus was himself extraordinarily well read both in the philosophy of the early period and in more recent work. He knew the writings of Aristotle as intimately as the Platonic texts themselves.”

Even prior to refining his metaphysical theories, Plotinus would have certainly become familiar with the tremendous intellectual inheritance of Middle Platonism and the Neo-Pythagoreans (which, like so many treasures from antiquity, has scarcely survived the centuries). Yet despite Plotinus’s acknowledged debt to his predecessors, he does more than simply summarily reproduce the insights of Middle Platonism. Instead we find that there is much within his philosophy which is distinctly original.

“The thought of his Middle-Platonist and Neo-Pythagorean predecessors formed the basis of the metaphysical speculations of Plotinus, but he worked over the pre-existing material available to him with such critical penetration and careful attention to his own mental experience that the resulting system was in many ways original, and far more coherent and attractive than anything found in Middle Platonism.”

While noting these elements of intellectual continuity, Plotinus and his successors can nevertheless be justifiably distinguished from prior Platonists due to their zealous insistence on the existence of an incomprehensible and ineffable Platonic One (αἰών τέλεος). Although Plotinus and his successors write extensively on this subject, they are nevertheless careful to emphasize the inapplicability of predicates to the One.

“Although the required utter simplicity of the One is probably best served by the way of negation, the ascription of positive characteristics is not the polar opposite of negation since the intention of the way of negation is not to remove all qualities from the ultimate principle but rather to suggest that it transcends them…the ascription of positive characteristics may be seen as a way of suggesting in what way it is not like and transcends everything else.”

Neither the processes of contemplation nor of willful volition can be accurately attributed to the One, as doing so would imply both mutability and duality- qualities which would be inconsistent with the One’s eternal and unitary perfection. Plotinus instead describes the One as pure, self-existent, dynamis (δυναμις) or potentiality. Recent Platonic scholarship has demonstrated with great certainty that the metaphysical conception of God as “Absolute Being” appears to have originated in the writings of Plotinus’s devoted disciple Porphyry. This negative, or apophatic (from the Greek ‘apophanai’), method of describing the One has precedents in earlier Jewish theology. However, Plotinus notably introduces this descriptive method to the cosmopolitan intelligentsia of Late Antiquity. This method would in later centuries feature prominently among the Cappadocian Fathers and in Eastern Orthodox Church where negative, or apophatic, theology is taught to be descriptively superior to positive, or cataphatic, theology.
Platonic One

Plotinus’s One is both the apex of the Neo-Platonic metaphysical hierarchy as well as the central concern of the Neo-Platonic tradition. What had been merely hinted at in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and the Pre-Socratics, in the writings of Plotinus and his successors, becomes the primary focus of investigation. An important element in understanding the influence of the Neo-Platonic tradition upon Christian metaphysics is the transmission of concept of immateriality, or incorporeality.

“Most Christians of this sort have agreed with Plotinus that God was spiritual, that is, immaterial or incorporeal, with all that this implies: and also that he was transcendent, in a sense which by no means excludes immanence and implies mystery, a transcendence of our speech and thought”

This concept of incorporeality is implied in many of the Platonic dialogs, and is most prominently featured in the arguments which Plato provides for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo. Throughout the subsequent development of Abrahamic theology this uniquely Platonic philosophical legacy would continue to facilitate a conceptualization of God as an active yet incorporeal entity.

Additionally, it is important to emphasize the unique beneficence of the Platonic One. In sharp contrast to the Gnostic conception of a malevolent and deceitful Demiurge or the more common Hellenistic conception of a largely apathetic yet reciprocally rewarding pantheon, the Neo-Platonists prominently distinguished themselves by ascribing, not merely goodness, but the origin and continual subsistence of all goodness and perfection to the One. The beneficence of the Neo-Platonic One is first hinted at in a famous passage contained within Plato’s Republic in which Socrates alludes to the Sun to describe how all goodness emanates from the Form of the Good:
The Pythagorean Monad

“The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation…In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power.” (Republic Bk. VI 509b)

However the relationship between the One and the Form of the Good is not merely a relic of earlier Platonism, but is instead intimately interrelated with the Neo-Platonic metaphysical hierarchy. Following Plato, Neo-Platonists similarly believe that the incorporeal Platonic forms are ontologically superior to those objects contained within the sensible world . All perfection and goodness in the sensible world is likewise attributed to the Form of the Good. A greater attribution of goodness to a thing implies a more potent instantiation of the Form of the Good. There is, as a result, an immediate correspondence between goodness, or perfection, and ontology. Plotinus extrapolates from this principle to postulate that there must exist an incorporeal entity, of the “highest” possible ontology, which contains within itself all possible goodness and perfection. This ontological zenith, which Plotinus calls the One (αἰών τέλεος), is neither spatio-temporal nor bound by causal laws. These unique properties allow Plotinus to describe the One as self-existent, self-caused, and also unlimited in either temporal duration or effectual potency.

Early in the Enneads, Plotinus offers a brief proof of the existence of the Neo-Platonic One. Although the existence of God is doxastically required in Abrahamic faiths, in the 3rd century Greco-Roman world it was not without its philosophical opponents. Although there appears to have been some influence of Platonic metaphysics upon Late Stocism, the school nonetheless remained largely materialistic and pantheistic (there are some notable similarities between Stoic and Hegelian ‘pantheism’).
Plotinus

“Christian thinkers, almost from the beginning of Christian speculation, found in the spiritualism of Plato a powerful aid in defending and maintaining a conception of the human soul which pagan materialism rejected, but to which the Christian Church was irrevocably committed. All the early refutations of psychological materialism are Platonic. So, too, when the ideas of Plotinus began to prevail, the Christian writers took advantage of the support thus lent to the doctrine that there is a spiritual world more real than the world of matter.”

Perhaps in recognition of either this prevalent philosophical opposition or the objection of Middle Platonists, Plotinus offers a difficult argument for the metaphysical necessity of the One without which individual entities, composed of a plurality of component parts, would lack a necessary unifying principle.

“The transcendent one is the ultimate cause of the relationship between the unity and plurality of the Intellect, providing each component with its coherent and unified identity and at the same time securing their relationships to each other as a whole.”

“Plotinus believes, arguing from the different levels of reality which represent, for him, the grades of being, the structure, the oneness and goodness, that he can refer back to the One-Good as the ultimate source and the highest principle of all being, all oneness, goodness and form.”

R. Baine Harris writes that this argument appears to work if we accept, as Plotinus certainly does, the existence of a Platonic metaphysical hierarchy.

“Plotinus assumes a whole hierarchy of beings and of the level of being which according to the grade of their being as well as their oneness and their goodness are dependent on each other and finally and ultimately on the One-Good as the highest principle and highest ground of all being.”

Finally, Plotinus advances the theory of emanation through which the infinitely powerful One continuously creates and sustains not only our discursive intellect but the entirety of the cosmos as well. There are clear indications of this theory of emanation contained within the Republic long before the time of Plotinus.

"God holds the beginning, middle, and end of all things. He is the supreme mind or reason, the efficient cause of all things, eternal, unchangeable, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-pervading, and all-controlling, just, holy, wise, and good, the absolutely perfect, the beginning of all truth, the fountain of all law and justice, the source of all order and beauty, and especially the cause of all good " (Republic Bk. VII 716a)
Socrates

Although this concept is hinted at within the writings many previous Greek philosophers, it is nonetheless Plotinus who most elaborately discusses the theory of Emanationism. In a departure from the finite power of the Hellenistic pantheon, Neo-Platonism advances the counter-intuitive theory in which the One continuously emanates the entirety of the physical and intellectual cosmos without itself being diminished in the process. In describing this concept, Plotinus often utilizes the analogy of a spring of water billowing forth.

“Think of spring which has no other origin, but gives the whole of itself to rivers, and is not used up by the rivers but remains itself at rest.”

This postulation of an incorporeal creator deity of infinite and inexhaustible power, allows Plotinus to offer an explanatory account of the perpetual emanation of the One.

During this formative period within Christian philosophy, many of the characteristics of the Neo-Platonic One would noticeably reappear in the metaphysical writings of Christian theologians.

“Platonism especially had always proved an attractive source of ideas as can be seen from earlier Christian thinkers such as Justin and Origin. All of these philosophical strands had been absorbed in different ways and in differing degrees by Christian writers before Plotinus, but the thought of Plotinus and those Platonists influenced by him was the predominant vehicle of influence in Late Antiquity.”

Any examination of the interrelationship between Christianity and Platonism must take notice of the centuries of mutual admiration and contention between these two intellectual traditions which in some cases preceded the school of Neo-Platonism. Armstrong argues that Christian theology was predominantly Platonic in the Patristic era, writing that:

“it is easy to see both that the Christians agreed with Plotinus and that the agreement is in no way surprising, since their formulated theology owed at least as much to contemporary Platonism as to Christian scripture and tradition.”
Julian the Apostate

Despite this admittedly shared intellectual tradition, scholars have been careful to avoid the simplistic characterization of Neo-Platonism as merely an intellectual forerunner and facilitator of Christianity’s philosophical and political development. Until the Emperor Justinian (b.483 r.527-565AD) closed the revived Neo-Platonic Academy of Athens in 526AD, Platonism was often the source of anti-Christian polemics. The first known philosophical response to Christianity is the treatise, “the True Doctrine” (~178-188AD), penned by the Platonist philosopher Celsus which is characteristically known only through the lengthy response, “Against Celsus” (248AD), composed a century later by Origen of Alexandria (185-254AD). In sharp contrast with the later imperial persecution of Neo-Platonists (notably by the Emperors Theodosius and Justinian), The Emperor Constantine (272-337AD) patronized the school and is known to have employed the Neo-Platonist Sopater of Apamea (d. ~330-337) at his imperial court in Constantinople. Within two decades however, both intellectual and political opposition to Christianity were manifested in the reign of the Emperor Julian the Apostate (b. 331/2 r. 355-363AD). Julian, who was himself instructed, in 351AD, by, a student of Sopater, the Neo-Platonist Aedesius (d. 355AD), personally wrote a no longer extant anti-Christian polemic entitled “Against the Galilaeans” (~362/3AD) . However despite the admitted political and philosophical opposition to Christianity which emerged from the Platonic tradition, the references to the Neo-Platonic philosophy throughout the development of Christian theology and their undeniable metaphysical similarities continue to reinforce the view that there existed a substantial, and often mutually beneficial, dialog between these two Greco-Roman intellectual traditions.

The earliest example of, the characteristically Hellenistic, philosophical syncretism is Philo of Alexandria (20BC-50AD), a Jewish hellenophile with a solid understanding of Middle Platonism, who produced a philosophical synthesis of Platonism and Jewish theology in the decades immediately preceding the composition of the Gospels. The writings of Philo the Jew survived due to his subsequent Christian admirers (Clement, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, and Augustine among others) who came to believe, incorrectly, that he had been an apostolic Christian. As he is the earliest synthesizer of Platonism and Abrahamic theology, both ancient and modern scholars have speculated about the possibility of Philo’s influence on the author of the Gospel of John as well as later Christian theologians.
Philo the Jew

The vibrant intellectual community of Alexandria, which was in Philo’s time a center of Jewish scholarship, would later come to host a large Christian intellectual community as well. In the Patristic era, Clement of Alexandria (150-215AD) taught Christian theology in Platonic terms and is believed to have founded the Catechetical School of Alexandria (~190AD) for the training of priests and theologians. Origen of Alexandria (185-254AD), a student of Clement who would later become the head of the school , also wrote extensively- producing commentaries on every book in the Bible. Utilizing the intellectually reputable techniques of Platonic philosophy, Origen produced De principiis (On First Principles), the first philosophical treatment of Christianity. Although Origen was a contemporary of Plotinus in the city of Alexandria where both men studied philosophy, recent research has demonstrated that it was very unlikely that these two philosophers had any more than a superficial contact. Origen is nonetheless notable as pre-Plotinian Christian theologian who adopted many elements of Middle Platonism, and in doing so foreshadowed the later influence of Neo-Platonism upon the subsequent development of Christian theology.
Clement of Alexandria

Although there are some notable Neo-Platonists who converted to Christianity in the 4th century (Senesius and Marius Victorinus), none is more influential upon subsequent Christian theology than St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430AD). Augustine records in his Confessions that he was, in his youth, deeply influenced by Manichaeism (a prophetic quasi-Christian religion which originated and briefly gained imperial patronage in early Sassanid Persia). Augustine was familiar with prior African Platonists such as Apuleius (123/5-180AD) , and mentions Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus (245-325AD) as the most important of “modern philosophers”. Augustine, like previous Neo-Platonist converts, recounts how he wrestled with the uncertain dissimilarities between Neo-Platonic metaphysics and Christian doctrine.

“By reading these books of the Platonists I have been prompted to look for truth as something incorporeal, and I ‘caught sight of your invisible nature as it is known through your creatures’ (Rom. 1.20). Though I was thwarted of my wish to know more, I was conscious of what it was that my mind was too clouded to see. I was certain both that you are and you are infinite, though without extent in terms of space either limited or unlimited.”
St. Augustine of Hippo

Chief among the philosophical disagreements were those pertaining to the creation (rather than immortality) of the soul at the moment of conception, the creation and final dissolution of (rather than the eternity of) the physical universe, and the divine resurrection of the body. The Alexandrian Neo-Platonist Senesius (370-413AD), who would later convert to Christianity and become the Bishop of Cyrene, writes of his struggle between faith and reason in a surviving letter.

“It is difficult if not impossible for doctrines to be shaken which have entered the soul through knowledge and proof. You know that philosophy in many ways opposes these doctrines that are on everyone’s lips. To be sure, I will never think it to be right to consider the soul to be generated after the body. I will not say that the cosmos and its parts will parish. The resurrection that everyone speaks about I consider to be something sacred and inexpressible and I am far from agreeing with the ideas held by the masses.”

Of those issues concerning the nature of God, two notable differences are the description of God’s free will and character. Because the One is absolute unity beyond intellectual or corporeal being, it likewise cannot be described through the use of either those predicates which are intrinsically spatio-temporal or those which may imply mutability or duality. The Platonic One must instead be conceptualized as a metaphysically distant, creative and sustaining force, absent of either human passions or temporal volition. The continual sustaining emanation of the Platonic one, as well as the absence of either passionate empathy of active volition, would seem to imply theistic determinism. These descriptive and conceptual restrictions may introduce substantial problems when an attempt is made to reconcile the apparently deterministic Platonic One with the apparently actively interventionist God of Abrahamic faiths.

In contrast to the infinitely loving God of the Beatitudes, the One of Plotinus is described with the logocentric characteristic of apathēs (ἀπαθές) or apathy. For the Neo-Platonists, the perfection of the One requires that it should maintain a perpetual state of apatheia- the absence feelings, passions, or affections. Rather than the empathetic God of Christ, the Platonic One might more appropriately be described in terms of the metaphysically distant, and entirely unconcerned, deity of enlightenment deism. This impersonal and dispassionate Platonic One appears to contrast with the immanent and providential God of Christianity and Judaism who continually intervenes in worldly affairs, not only through miracles but more substantially, through Christ’s incarnation, ministry, and resurrection.

While an apparent distinction is often raised between the empathetic God of the Gospels and the distant logocentric Platonic One, the Neo-Platonic scholar Arthur Armstrong attempts to minimize the distinction. He ascribes the significance of this difference in character primarily to the differing sources of philosophical exegesis, rather than to a genuine philosophical divide:

“There are certainly, important differences of tone and emphasis between Plotinus and Christians: but these seem to be due primarily to the different character of the sources which they were expounding: on both sides we are concerned with exegetes, who regard it as their main business to bring out the true and deepest meaning of the texts which they regard as authoritative.”

Additionally, it is not entirely clear whether the Neo-Platonic One is necessarily either deterministic or wholly divorced from worldly affairs. The inapplicability of emotional or volitional predicates to the Platonic One need not necessarily prohibit the One from freely intervening in the spatio-temporal realm if such an intervention is compatible with this realm’s teleological end. If the material world is created and sustained for the sake of some beneficent soteriological end, then it is not inconceivable that miraculous theistic intervention (such as the incarnation of Christ) might be entirely necessary for the realization of this soteriological end. Various Christian theologians (notably Origen and Augustine) have either attempted to reconcile Neo-Platonism with Christianity, or have conceptualized God as sufficiently deterministic so as to be conceivably reconcilable Christianity with Neo-Platonic theistic determinism.

Platonism, especially as it was developed by the Neo-Platonic school of late antiquity, seems, then and now, to be especially compatible with Christianity, either due to its innate commensurability or due to the centuries of philosophical synthesis which have inseparably intertwined these two intellectual traditions. Both the nascent Christian Church as well as the school of Neo-Platonism grew to philosophical maturity during the ruinous wars, famine, and political calamities of the Third Century. Bertrand Russell openly speculates about the influence of political pessimism upon philosophy, writing that:

“of all this there is no mention in the works of Plotinus. He turned aside from the spectacle of misery in the actual world, to contemplate an eternal world of goodness and beauty. In this he was in harmony with all the most serious men of his age. To all of them, Christian and Pagans alike, the world of practical affairs appeared to offer no hope, and only the Other world seemed worthy of allegiance.”

During the exceedingly heresiophobic 6th century, the Neo-Platonic school was brought to a sudden end when the Emperor Justinian (b.483 r.527-565) ordered the forcible closure of the revived Academy of Athens in 526AD. During this time of increasing theological dispute, heterodox Christian communities throughout the Roman Empire were widely persecuted. The theological tradition of Origenism was notably condemned by the Patriarch Mennas of Constantinople in 544AD and thereafter declared anathema by the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553AD. Yet despite these persecutions, the intellectual inheritance of Neo-Platonism has remained inextinguishable, ever finding renewed expression in the writings of subsequent Christian theologians. The 20th century Cambridge Platonist and Neo-Platonic scholar William Ralph Inge writes:

“Platonism is part of the vital structure of Christian theology, with which no other philosophy, I venture to say, can work without friction… There is an utter impossibility of excising Platonism from Christianity without tearing Christianity to pieces.”

Miniature Ladies: Barbie’s Commodity Chain

2009-05-09T18:43:00.000-07:00

[I wrote this paper tonight for a Human Geography class assignment to research commodity chains of international products. I selected Barbie, not because I own Barbie toys, but because I found the cultural issues surrounding the doll to be amusing and mildly intriguing. However, when I tell people of my topic I generally receive confused and hostile stares which I presume indicates that people assume I am some sort of pervert. Read the essay and you will surely find the controversies which surround Barbie is enormously entertaining.]

Miniature Ladies: Barbie’s Commodity Chain

by Ryan Haecker

Dolls are believed to have been a plaything of humans since before recorded history. Often being constructed of local materials, Dolls have been found in Egyptian graves dating as far back as 2000BC.

However the modern era of mass produced plastic dolls began with the replacement of celluloid with plastic as the preferred material for constructing dolls in the aftermath of the Second World War . Created in 1959 by American business woman Ruth Handler, Barbie has in the past half century become the worlds most purchased doll. Barbie’s extraordinary popularity has been the cause for satire, lawsuits, and even political controversy. Barbie has received criticisms from both feminists and social conservatives. Partly as a result, Barbie has been subject to innumerable controversies stemming from her ubiquitous popularity and the perceived cultural influence of Barbie dolls on young girls.

Recent sociological literature has attempted to demonstrate the connection between childhood dolls and the adolescent socialization of gender roles . In one recent example, West Virginia Congressman Jeff Eldridge introduced a bill to "ban the sale of Barbie dolls and other dolls that influence girls to be beautiful" within the state of West Virginia.” As recently as April of 2009, a “Totally Tattoos Barbie” was released which included what was perceived to be a sexually provocative lower back tattoo, or “tramp stamp”. Critics alleged that the doll unnecessarily sexualized young girls and promoted the crass culture which tattoos are often associated with. In 1999, a similar controversy was ignited when Barbie’s pregnant friend Midge of the “Happy Family” play set was hastily recalled after the doll received “uniformly negative” reactions from parents who often mistakenly interpreted the individually packaged doll as a single mother. Feminists have, for decades, criticized the “1 in 1000” body proportions of Barbie which they argue portrays unrealistic body standards and only serves to encourage male domination .

The production and purchasing of the doll has often aroused great hostility in foreign markets. In a provocative example, the conservative Islamic kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice published on their website that “Jewish Barbie dolls, with their revealing clothes and shameful postures, accessories and tools are a symbol of decadence to the perverted West. Let us beware of her dangers and be careful!” The doll “Fulla” is widely sold throughout the Islamic community as an Islamic alternative to Barbie, which, in contrast to the perceived western licentiousness of Barbie, is marketed as modest and pious, complete with a detachable hijab (head scarf) and a tiny pink prayer rug.

Mattel, the Toy manufacturer which distributes Barbie, is a publicly traded Fortune 500 company with 31,000 employees and nearly six billion dollars in yearly revenues . A fact, which serves to reinforce the tremendous importance of Barbie, is that 80% of their revenue is derived from the sale of Barbie dolls . In the year 2000 alone, Barbie products brought Mattel yearly earnings of 1.5 Billion dollars! Mattel reports that over a billion Barbie dolls have been sold in 150 countries since the introduction of the doll, with three dolls being sold every second. Part of Barbie’s international success has been attributed to her post-war television marketing strategy. The first Barbie dolls were manufactured in Japan with their clothing being hand-sewn by Japanese women. From 1959 through 1972, Mattel focused on a bottom line of manufacturing and Barbie was therefore made in low cost facilities in Japan. Today however, 65% of Mattel’s toys are manufactured in China. In the 1980’s “Mattel aggressively expanded the number of plants it owned in Asia. Noncore products, like trinkets made under movie-licensing deals, could be outsourced. But Barbie dolls and Hot Wheels, among others, would be kept in tightly controlled factories.” Mattel does not publically reveal the locations of Barbie’s international production; however it is known that many of Barbie’s component parts are produced in Southeast Asian countries such as China, Indonesia, and Malaysia. One of Mattel’s largest factories is the 330,000 sq. ft. factory in Guanyao, a city in south China’s Guangdong province, considered the world’s biggest toy manufacturing center. Here about 3,000 young, mostly female, workers busily assemble Mattel products for an average salary of 175$ a month.

Barbie’s enormous international popularity has been facilitated partially by an unusually large collectors market. It is estimated that there are more than one hundred thousand “avid fans”, 90% of whom are women over the age of 40, who will yearly spend over 1,000$ on collectable dolls . Mattel estimates that there are upwards of eight million Barbie collectors internationally . It has been reported that “the 1959 Barbie doll in mint condition will sell for thousands of dollars. Some have sold for as much as $8000 to $10,000 but you can buy them for much less and $2000 to $3000 is quite common.” It is said that “about 300,000 of the 1959 Barbie were made and there are undoubtedly many out there still undiscovered.” Mattel has recently attempted to create a local consumer base in China with a recent Barbie shop opening in Shanghai.

With her release in 1959, Barbie’s head and body were manufactured from a potentially toxic polyvinyl chloride or PVC . Barbie has received some recent material enhancements to make her appear more attractive and human in appearance: “New elastomers have given her a more lifelike body. Engineering thermoplastics have improved her complexion. And developmental water-based paints could soon result in a face that goes easier on the environment”. Barbie’s complex internal structure (flexible waist Barbie consists of more than 20 parts) and stress resistant polymers allow her to endure intensive abuse. Her characteristic hair is manufactured from a variety of synthetic fiber . The precise chemical composition of Barbie is unknown, making any assessment of the procurement of her materials problematic.

Although Mattel owns some Barbie themed retail stores, she is primarily sold internationally through auxiliary chains such as KB Toys and Toys R Us. However collectors and shoppers can also purchase Barbie online from a variety of vendors such as Amazon.com. The shipping and distribution of Barbie, of course, an enormously complex feat of the international trade system utilizing transportation venues such as airmail, local shipping, and large freight vessels. The 50 year history of Barbie is remarkable testament to the perennial popularity of the doll among young girls and adult collectors. Although recent market challenges have arisen from rival toy lines (such as the controversial Bratz toy line), Barbie nonetheless has demonstrated a remarkable international and intergenerational appeal that is not likely to diminish soon.

Works Cited

1 "A History of Dolls." Connecticut Doll Artists - quality greenware, doll costuming and porcelain doll. 07 May 2009 <http://ctdollartists.com/history.htm>.
2 Sobieraj, S. "Taking control: Toy commercials and the social construction of patriarchy". Masculinities and violence (L. Bowker ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage..
3 Cart, Kallie. "Lawmaker Wants Barbie Banned in W.Va.; Local Residents Quickly React." WSAZ Home Page | Breaking News, Severe Weather, & Local News Coverage for West Virginia, Ohio, & Kentucky. Associated Press. 07 May 2009 <http://www.wsaz.com/home/headlines/40657447.html?pollSubmit=y&submit=submit&oid=2&mr=18>
4 "'Chav' Barbie gets tattoos to mimic high profile celebs like Amy Winehouse | Mail Online." Home | Mail Online. 08 May 2009 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1175039/Chav-Barbie-gets-tattoos-mimic-high-profile-celebs-like-Amy-Winehouse.html>.
5 "USATODAY.com - Pregnant doll pulled from Wal-Mart after customers complain." News, Travel, Weather, Entertainment, Sports, Technology, U.S. & World - USATODAY.com. 08 May 2009 <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2002-12-24-pregnant-doll_x.htm>.
6 Lind,Amy. "Battleground:Women,Gender

,and Sexuality",Published by Greenwood Publishing Group,2008
7 "Becoming Barbie: Living Dolls - CBS News." CBS News - Breaking News Headlines: Business, Entertainment & World News. 08 May 2009 <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/29/48hours/main632909.shtml>.
8 "USATODAY.com - Pregnant doll pulled from Wal-Mart after customers complain." News, Travel, Weather, Entertainment, Sports, Technology, U.S. & World - USATODAY.com. 08 May 2009 <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2002-12-24-pregnant-doll_x.htm>.
9 "Bestseller in Mideast: Barbie With a Prayer Mat - New York Times." The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. 08 May 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/22/international/middleeast/22doll.html?ex=1285041600&en=72bb8cc089bf9435&ei=5090>.
10 "Quote Search - Fundamental Data, Company Proflem, and more..." ZenoBank.com::Welcome. 07 May 2009 <http://zenobank.com/index.php?symbol=MAT&page=quotesearch>.
11 "Fortune 500 2008: Mattel - MAT." Business, financial, personal finance news - CNNMoney.com. 07 May 2009 <http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2008/snapshots/272.html>.
12 Mattel's Earnings Tumble By 42% in Third Quarter - The New York Times." The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. 07 May 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/22/business/mattel-s-earnings-tumble-by-42-in-third-quarter.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/C/Corporations>.
3 "Engineering Barbie - 2000-12-18 00:00:00 - Design News." Design News for Mechanical and Design Engineers | Design News. 08 May 2009 <http://www.designnews.com/article/10708-Engineering_Barbie.php>.
4 "The New York Times Log In." The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. 08 May 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/26/business/26toy.html>.
5 "BarbieCollector.com - Welcome to the official Mattel site for Barbie Collector." BarbieCollector.com. 08 May 2009 <http://www.barbiecollector.com/collecting/tiers/>.
6 "The Dao of Barbie: Business Lessons from her first 50 years | Factoidz." Factoidz | bite-sized knowledge. 08 May 2009 <http://factoidz.com/the-dao-of-barbie-business-lessons-from-her-first-50-years/>.
7 "EBay Guides - Barbie Dolls - History and Facts-by GOODSVIEW." EBay Reviews & Guides. 08 May 2009 <http://reviews.ebay.com/Barbie-Dolls-History-and-Facts-by-GOODSVIEW_W0QQugidZ10000000008262779>.
8 "Malibu Barbie, Holiday Barbie ... Toxic Barbie?" WebMD - Better information. Better health. 08 May 2009 <http://www.webmd.com/news/20000825/malibu-barbie-holiday-barbie-toxic-barbie>.
9 "Engineering Barbie - 2000-12-18 00:00:00 - Design News." Design News for Mechanical and Design Engineers | Design News. 08 May 2009 <http://www.designnews.com/article/10708-Engineering_Barbie.php>.
20 "Barbie Dolls - All About Barbie Dolls." Doll Collecting at About - Explore dolls from Bru to Barbie! 08 May 2009 <http://collectdolls.about.com/od/barbiemodern/p/barbiedolls.htm>.

A short logical refutation of the the theology of Westboro Baptist Church

2009-03-12T21:55:00.001-07:00

As I have a continuing interest in heresiology and contemporary anti-liberalism, I have recently taken a mild interest in America's most reviled Christian sect, the Westboro Baptist Church(hereafter referred to as WBC) of Topeka Kansas. You may have heard of this organization from their highly publicized and inflammatory demonstrations against the burials of recently deceased military veterans in which they have proudly displayed signs reading "God Hates Fags" or "Fags doom America" or "Fag+Sin=9/11" etc. After watching a BBC documentary on the organization and many interviews of members within the group, I have begun to attempt to reconstruct their peculiar form of Christian heresy, with the intention of showing their theology to be both incoherent and incompatible with Christian Orthodoxy. If you are not familiar with the WBC, I have assembled the following YouTube videos with which you should familiarize yourself with some of their more amusing diatribes:

Videos

Here is an interview with the lovely young granddaughters of WBC leader:
http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D-gX-vQ5sMOw&h=a001724df830d39c98a1cd1f1ea6d31d
"dying time is truth time!"

Here is an interview of Fred Phelps condemning John Stewart and Stephen Colbert:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e647x8xFKTs&feature=related
"America is a nation of Fag enabling fools!" "weep for your sodomite sins"

Here is a fascinating BBC documentary about the group:
http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fvideo.google.com%2Fvideoplay%3Fdocid%3D-7735501683185935638%26q%3Dmost%2Bhated%2Bfamily%26ei%3D-hNISNqbCYum-wHm5syWDA&h=a001724df830d39c98a1cd1f1ea6d31d

Here's a contentious interview with the Daughter of the organization's leader on Fox News:
http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DIxMFhfVGvzk%26feature%3Drelated&h=a001724df830d39c98a1cd1f1ea6d31d
During this interview, Fox News anchor Julie Banderas angrily shouts: "You are the devil! If you believe in the Bible, miss, you're going to hell!" Another unfortunate example of the declining state of journalism and American culture.

Futher Analysis

Although the WBC has a diverse portfolio of inflammatory and provocative views on the subjects of race, Catholicism, Islam, Judaism etc. (For more information: http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FWestboro_Baptist_Church%23Other_value_judgments)&h=a001724df830d39c98a1cd1f1ea6d31d I will herein focus on the subject for which they are most notorious; their theological belief that God distributes divine retribution to American soldiers and families due to both the uninhibited practice of sodomy and the unabated celebration of homosexuality and sexual licentiousness.

Although their anti-homosexual diatribes are generally of such an inflammatory and incoherent nature to be easily dismissed by philosophers and theologians, I have found, in them, a remarkable degree of internal consistency through which we can reconstruct their most basic beliefs. As a disclaimer, I should like to note that although I will herein attempt to provide their theology with some degree of coherency and logical validity, it should not be presumed that I am in any way endorsing many of the indefensible and heretical conclusions which these arguments lead to. Their theological views can be roughly summarized with the following five arguments:

1st Argument

First among their multitude of presuppositions is the existence of God. For the sake of simplification, I will assume that they share a similar conception of God's attributes with other monotheists.
1. God exists (most likely an foundational claim, known immediately through faith)
2. If God exists then God is PKG (all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good)
TF: God is PKG

2nd Argument

Second, we must define the essential characteristics of God from which we will support are subsequent claims of divine retribution.
1. God is omni-benevolent(G)
2. If God is omni-benevolent(G) then God is perfectly just(J)
TF: God is perfectly just(J)

3rd Argument

The third argument is critical for establishing the claim God must divinely distribute worldly justice through the act of divine intervention.
1. God is omni-prescient(K) & omni-powerful(P) & perfectly just(J)
*2. If God is K & P & J then God must intervene in human affairs to punish sinners
TF: God must intervene in human affairs to punish sinners

4th Argument

The fourth argument is critical for establishing which types of sins (or moral misconduct) should require divine intervention. Although I suspect that the WBC considers many sins as deserving of divine intervention, they have primarily emphasized the following three sins. An important aspect for establishing the moral culpability of all Americans, is claim that person X is deserving of redistributive punishment if person X should tolerate the following three sins.
1. If person X is a homosexual(h) or fornicator(f) or idolater(i), then person X is a sinner
2. If person X tolerates (h v f v i), then person X is a sinner
3. If person X does not protest against (h v f v i), then person X tolerates (h v f v i)
4. All American persons do not protest against (h v f v i)
5. Some American persons are themselves a (h v f v i)
TF: All American persons are themselves sinners

5th Argument

Finally, we must establish what sorts of events can be considered a justifiably acts of redistributive punishment through the act of divine intervention.
1. If God must intervene in human affairs to punish sinners & All American persons are themselves sinners, then God must intervene in human affairs to punish all American persons
2. If God must intervene in human affairs to punish all American persons, then God causes disasters
3. 9/11 is a disaster
4. Hurricane Katrina is a disaster
5. Iraq War death is a disaster
TF: God causes 9/11 & Hurrican Katrina & Iraq War death

Refutation

In order to convincingly refute the previous argument, it should be necessary to refute only a single key premise from which the subsequent erroneous conclusions were deduced. While many of the aforementioned premises are highly dubious and potentially problematic, I would like to examine the earliest instance in which theological error enters into the theology of the WBC. This premise, which is starred above reads:

*"If God is K & P & J then God must intervene in human affairs to punish sinners"

So as to avoid from deviating from the correctness of Catholic Orthodoxy, and for the benefit of the WBC, let us for the purposes of this refutation assume as true the conclusions that God exists, God is PKG, and, most importantly, that God routinely miraculously intervenes in human affairs. With these premises assumed, I will argue that the belief that God should miraculously intervene to distribute punishment to those deserving persons who violate his revealed moral law (which for our present purposes is defined in the fourth argument) is indefensible if we believe that God intervenes through such undiscriminating processes as natural disasters & humanly wrought calamities (the fifth argument). This argument will quickly demonstrate the internal invalidity of the theological conclusions of the WBC. With this demonstrated, the repeated protestations of the WBC will be shown to be bereft of their theological and philosophical foundations, and therefore subject to moral and theological condemnation. The previously quoted premise will for our present purposes be summarized as a conditional claim:

If (God=KPJ) then (conditional) God must intervene in human affairs to punish sinners (GpS)which we might simplify to read as a conditional claim(if A then B): (God=KPJ) --> (GpS) This refutation will attempt to problematize the the conditional consequent of [p1], or GpS, that God must intervene in human affairs to punish sinners.

We will proceed to accomplish this demonstration of logical invalidity by showing that if we assume that the antecedent condition (God=KPJ) is true then it will follow that the consequent condition (GpS) is false, from which we can show the invalidity of the conditional claim. This is true because a conditional (if A then B) claim may only be invalid in the case in which we assume the truth of the antecedent(A) then the consequent(B) is shown to be false.

If we assume the precedent (God=KPJ), we must then accept the attribution that God is perfectly just(J), which is contained within the precedent attribution of God as containing those qualities K, P, & J. However the attribution to God of the quality of being perfectly just becomes problematic if we believe that God distribute punishment to sinners through the processes of natural disasters and humanely wrought calamities(fifth argument). Now, we can divide the means by which God distributes punishment to sinners into two categories: those natural disasters wrought by environmental processes, and those humanely wrought calamities which result from warfare and homicide.

Problem of Indiscriminate Harm of Natural Disasters

Natural disasters which result from environmental processes and commonly obliterate human habitations have in the distant been thought to be the work of a supernatural agency. While this attribution of natural calamities to God's Will may have held a satisfactory persuasive ability in the ancient past, we will see that upon further inspection it will prove wholly unsatisfactory. This becomes especially true once we attribute the characteristic of perfect justness to God(J). With this attribution, the intervention of God to bring about widespread human suffering becomes irreducibly problematic. The classic example of this problem is satirically provided by Voltaire in his anti-Christian comedy "Candide". This comedy mentions the terribly costly Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 in which an estimated 100,000 people perished. Voltaire mentions this calamity and with it the problem of natural evil in order to problematize and humorize Leibniz's (here represented as Dr. Pangloss) famous claim that as God is perfectly good, he created for human beings the best of all possible worlds.

Despite its historical use in an anti-Christian comedy, the incident will serve to demonstrate the a perfectly just God who redistributes worldly punishment to sinners could not foreseeably do so through the agency of natural disasters. This problem arises because of the indiscriminate nature of natural disasters in distributing harm. If God has the attribute of being perfectly just and divinely intervenes in the world to justly distribute harmful punishment through the agency of natural disasters, we should expect that these disasters should discriminate between greater and lesser sinners. For example, in Christian theology, it is assumed that a baby is born in the absence of all but original sin. For the WBC, sodomy is a nearly infinite moral transgression and heinous sin. With these examples, we may say that babies are lesser sinners and sodomites are greater sinners.

Argument for Divine Intervention:

"If God is perfectly just(J) & God must intervene in human affairs to punish sinner(GpS) & God uses the means of natural disasters to distribute punishment(Nd) then Natural disasters must discriminate between Lesser Sinners and Greater Sinners(NdS)"or "if J & GpS & Nd then NdS"if (NdS) is false the conditional claim that (J & GpS & Nd) --> (Nds) is proved to be invalid

Now perfect justice requires a distribution of harmful punishment that is appropriate or in some manner fitting to the sin or moral transgression for which the harmful punishment is distributed. With this in mind we should expect that God would harmfully punish people through the agency of natural disasters discriminately on the basis of their greater or lesser sins. However, when we examine natural calamities such as earthquakes and hurricanes we find that this is not the case. Far from drowning sodomites and floating babies and Christians to safety, the floodwaters of hurricanes and the tumbling buildings of earthquakes injure greater and lesser sinners alike indescriminately. For natural disasters to discriminate between greater and lesser sinners, we should require some startling and apparently directed harmful natural phenomenon to smite sinners once they have reached a certain level of sinfulness. This might take of form of a pestilence which only kills sodomites or lightning from above which only strikes perverts and homosexuals. In the absence of any statistical data which would review that these forces of nature discriminate between sodomites and virgins we must presume that they strike randomly and indiscriminately. This fact alone will serve to conclusively demonstrate the unsoundness of the antecedent condition (NdS) that natural disasters discriminate between lesser and greater sinners.

Problem of Divine Intervention through Human Agency and Free Will

The case of humanly wrought calamities such as war and terrorist attacks is similarly problematic for the theology of WBC. We might speculate that just as there are greater and lesser sinners in coastal towns, there are also greater and lesser sinners in the Army. For example, army soldier A sodomizes his whole platoon and is for WBC a nearly infinitely terrible sinner while army soldier B is a pious virgin Christian who is intolerant of "fag culture" and is therefore hardly a "fag enabler" or sinful. However we encounter the same problem as before. IEDs and Iraqi combatants will not discriminate between attacking soldier A and soldier B.

Aside from the aforementioned problem of indiscriminate harm, we encounter the additional problem of attributing divine intervention to what must be, for a Christian, sinful human volition. This is because, Christian philosophers have historically avoided the Problem of Evil (which asks if God is Perfectly Good then why is there Evil) by allowing for human beings to freely will evil and harmful actions. This is done because it would seem that if God is perfectly good(G) then God cannot be the cause of human evil.

Problem of Evil Argument:

If God is perfectly good(G) then God cannot be the cause of moral evilor "If God(G) then God not (Evil)"

However for the theology of the WBC: God is the cause of moral evilor "God is (Evil)" which introduces a contradiction in which God must be both Evil and not Evil.

If Humans are predetermined, according to the universals laws which God created, to bring about evil deeds (murder, theft, violence etc.) then God carries the moral responsibility for evil in our world. However for WBC, God is the causal factor which leads humans to angrily kill one another in war and terrorist activities (See Iraq War and 9/11 in the fifth argument). By citing God as the cause for human evil, we deny the perpetrators of evil human actions the free will to choose to commit or refrain from evil acts. Not only would this denial of Free Will imperil the attribution of perfect goodness to God, it would also make God the immediate cause of moral evil on Earth. These two theological dilemmas would seem to require that a person take the position that God is not perfectly good, but instead the cause of human suffering and moral evil.

WBC Counter-argument:

WBC will presumably contest the first problem of the indiscriminate harm of natural disasters by making the following counter-claim:

First Counter-Claim:

The distinction between greater and lesser sinners is artificial because all persons are equally and infinitely sinful insofar as they participate in and enable "fag-culture".

p1) if person X does not protest against "Fag Culture" by joining the WBC then person X is infinitely sinful

p2) an infinitely sinful person requires an infinitely harmful punishment

p3) Natural disasters are not an infinitely harmful punishment

p4) If God distributes harm unevenly then God shows mercy on sinners unevenly

This denial of the distinction between lesser and greater sinners would seem to allow that all persons not already apart of the WBC may be harmed by natural forces indiscriminately. However the problem which remains is that it seems that people are harmed differentially and discriminately by these forces. This would lead an impartial observer to question why God's mercy is distributed unevenly without regard to the sinners degree of sinfulness. I believe that this problem is irresolvable if God is causal agent which produces and directs natural disasters. Another counter-claim might go as follows:

2nd Counter-Claim:

God's wrath is revealed to a sinful "fag-enabling culture" gradually through these processes of natural and humanly wrought calamities. This revelation of God's wrath is for a the salvation of souls. As the salvation of souls is an infinite consesquence, the revelation of God's wrath through the means of natural and human calamities is justifiable insofar as it causes people to repent and save their souls from damnation.

p1) X finitely evil means are justifiable iff Y is an infinitely good end

p2) the salvation of souls is an infinitely good end

p3) natural disasters are an finitely evil means

TF: Natural disasters are justifiable

However, it would seem that if we accept the attribution to God of being all-powerful(P) then it would be conceivable that God could utilize a means which requires no evil to save souls. Such a means, like the kind persuasion of Christian apologists, need not require that any evil should be done. This would wholly avoid the problematic diminution of God which the removal of the attribution of perfect goodness would require. So here we find that this argument is again indefensible.

Conclusion

These assortment of problems in WBC theology irresolvably demonstrate the invalidity and internal contradiction of their theological beliefs. Rather than condemning them for their mistaken theology, I would hope that American's will kindly offer to persuade these heretics away from their misbegotten theology and into the perfection of Catholic Orthodoxy. We Christians ought to, rather than condemn them, pray for the their conversion and the rectification of their misguided beliefs. Only through the efforts and prayers of the faithful can the heretics and heathens be converted to the correctness of Catholic Orthodoxy

Santa Claus: Patron God of American Consumerism

2009-02-07T19:06:00.000-08:00

Santa Claus: the Patron God of American Consumer Culture
By Ryan Haecker

In the closing quarter of the 18th century, the United States would be, with great potential but an uncertain future, expressly founded as a secular republic. And although Protestant Christianity had then, and still retains, the greatest number of adherents, our nation has always lacked a single unifying faith. In the past, great civilizations have found the need for expressions of public rejoicing in parades and religious festivals. In antiquity, the Athenians showed their adulation towards their patron goddess Athena during the Pan-Athenian festival. This important practice serves to unite a community, not only in honoring their Gods, but perhaps more importantly, in publicly reaffirming a communal ideology and identity.

Although America may at first appear to be lacking in such a festival, we are in fact united yearly in a singular common celebration. On a cold winter day, before the coming of the New Year, Americans unite to offer an enormous monetary sacrifice to impersonal financial powers of which give structure and meaning to our cosmos. On Christmas day, Americans celebrate their material abundance and consumer culture through the oblation of mass consumption. And the personification of this orgy of spending is Santa Claus: the patron god of American consumer culture.

Before the modern era, European towns would often be overlooked by the looming presence of castles and monasteries. These medieval structures dotted the hilltops and served to remind the townsfolk of the dual powers of church and state. Today the bastions of American power are to be found, not in the temple or the army barracks, but in the towering buildings of the financial district. Here great cathedrals of capitalism soar to the heavens. Here it is that the ruling bourgeoisie venerate the esoteric workings of an impersonal global economy through the daily liturgy of financial transactions.

It was once believed that that the practice of ascetic self-sacrifice could appease the Gods and ennoble the faithful. Today, consumer spending and fiscal responsibility are the indicators of a healthy economy and a prosperous society. Local parishes and ancestral shrines once provided agrarian peoples with a means of communion with their Gods. There was thought to be an organic correspondence between the environment on earth and the heavens above. Today we disfigure the countryside with expansive shopping malls and glorify the bull market through the veneration of our purchases.

With the ever increasing complexity and importance of global financial institutions, we have, in the past four centuries, come to replace our communal adulation of the divine with a new faith in the esoteric workings of global capitalism. Already, we have erected temples to this new deity whose offerings take the form of the dollar and whose omens are revealed by the Wall Street ticker. Christmas carols may still retain some semblance of the Christian religion, but for many they are now a mere façade to hide the hideous fact that what we now value is not our religiosity but our material commodities.

In the increasingly secular setting of the 21st century, we are beginning to witness an apotheosis of Santa Claus from merely one among many Christian saints to an icon of consumer spending and mass consumption. American society, bereft of a common faith, has found, in Santa, the perfect representation of their communal preoccupation with material commodities. At one time Saint Nicholas was venerated on account of his piety and generosity. Today we find that Santa Claus is represented as an obese toymaker indoctrinating children into the cult of materialism. In him we find a perfect personification of America’s grossest vices of gluttony and avaricious consumption. It is time to abandon the consumer culture of Santa and save the real meaning of Christmas.

The Trials and Tears of the Great War

2009-01-24T16:09:00.000-08:00

the Trials and Tears of the Great War
by Ryan Haecker

“From all sides, wounded men were making tracks towards it from the shelled woods. The trench was appalling, chocked with seriously wounded and dying men...This was the home of the great god Pain, and for the first time I looked through a devilish chink into the depths of his realm. And fresh shells came down all the time.” - Ernst Jünger, “Storm of Steel” (1920)

The Great War, which lasted from the mobilization of muscovite arms in the year 1914 until the abdication of the Kaiser Wilhelm II in the year 1918 was the last and greatest of the European great power conflicts which had, since the treaty of Westphalia 270 years prior, periodically ravaged the European continent. The Great War burst forth on a heretofore unimaginable scale in which upwards of 70 million Europeans were mobilized and 40 million lost their lives. Despite the irretrievable multitudes who perished in this war, the greatest casualty of all was European civilization. The integrated tradition of dynasty, nobility, and caste which conservative vigilance had diligently preserved from revolutionary republicanism would be brought crashing down with the conclusion of the War.

Never again would the youth of Europe be so aptly spent to safeguard the majestic dignity of ancient dynasties. The heraldic banners of the Romanovs, the Hapsburgs, the Osmans, and the Hohenzollerns would never again fly proudly upon the battlefield. Neither would the privileged pride a hereditary nobility inspire the populace to martial feats to equal their illustrious forbears. The old order of princes and nobility which martial valor had violently hewn from the plebeian forests of antiquity would meet their fiery end in the holocaust of industrial warfare. Republics were born which would replace the anointed sovereigns of Europe with democratically elected officials. Statecraft would henceforth be shaped not by the honorable aspirations of a hereditary gentry and a pious clergy but by the guiding hand of the bourgeois capitalists and the vulgar workers. In an age when rifelry and cannonry had replaced chivalry on the battlefield, merit and lineage would be forgotten as the vote was extended to all persons.

How are we, the inheritors of this irredeemable tragedy, to find meaning in the immeasurable suffering of the Great War? If this calamitous suicide of Europe was inevitable, was it also bereft of meaning? Or might there be some immortal value for which the heirs of Leibniz and Descartes soiled their hands in Christian blood. If the Great War is to have any meaning, any cause for which so ghastly a sacrifice might be held as fair compensation, it must lie in the preservation of the hallowed traditions of Western Civilization which restrained action and prudent council had over one thousand year been wrought. These traditions, enshrined in both religious dogma and the socio-political structures of Old Regime Europe, preserved undiminished the sturdy vigor and cultivated character of a more virile agrarian past.

The integrated traditions of Old Europe had grown into the full of their majestic splendor in a past which was uncorrupted by the pollution of industrialism or the demands capitalism. These traditions had been wrought in a prior age, before workers were uprooted from their family farms and the aristocracy had been reduced to an effete and complacent bourgeois. The long struggle of agrarian peoples to find harmony and salvation in a pitiless world would be abruptly interrupted by the technological innovations of steam, steel, and rail. The ruinous plundering of the natural world would foreshadow the forthcoming devastation of the old societal order. For the sake of military preparedness, Hapsburg and Romanov princes, ignorant of their doom, would eagerly cultivate the very instruments of their demise. For a landed aristocracy could not hope to survive the proliferation of the printing press, the factory, and the rifle.

What hope remained for the old order was to be found in the authoritarian military tradition of Sacred Germany. In her lands alone had the vulgar demands of industrialism and capitalism been faithfully reconciled with the dignified requirements of an aristocratic gentry. The heirs of the Holy Roman Empire had found in industrial production a fitting outlet for their creativity, industriousness, and discipline. The military elan of the Teutonic Knights was still retained undiminished in the martial tradition of the Kaiser's armies. The lean successors of Bismark were the envy and terror of a continent which had grown fat on the surpluses of empire and industry.

Arrayed against this power were the Revolutionary Republics of America and France as well the maritime leviathan of British Empire. Both America and France had rejected as false the integrated traditions of European civilization in their respected revolutions, and what tradition was retained in England had been corroded by the acidic conditions of the first industrial revolution. Against the full weight of these combined powers, even Germany's militant spirit could not prevail. And in the year 1918, the Kaiser's navies mutinied, his armies surrendered and his people revolted. In fear the Kaiser fled to Denmark while an iconoclastic republic was proclaimed at home, forever abolishing the hallowed heritage of kingship and nobility. The fighting spirit of the German people had been in this war spent for the foreseeable future, and none would suspect the looming danger which would soon befall the next generation.

The story of the Great War is doubly a tragedy, both for the irreplaceable lives spent and hallowed traditions marred. Tens of millions had died in the war and tens of millions more would perish in the successive wars, revolutions, and mass starvations which would follow. Military necessity required that the gentlemanly manners and innocent optimism of Victorian society be traded for calculated endurance when faced with the grim realities of attrition warfare. Philosophical nihilism, economic collapse and social unrest would erupt from the festering wounds of this great conflict, shaping the remainder of the bleak 20th century. By 1920, the suicide of Europe and the end of an age were complete.

a Short Refutation of Gender Anti-Realism

2008-11-25T21:55:00.000-08:00

A Short Refutation of Gender Anti-Realism and Deconstructionism
By Ryan Haecker

Argument:
I didn't go into this in my initial comments because it's a fairly radical idea, but since you brought up the supposed limitations of comparisons of sexism and racism, I feel compelled to point out that gender is not a binary category. How do you define a woman? As someone who has the ability to reproduce? As you said in your paper, technology has moved beyond reproduction in many ways (women can choose not to have children, etc). Furthermore, where do infertile women fit into this schema? If there are women who choose not to have children and women who cannot have children, then this cannot be the definition of womanhood. The same can be said of men, if you substitute impotence for infertility. Do you define a woman as someone with a vagina? Where does this leave inter-sex individuals, who may have both a penis and vagina, neither a penis or vagina, or something in between? Do you define a woman as someone with an X chromosome? Again, there are genetic anomalies, in which individuals may have two X chromosomes, 3 Y chromosomes, etc. What about transgendered individuals? Are they men or women? There have been multiple studies that show that women who transition to men receive higher pay for the same work after their transition. These individuals still have an X chromosome, but the presence of a surgically-constructed penis and a presentation of themselves as 'male' changes the way society regards them.

All of this goes to say that, in my sincere opinion, the gender binary is false in more or less the same way that racial binaries are false. Do I believe that the gender binary will be changed any time soon? No, not really. Nonetheless, I do not believe that we should just accept that women are 'biologically different' and be done with it. There are a range of biological factors cited to illustrate the differences between men and women, but none of these factors is truly part of a binary, rather each exists on a continuum. For instance, you might want to say that women have more estrogen than testosterone. However, each individual person has a different level of estrogen and testosterone in their body. Some women have more testosterone than some men. These scientific categories represent a continuum which we, as human beings, find convenient to reduce into a binary. Unless you can pinpoint a specific definition of womanhood and manhood, then the idea of a gender binary is clearly a social invention (albeit a long-standing one). Science likes to create neat categories which are, in my opinion, almost always false.

My Response:
In recognition of the arguments which have been made since the 1970’s to refute the standard idea of Gender Realism; the belief that Gender is a real category, I have found it necessary to briefly review the extensive literature on the subject in order to decisively refute the Gender Anti-Realist position. This, admittedly short refutation, has been written in response not only to the argument which has above been presented, but also to the works of influential Third Wave feminists writers such as Judith Butler and Elizabeth Spelman. While the argument is reflective of Post-Structuralist Third Wave feminists, it should be noted from the beginning that this view is neither lacking in objections nor universally accepted. It is true that Iris Marion Young believes that Elizabeth Spelman has definatively shown that Gender Realism is untenable (Young 1997, 13), however Mari Mikkola argues that Gender Realism is indeed tenable (Mikkla 2006). Indeed, it has been admitted, this view is considered fairly radical even within the feminist movement. Among the many reasons why there exists hostility among feminists to the acceptance of, what is a natural extension of the Sex-Gender divide which feminists (Simone De Beauvoir 1949) and psychologists initially introduced (Robert Stoller 1968), is due to the fact that the deconstruction of Gender and Sex would eliminate the very existential purpose of the feminist movement.

Feminist writers, like De Beauvoir, originally created the Sex-Gender divide- which distinguished biological Sex from culturally constructed gender- in order to counter the position of biological determinists, which held that woman had a biological nature which was determined and destined by her female biology (Geddes and Thompson 1889). This argument had existed at least since the time of Aristotle, who first speculated that there must be an Essence of Woman which distinguishes her from Man. It gained increasing support with the growing enthusiasm for biological determinism which abounded in the late 19th and early 20th century. To counter this sort of biological determinism, which remained popular at the time, feminists like De Beauvoir argued that “gender” was culturally rather than biologically determined. This position is necessary for, and shared by all feminists, because it allows feminists to argue that Woman has the ability to, through social change, alter the existing conditions which create woman’s social subordination. However it should also be noted that the biological determinist position remains popular among some biologists and neuroscientists (Rogers 1999, Gorman 1992), forever threatening the very preconditions for a discussion of feminism. As de Beauvoir noted in 1949, the biological determinist position remains, and perhaps will forever remain inconclusive. The inability of biologists and neuroscientists to show that womanhood is biologically determined has allowed feminists and psychologists to argue that Gender is something culturally and psychologically, rather than biologically, constructed. Gender is commonly perceived and spoken of as if it naturally arose out of biological preconditions of a person’s Sex. Linda Nicholson calls this the ‘Coat Rack’ view of gender, in which our sexed bodies are the coat racks upon which gender is constructed (Nicholson 1994).

The argument between Gender Realists and Anti-Realists is no mere pedantic theoretical exercise, without ethical or political implications. Should the Gender Anti-Realists be shown to be correct in their assertion that Gender and Sex are not real categories, there will be no legitimate ground for speaking of males and females as real categories. Since the time of Aristotle, it has been argued that there are virtues (or moral imperatives) which men and women possess as a result of their being a man or a woman. For example, an argument may be made like this:

P1: If a person is a female (P) then a person must act feminine. (Q) P=>Q
P2: If a person must act feminine (Q) then a person must wear a dress. (R) Q=>R
TF: If a person is a female (P) then a person must wear a dress. (R) P=>R
P=>Q, Q=>R TF: P=>R

While this argument is logically valid, its premises may be shown to be unsound. If the gendered categories of woman and man could be shown to be meaningless, then the premises upon which this ethical argument is based would similarly be unsound. Additionally, many feminists worry that if third wave feminists could definitively deconstruct gender it would lead to the self-destruction of the feminist movement. Interestingly, there is, in the ancient Pythagoreans, a historical precedent for the self-destruction of intellectual movements once this movement comes to the realization that their presuppositions have led them to intolerable conclusions. Sally Haslanger expresses her concern, which is commonly held by second wave feminists, that without a meaningful political category of “women”, there would be no meaning to the feminist movement’s political struggle to oppose the injustices created by sexist and patriarchal institutions (Haslanger 2000, 36). Lind Alcoff argues that feminism is now facing an identity crisis, since the category of woman was feminism's starting point, without which there can be no feminist movement (Alcoff 2006, 148). Both of these feminists offer arguments in favor of Gender Realism.

Drawing on the works of postmodernists, feminists, and psychoanalysts like Michel Foucault,
Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, and Simone De Beauvoir, Judith Butler has made the Gender Anti-Realist argument, in both Gender Trouble(1990) and Undoing Gender(2004), that the commonly used categories of sex and gender are socially constructed through stylized and repetitive acts. In the tradition of post-structuralism and postmodernism, Butler argues that such categories as sex and gender are wholly unintelligible and lacking in an objective basis. Butler argues that (i) there are no essential properties of gender or sex and (ii) that gender is an illusion maintained by the prevalent power structures. Butler calls the ideals and practices which would have gender uniformly rendered “heterosexism”; the view that heterosexuality is natural and homosexuality is deviant (1999, 42). Butler maintains that these ideas of essential gendered properties, which are sexually dimorphisized between men and women, are created to serve a “heterosexist” social order. In order to counter to prevailing conception of gender as biologically determined through sexual dimorphism, Butler claims that gender is merely “performative”- that gender is “instituted through a stylized repetition of habitual acts” (Butler 1999, 179). Just as Simone de Beauvoir had claimed that “one is not born but rather becomes a woman”, Butler claims that “gender is not something one is, it is something one does.” Our gendered actions such as wearing gendered clothing or acting in a gendered manner only serve to create the “compelling illusion” that gender is an actual objective quality (1990, 271). Butler says that his classification scheme is nothing more than a “strong pragmatic construction” which is wholly determined by social factors while failing to accurately represent the true nature of human sexuality (Haslanger 1995, 100).

Butler applies the effects of her gender Anti-Realist argument to ethical and political philosophy by making her normativity argument which is comprised of two additional claims: The first, which is reflective of the general trends in third wave feminism, is that the unitary conception of gender fails to take into account the enormous diversity of women. Butler writes such homogeneous conceptions of gender fail to recognize “the multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of ‘women’ is constructed” (Butler 1999, 19-20). Butler’s second claim is that because these conceptions of womanhood are necessarily normative, they imply that there is some correct way to be a woman. Butler writes that the term ‘woman’ “operates as a policing force which generates and legitimizes certain practices, experiences, etc., and curtails and delegitimizes others”(Nicholson 1998, 293). This second claim is based on her argument that “identity categories [like that of women] are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary” (Butler 1991, 160). Butler makes the foucauldian argument that “all processes of drawing categorical distinctions involve evaluative and normative commitments; these in turn involve the exercise of power and reflect the conditions of those who are socially powerful.”(Witt, 1995). Butler makes these seemingly absurd claims with the intention of eliminating both the category of gender and the normative arguments which they entail. Butler writes “without heterosexisms that compels people to engage in certain normative gendering acts, there would not be any genders at all. And ultimately the aim should be to abolish norms that compel people to action these gendering ways” (Butler 1990, 278).

As has been correctly noted, Judith Butler's arguments in favor Gender Anti-Realism has remained controversial since its first publication. There have been, since the initial publication of her work, numerous counter arguments published in an attempt to refute Butler's claims. Iris Young, Natalie Stoljar, and Sally Haslanger, and Linda Alcoff are only a few of the feminists who have, in recognition that Butler's arguments could fragment the feminist movement, worked to refute Butler's Gender Anti-Realist arguments. However because the arguments of these women are admittedly diverse and often inconsistent, I will present my own refutation of Judith Butler, supplemented with references to their arguments, in favor of Gender Realism.

The first question which a skeptic of Gender Anti-Realism should immediately ask is: If sex and gender are unreal linguistic categories, how did they originate, and through what force are they continually perpetuated in public consciousness? It is generally assumed that we create linguistic categories and continually employ them because they capture some real or perceived phenomenon. For example, the distinction between 'cats' and 'kittens' is often made to distinguish adolescent from adult felines. While it may be argued that this distinction is wholly imagined, as there is no swift demarcation between a 'cat' and a 'kitten', it does seem to capture some real difference; namely that 'kitten' is not yet an adult, while a 'cat' is. Similar age delineations exist in the English language to refer to the childhood development of humans. We might say that the word ‘teen’ remains in frequent usage because it captures some real stage in the lives of human adolescents; namely when a person is physically mature but not yet entirely mentally developed. However, other words like 'tween', which refers to the stage of life when an adolescent is between the stage of child and teen, are significantly less popular and may fall out of popular usage. So it seems as though the reason for the origination and the force that continually perpetuates the common usage of language is a word's “use value”; which is how strongly a word corresponds to some real or perceived phenomenon.

With this definition is mind, we should remember that there are a plethora of linguistic assignments in common usage which describe unreal things. Not only do we have names for categories in astrology and theosophy, but we also commonly refer to unreal phenomena. For example, people often refer to the Sun as if it were rising and setting because the Sun appears to do so, while it is actually the case that the Earth revolves around the Sun. This problem in word usage is not simply the assignment of language to unreal things, but is a result of an epistemic discrepancy in which the appearance of the Sun rising and setting deceptively leads us to believe that the Sun is in fact revolving around the Earth. The authorities of science and education tell us, contrary to our perception that it is the Earth which rotates and revolves around the Sun. Gender Anti-Realists will presumably argue that the same epistemic deception exists with regard to the sexes of male and female. The argument will be presented that while it may appear that the linguistic categories of sex and gender correspond to discernable biological categories, these categories are in fact unreal both because they are too amorphous and tenuous to correspond with any objective standard, and because they are entirely culturally constructed.
This argument relies on the post-modernist’s attempt to deconstruct these categories of knowledge and language by demonstrating that they are both arbitrary and culturally variable.

Because philosophical knowledge, both speculative and natural, has historically been gleaned by delineating and differentiating between unlike things, it behooves us to examine the way in which knowledge of these categories are obtained. All knowledge begins to a certain extent generalized, and gradually grows more acute and distinct as we sharpen our distinctions and categorizations. At the beginning of western philosophy, Aristotle was renowned for extending the breadth of human knowledge by creating a variety of new taxonomies in government, metaphysics, botany and ethics. These categories, whether they be the distinction between the four types of causes or the delineation between the different types of constitutions have continued to serve as the necessary hallmarks of learning and education. What was before Aristotle known simply as government in a general form, has through the creation of categories become oligarchy and democracy, monarchy and republic. Without these linguistic distinctions, there can be neither the means of thinking nor of communicating the acute differences inherent between similar but unlike things. For this reason, categorization in both language and thought has forever been the basis of both public and private knowledge.

The profound question which post-modernists and the deconstructionists pose is whether these categories and distinctions which we have derived actually correspond to an objective and intelligible cosmos, or are they merely fanciful imaginings of an mistakenly triumphant yet terribly naïve civilization. Have we, with the heirlooms of a thousand of years of learning, now achieved a mastery of science and philosophy, or will we remain forever merely children playing with sailboats on the sea shore? This question, of whether the cosmos is comprehensible, was posed at the beginning of philosophy: Lao Tzu challenged Confucius in the East just as the sophists challenged Socrates in the West to demonstrate whether true knowledge could ever be possible. The answer must be, and has always been irrefutably yes! Since the Pythagoreans, it had been known that the iron laws of geometry and mathematics were more than mere fanciful triflings. Aristotle applied the geometrical axioms of the Pythagoreans to argumentation to produce the law of non-contradiction (A & not A), the law of identity (A = A), and the principle of sufficient reason (if A then B), three universal laws of thought which all rational beings must obey. Further, Immanuel Kant demonstrated in the Critique of Pure Reason that there exist categories of thought which all rational beings, independent of time and place, must recognize, such as unity, plurality, totality, reality, negation, and causality. While these irrefutable principles of thought suffice to show that the project of rationalization, which the earliest philosophers embarked on, has succeeding in showing how human thought may truly correspond to an intelligible cosmos, we have yet to show that the categories of male and female are actual and not merely fanciful.

With the deconstructionists answered, we now return to the question which I posed earlier: If these categories are unreal and merely imaginary, how is it that they have arisen and are continually perpetuated? At the beginning of history, how were these distinctions between male and female introduced? The first family must have recognized the distinction between male and female for the very same reason which we universally do today. In a pre-genetic era when chromosomes and hormones were as yet unknown, the first men discerned the distinctions between men and women not only through the immediately apparent differences in body mass, musculature, primary sexual features (genitalia), and secondary sexual features (wide/narrow pelves, small/large shoulders etc.) but more importantly through the force of sexual attraction which has forever bound the sexes in mutual fidelity. Men and women recognize the opposite sex not only in the secondary sexual features which nature has supplied, and the temptations of concupiscence, but also in the differences in character which the eternal force of sexuality requires that we adopt (for more on this subject, see my previous note on the “First Cause of Woman’s Social Subordination”). All of these factors serve to immediately differentiate man from woman in ways in which even the tiniest infant can discern.

So pervasive and widely understood are these signals of sexual differentiation that while
transgendered individuals are commonly known to exist, they rarely appear in either conversation or consideration. Indeed the rarity of transgendered persons in speech is a reflection of their rarity in actuality. So efficient and thorough is nature in the process of sexual dimorphism that less hardly more than 1% of human births are unrecognizable as either male or female, and less than 5% of humans will after the onset of puberty develop an attraction towards their own sex. While those persons not entirely comprised of one sex or the other have been known since the beginnings of history, they have always, like the Greek hermaphrodite, been assumed to be merely an intermediate form between the binary poles of the male and female element.

Whether this elementary and binary conception of male and female is actual or merely fanciful is not relevant to the present dilemma. What we are instead tasked with determining is whether the nominal and linguistic categories of male and female actually correspond some objective commonality among the male and female sexes. Of especial importance to the feminist movement is defining what is this common quality which defines woman, who is the object of the feminist socio-political struggle. As I mentioned above, feminists are understandably concerned about the deconstruction of gendered categories, and have responded to Judith Butler with a variety of counter-arguments. Iris Young has argued that women form an intelligible category insofar as all women experience both similar social pressures to remain passive and are similarly objectified as sexual objects by men. Young writes that women are those persons “whose members are unified passively by the objects their actions are oriented around and/or by the objectified results and material effects of the actions of the other” (Young 1997, p.23). Young accepts that women have no universally shared commonality, instead relying on the shared experiences of women to define them as a social collective. Young argues that woman’s category is unified by “certain practio-inert realities or the ways in which women’s lives and their actions are oriented around certain objects and everyday realities” (Young 1997, p.23-4). Young argues that there are two groups into which these practico-inert objects and realities fall into: first, the phenomena associated with the biological processes which occur within women’s bodies (pregnancy, childbirth), and second, the gender coded objects and practices which pervade our everyday experience (space, language, cosmetics etc.). Because women’s lives and actions are organized around both their bodies and the gender restrictive objects of their experience, these twin pillars of sexuality will forever serve to define and categorize the female sex.

Transhuman Traditionalism

The Historicism and Providence of Middle-Earth

An Idealist Interpretation of Revolutionary Girl Utena, 2nd Draft

Introduction to the Setting of the Ohtori Academy

Mike and the Rose Bride from Episode 5, "the Sunlit Garden"(4:45)http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_n8HvsIadv0Utena and Juri duel in Episode 7, "Unfulfilled Juri"(3:27)http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbX59Xqmw6E

Life and Desire in Self-Consciousness of the Phenomenology of Spirit

An Essay on the Theoretical Origin and Social Function of Modesty

History and Historicism of Middle-Earth, Second Draft

Lord of the Rings essay: the History and Historicism of Middle Earth

Contra Lockean Toleration

Judith Butler Summary and Commentary

Ode to Immanuel Kant

Ode to Immanuel Kant

a Short Defense of Monarchism

Justin:

Ryan:

Discussion of Homosexual Marriage in Political Liberalism

Jen

Ryan

Jeremy

Ryan

Jen

Ryan

Immanuel Kant's theory of the transcendental Freedom of the Will

Interview with Pablo on Immanuel Kant's theory of the transcendental Freedom of the Will

Definition of Terms:

Kant's theory of Free Will Interview with Pablo Vasquez.

A Short Refutation of the Principle of Hereditary Succession

A Short Refutation of the Principle of Hereditary Succession

Justified Political Authority

Theory of Justice

Legitimist objections to John Rawls's OP:

Legitimist Arguments for the Utility of Hereditary Succession:

Conclusion:

The Influence of Neo-Platonic Conceptions of God in Early Christian Theology

Miniature Ladies: Barbie’s Commodity Chain

Miniature Ladies: Barbie’s Commodity Chain

A short logical refutation of the the theology of Westboro Baptist Church

Videos

Futher Analysis

1st Argument

2nd Argument

3rd Argument

4th Argument

5th Argument

Refutation

Santa Claus: Patron God of American Consumerism

The Trials and Tears of the Great War

a Short Refutation of Gender Anti-Realism

Mike and the Rose Bride from Episode 5, "the Sunlit Garden"(4:45)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_n8HvsIadv0

Utena and Juri duel in Episode 7, "Unfulfilled Juri"(3:27)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbX59Xqmw6E